Duncan Weldon
In September 1938, at the time of the Sudetenland crisis and the Munich Agreement, Britain had undergone a war scare. That autumn, the last-minute preparations for war had thrown light on a wide range of military shortcomings. Of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) 26 fighter squadrons available for home defence, only six had been equipped with the most modern fighters. A shortage of parts meant that only around half of the RAF’s bombers were ready to fly. The Royal Navy lacked enough smaller escort vessels and minesweepers to protect convoys and keep the sea-lanes clear. The British Army was revealed to have only around one third of the number of searchlights and anti-air guns considered necessary to protect London.
Over the course of 1939, however, confidence had grown. While not all of the previous faults had been rectified, a great many had. By the time of the declaration of war on Germany in September 1939, the RAF had 39 operational fighter squadrons, 26 of those equipped with the most modern aircraft – the Spitfires and Hurricanes that would prove their worth the following summer, during the Battle of Britain. The radar system of early warning stations along the coast was up and running, giving air defence a further crucial boost. The Army, which in September 1938 had only hoped to be able to send two divisions – around 40,000 men – to France was able to have more than 150,000 soldiers and 20,000 vehicles across the Channel by the beginning of October 1939.
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