Aaron Glasserman and Ramin Mansoori
Afghanistan is one of China’s thorniest security and foreign policy problems today. Rich in natural resources and strategically situated at the nexus of South, Central, and West Asia, the country is a natural target for Chinese investment and influence. For decades, however, Afghanistan’s domestic instability and proximity to China’s own restive Xinjiang region have inhibited economic cooperation and led Beijing to treat its neighbor primarily as a source of security threats, including terrorism as well as drugs and migration. In the 2010s, China voiced support for stronger economic and security ties with the U.S.-backed government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, but it remained wary of the perceived risks of greater involvement and therefore did not deliver on many of its commitments. The complete withdrawal of U.S. forces and return of Taliban control in August 2021 have exacerbated China’s long-standing challenges in Afghanistan and produced some new ones as well.
As the Islamist government in Kabul contends with crippling sanctions, international isolation, and weak state capacity, Beijing’s priority is to mitigate the threat posed by Uighur militants and other armed groups based in Afghanistan against China and Chinese assets in the region. Its approach to Afghanistan under the Taliban involves three elements. The first is eschewing sticks: China is unwilling to take on the security role previously performed by the United States and indeed juxtaposes its conduct in the international arena against U.S. interventionism. The second element is dangling carrots: China is offering the Taliban valuable economic support but making it contingent on cooperation in neutralizing the threat from Uighur fighters and other China-designated terrorist groups. The third is building fences: China is tightening security along its border with Afghanistan and working with other countries in the region to contain any “spillover.”
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