Rear Admiral Sean Bailey, Captain Brian Evans, and Commander Matthew Timmerman
After more than 24 hours of careful movement to evade detection, the strike group remains more than 18 hours from its designated position to launch strikes. The screen is distributed to the maximum extent feasible, optimizing sensor employment while attempting to complicate adversary targeting. The tactical situation (TACSIT) assessment from the information warfare commander (IWC) holds all units within ordered mission go/no-go criteria. Determining that adversary positioning and sensor capabilities provide a period of simplified maneuver and decreased detection risk, the strike group commander and information warfare commander retire for a couple hours of sleep before the operation’s next phase.
As the strike group continues its clandestine transit, conditions appear to confirm the decreased risk of detection. But then a chat report comes in: The protected satellite communication (SATCOM) voice circuits for the air and missile defense commander and the sea combat commander are down. Immediately, one of the forward screening destroyers reports SLQ-32 detection of an adversary airborne surface search radar. Seconds later, supplementary plot (SUPPLOT) reports indications and warnings of a missile launch. Based on adversary capabilities, the force may have only minutes to respond.
In the Tactical Flag Command Center, the battle watch captain and force tactical action officer assess the situation: Was the screening destroyer the only unit located, or is the entire force now at risk of being targeted? What are the detection ranges of adversary airborne radar versus the destroyer’s SLQ-32? Is the SATCOM disruption a casualty, interference, or jamming? Should we break emission control to defend the force? If so, what sensors should we energize? What’s the updated TACSIT assessment? Has anyone called the IWC?
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