Matthew Revels
Despite a robust architecture of strategic documents, planning processes, and professional staff, the US Army and its strategic leadership have struggled to consistently develop and implement a strategy aligned with the threats it faces. Many explanations exist for this persistent shortcoming, but one critical factor is often overlooked: the Army attempts to develop strategists far too late in an officer’s career. Most officers do not receive formal instruction in strategy development until attending a senior service college—long after they have internalized tactical habits, service-specific norms, and cognitive biases that constrain strategic thought. By delaying strategic education until the later stages of an officer’s career, the Army forfeits the opportunity to cultivate adaptive thinkers capable of pursuing innovative, asymmetric solutions to its most complex challenges.
Over the past decade, scholars and practitioners have written extensively about the value of strategic education and wargaming within the US military. So why is it pertinent to raise this issue once again? The answer lies in America’s increasingly precarious strategic position. As the international order progressively features competition among at least two great powers, a growing cohort of middle powers exerts greater regional influence, complicating the military balance of power. In this changing system, the United States’ adversaries appear to be increasingly capable of challenging the American military’s regional dominance. In addition to their individual capabilities, the burgeoning “axis of autocracy” threatens coordinated action to overwhelm the dispersed capabilities of the United States and its allies. With this backdrop in mind, the Army needs to develop senior leaders with genuine strategic expertise, which can only be developed through continuous education and experience.
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