Indian Strategic Studies: 03/10/26

10 March 2026

A Prolonged Gulf Crisis: Implications For India’s Economic Security

Amitendu Palit

The political uncertainty in the Gulf has generated new economic challenges for India. Global oil prices are rising fast following the attacks by the United States (US) and Israel on Iran, and retaliatory strikes by Iran on US energy assets in the Middle East. The developments occur at a time when global energy supplies outstrip demand. Nevertheless, oil prices are rising from deep ruptures in energy supply chains.

The foremost underlying cause behind the rupture is lack of security for energy traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The narrow waterway between Iran and Oman is the main conduit for the export of oil and gas from the Gulf to the rest of the world. Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has ground to a halt with tankers fearing attack. Qatar has stopped supplying liquified natural gas (LNG) through the Strait of Hormuz. For India, the challenge of tackling rising crude oil prices is amplified by lack of LNG imports from Qatar that has implications for a substantial number of vehicles running on compressed natural gas.

Can India Exercise Strategic Autonomy When The US And Israel Give No Room For It?

P. K. Balachandran

Within the space of a year, India has had to relinquish its bid to exercise strategic autonomy based on its own power and influence and become a junior partner in a US-led alliance. This is a far cry from the era of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, when India was nonaligned and yet had a significant moral/political influence in the world. It condemned unlawful actions by the big powers, especially the Western powers, and led peace efforts in various theatres of conflict.

It was able to secure the cooperation of the Soviets as well as the US and the West for its economic development. India’s non-alignment was touted as a path to peace. This is in sharp contrast to the way that India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has been touting its policy of “strategic autonomy”. It smacks of the arrogance of a parvenu, which has triggered the animosity of the established powers and apprehensions among small powers, especially the neighbours.

Why the Karachi Siege Shatters the Pakistan-Iran Bargain

Albert Wolf|

Karachi – The durability of a diplomatic “buffer state” is rarely tested by its successes, but by its ability to absorb shocks that its domestic population finds intolerable. For the Pakistani civilian and military establishments, that ability vanished on Sunday afternoon on Karachi’s Mai Kolachi Road. With at least 22 reported fatalities following a breach of the U.S. Consulate, the crisis is being framed by international observers as a predictable spasm of religious fury over the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader. This assessment is dangerously shallow.

To the casual observer, the 560-mile frontier dividing the Balochi nation is a site of constant friction. But realists know that Islamabad and Tehran have long maintained a sophisticated “live and let live” arrangement. It is a pact born of mutual strategic necessity that does not bear any of the formal obligations of an alliance. Both nations are heavily invested in sensitive nuclear and ballistic programs; both recognize that a “hot” western border would invite the kind of international intervention and scrutiny that threatens their respective survival.

Why Are the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan in an ‘Open War’?

Clara Fong

On February 26, Afghanistan’s Taliban government launched an attack on Pakistan’s military bases near their disputed shared border. The regime claims this was in retaliation for Pakistan’s strikes on Afghan military bases several days before. Within hours, Pakistan responded by bombing several Afghan border provinces and the capital, Kabul—the first time Pakistan has conducted an attack on Afghanistan’s urban areas. Pakistan’s defense minister later described the situation as one of “open war” with Afghanistan. The cross-border attacks mark the latest and most significant escalation between the two countries since they agreed to a fragile ceasefire in October 2025 after a previous border conflict that lasted over a week.

As of March 2, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has recorded at least 146 civilian casualties in Afghanistan, including 42 dead and 104 injured, though these figures are preliminary. The Afghan Taliban has said that it is willing to negotiate with Pakistan, but there are growing concerns that the conflict could continue to escalate, further destabilizing a region already grappling with the rippling fallout from joint U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran.

Will China Overplay Its Hand?

Thomas J. Christensen

At the end of this month, U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit China for a major summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the first of what may be as many as four meetings between the two leaders in 2026. The planned three-day summit comes on the heels of discussions the leaders held in October 2025 on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Busan, South Korea, where they reached a fragile truce to calm the rising economic tensions in the U.S.-Chinese relationship. Trump and Xi agreed to forgo, for one year, many of the draconian measures their countries had imposed or threatened to impose on each other in the preceding months. The United States backed down from the threat of sky-high tariffs and suspended a large expansion of the roster of Chinese companies on the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List, which limits their access to American business on national security or foreign policy grounds. China, for its part, reversed its refusal to purchase U.S. agricultural products and dropped sweeping restrictions on exports of critical minerals on which the United States and many other industrial economies depend. The agreement left the two countries fairly close to where they started before the economic conflict began earlier in 2025.

Would Regime Change Solve the Iran Challenge? | State of Play

Will Todman: Shortly after launching Operation Epic Fury, President Trump indicated an interest in regime change in Iran. He told Iranians that it would soon be time to “take over your government.” But U.S. efforts to bring about regime change in the Middle East have not gone well in recent decades. Are we really heading towards regime change in Iran? What are the risks? And what lessons can we draw from past regime change efforts in the Middle East and beyond? I’m your host, Will Todman. Welcome to this special live episode of State of Play.

All right. So just earlier today Secretary Hegseth said that the U.S. will soon have air supremacy over Iran by the end of the week. We’ve seen reports about the CIA supporting Kurds, Iranian Kurds and Kurds that might cross over the border into the northwest of the country. And President Trump has said some mixed things about whether or not regime change is really his aim or not his aim. So today the four of us are going to be discussing kind of what lessons there are from regime change experiences and efforts around the Middle East, and also more broadly.

Why Decapitation Will Not Solve the United States’ Iran Problem

Jon B. Alterman

When Iranians took to the streets to celebrate the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, it was tempting to think that the hardest part of the current confrontation with Iran was over. Iran has been a wicked policy problem for the United States, its Middle Eastern allies, and the international community for decades, and Khamenei was more than merely the face of the problem. He was a bitter voice of opposition, a hard-liner who persistently undermined moderates, and in control of all of the most threatening elements of Iranian power: its nuclear program, its paramilitary forces, its proxy network, and the intelligence services that both terrorized Iranians and carried out acts of terror around the world.

The United States and Israel were able to use exquisite intelligence and powerful munitions not only to kill Khamenei at the outset of the war, but also to kill many of his most senior advisers. Decapitating the regime seems to offer a tidy way to “solve” a problem that has resisted solution for almost half a century, and it could unfold along several paths. The new leaders who arise could adopt a wholly different posture toward the world. They could be incompetent in implementing Khamenei’s strategy. Or they could decide that self-preservation requires them to be more pliable in the face of U.S. demands. It is not unreasonable to think that any of Khamenei’s successors would be an improvement.

Operation Epic Fury - Déjà Vu

Martin A. Perryman

In February, the Republican President, after conducting military operations against the government of a foreign power, appealed directly to the armed forces and to the citizens to rise and overthrow the regime. While this sounds ripped from Saturday’s headlines, it occurred in 1991, the President was George H. W. Bush, the foreign power was Iraq, and the encouragement was directed to the Kurdish population of the northern provinces. The Kurds answered the call, believing the regime was ripe for change. In March and April, the uncoordinated uprising, consisting of several disgruntled factions, enjoyed initial success but failed to consolidate and organize. The regime, still formidable, rebounded and crushed the rebellion, leaving tens of thousands dead and nearly two million displaced. The U.S., after encouraging the uprising, stood quietly by.

While it is likely that the majority of U.S. citizens have long forgotten this incident, it is equally likely that the majority of the people in the Middle East have not.

Operation Epic Fury: Iran’s Declining Capabilities and Emerging Strategy

Can Kasapoğlu

Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, the joint US-Israeli campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran, has begun to reduce Iran’s long-range strike tempo. Tehran’s missile and drone salvos have declined by roughly 70 to 85 percent since the first day of strikes, largely thanks to an aggressive hunt for Iranian missile launchers and drone launch positions. Because the US controls the skies over Iran and has unprecedented information superiority, it can now strike Iranian Shahed loitering munitions on the ground.

The Mirage of a New Middle East

Dalia Dassa Kaye

Eager to show that he can do what no American leader has done before, President Donald Trump has chosen conflict over diplomacy and gone to war with Iran. The Islamic Republic, knowing that this fight is existential, retaliated quickly with deadly missile and drone attacks on Israel, U.S. bases in the Middle East, and targets in Gulf states and beyond. This is now a regional war with global impact, disrupting oil and financial markets, supply chains, maritime commerce, and air travel. Threats to Americans and the death toll in Iran mount by the hour. These growing risks were predictable long before the war became reality, which might help explain why no previous president took the United States down this perilous path.

How this war will end remains uncertain. But when it does, the United States will have to face what comes next. To the extent that the Trump administration has considered plans for “the day after,” it seems to have made a series of overly optimistic assumptions about how the war might reshape Iran and the Middle East. For one, the Trump administration has insisted—including in Trump’s social media post on February 28 announcing the war—that a relentless degradation of Iranian leadership and military capabilities would weaken the regime enough that the Iranian people could rise up and “take over the government.” Even if that doesn’t happen, the administration’s logic goes, Iran would be defanged and so preoccupied with internal problems that it could no longer pose a threat to the region or American interests. Taking the current Iranian regime out of the equation, Washington assumes, would remove one of the largest sources of regional instability and usher in a new Middle East more to the United States’ liking.

Iran, Israel, and the U.S. Are Racing the Clock

Amos C. Fox and Franz-Stefan Gady

At first glance, the Israeli-U.S. attack on Iran is an uneven fight. The United States and Israel have overwhelming air superiority, precision-guided munitions, integrated intelligence, and multilayered missile defense systems against Iranian retaliatory strikes. While it’s hard to see a political theory of victory over Iran in this campaign, the operational theory of success is based on precision strikes quickly taking out Iranian air defenses, command and control, and missile launchers.

The attackers do not want to find themselves trapped in an attritional slugfest, where they burn through hundreds of millions of dollars per day, exhaust their stocks of the most advanced interceptors, and face the prospect of a prolonged war—not by losing on the battlefield but by simply exhausting their anti-air weapons in the coming days and weeks.

The Dangerous Mismatch Between American Missiles and Iranian Drones

Brynn Tannehill

The American air campaign against Iran would seem to be a tactical and an operational success. The United States has struck 1,700 targets in Iran and apparently suffered only six fatalities. The Iranian leadership has been disrupted and dozens of senior figures killed, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

But a price must be paid for these short-term successes, and it makes the bigger, strategic picture far less clear. The United States, Israel, and their Gulf allies are using up scarce and costly munitions at an astounding rate. These losses can’t be replenished nearly quickly enough to avoid possible global repercussions, as far more formidable adversaries than Iran—Russia and China—assess the war-fighting capacity that America holds in reserve. If they conclude that the West has burned through too many interceptors to defend itself, Russia might pursue aggressive action against NATO, or China could move against Taiwan.

Opinion – The Iran War Viewed Through Broader Regional Security Changes

Lilia A. Arakelyan

Overthrowing the status quo has long been considered the true nature of imperialism. Hans J. Morgenthau, in his monumental work Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, argued that “when a nation is engaged in war with another nation, it is very likely that the nation that anticipates victory will pursue a policy that seeks a permanent change of the power relations with the defeated enemy.” This is precisely what Israel and the United States are trying to achieve with the ongoing war against Iran, ominously labelled Operation Epic Fury, which began on February 28. 2026.

Tel Aviv and Washington are both anticipating a victorious war that will not only dismantle the 47-year-old clerical regime in Iran but also shift power relations with Tehran in their favor. Morgenthau, describing such conflicts as imperialistic, suggested that major powers seek to replace the prewar status quo with a postwar order in which “the victor becomes the permanent master of the vanquished.”

Will Al-Qaeda Actually Fight for Iran?

Pasar Sherko Abdullah

Common enmity toward the United States and Israel has turned Iran and Al-Qaeda into unlikely allies. Despite deep ideological rifts, Al-Qaeda’s central leadership has quietly used Iranian soil as a sanctuary and operational hub for years. Now, the group has issued an official statement declaring jihad against U.S. and Israeli military preparations and the buildup of forces in the Middle East. Recently, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran warned that in the event of a military strike against Iran, the conflict would not remain confined within its borders but would escalate into a regional war.

While this warning is generally interpreted as a signal to the Shia militias comprising the Islamic Resistance Front, Al-Qaeda’s latest statement suggests another possibility: that the time has come for Iran to cash in on its long-term investment in Al-Qaeda, bringing the group into the broader regional conflict.

Why Didn’t Iran’s Air Force Put Up a Fight Against the United States?

Harrison Kass

The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) has sometimes been described as a “flying museum,” as much of it dates back to the pre-1979 era. Following the 1979 revolution, Western nations blocked Iran’s attempts to buy new aircraft, leaving the country reliant on 50-year-old American jets and a small number of Soviet aircraft. As a result, the IRIAF has struggled to match modern fifth-generation fighters such as the F-35 and the F-22.

The Iranian Air Force’s Origins

Prior to the 1979 revolution, Iran operated one of the most advanced air forces in the Middle East. The Shah’s government purchased vast quantities of US aircraft—including the F-14 Tomcat, F-4 Phantom II, and F-5 Tiger II. Notably, Iran was the only foreign country ever allowed to operate the F-14—and is today the last remaining operator of the venerable jet.

Cumulative confirmed missile, UAV and fighter-jet interceptions by the GCC states

Albert Vidal Ribe

Over half the confirmed interceptions by the GCC states occurred in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with a quarter taking place in Kuwait. Qatar and Bahrain stand at slightly below 10% of total GCC interceptions each, while Saudi Arabia and Oman have confirmed an almost insignificant number comparatively (roughly 2% and 0.1% respectively). Three-quarters of all interceptions recorded so far took place during the first three days (0–72 hours), whereas the rest took place between days four and six (73–144 hours).

Interception rates vary across GCC states. The UAE has reported an interception rate of around 93% for ballistic missiles and UAVs. Moreover, it intercepted all eight cruise missiles launched at its territory. Qatar’s overall interception rate stands at 89%, with a high missile interception rate (97%) but a lower UAV-interception rate (72%). Qatar has also intercepted two Iranian Su-24 fighter ground-attack aircraft. Bahrain’s performance is slightly below that of the UAE and Qatar, with an overall interception rate of 76%, which is higher for missiles (86%) than UAVs (71%). Interception rates for Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia are unavailable due to a lack of data.

The Making of a Forever War in Iran

Jon Hoffman

President Donald Trump has embraced the military hubris in the Middle East that he once condemned.

President Donald Trump has plunged the United States into an open-ended war with Iran, lacking clearly defined and achievable objectives, a discernible endgame, or a viable exit plan. This is a war of choice—Iran posed no imminent threat to the United States, and the White House is now scrambling to devise a strategy for a war already underway and proving more difficult than anticipated.

The war will likely escalate as Iran digs in and hawkish voices push Trump toward maximalist—and largely unachievable—aims. By setting this crisis in motion, the Trump administration is repeating the same failures that have long defined US Middle East policy. Absent a course correction, the United States is on the path to another forever war.

As Israel Pushes for Annexation, Is There Hope for Palestinians?

James Ron

Over the last two weeks, the Israeli website +972 reported, “Six ‘game-changing’ recent cabinet decisions may push the occupation past a tipping point toward permanent Israeli rule.” Many think this will spell political disaster by ending all hope for a negotiated two-state solution. I suggest a different, and perhaps overly optimistic perspective. Maybe – just maybe – these new moves could spark a long-term process ending in a more democratic, egalitarian, and peaceful Israeli-Palestinian space.

The current government of Benjamin Netanyahu has been heavily influenced by its ultra-nationalist cabinet members, including Finance Minister Bezalal Smotrich, who leads the political party “Religious Zionism,” and whose responsibilities include administering the Palestinian West Bank (known to his supporters as “Judea and Samaria”). Another key right-wing government figure is National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, head of the Israeli party, “Jewish Power,” who was handed control over the powerful national police.

Selling Iran King Without a Kingdom: How Coordinated Networks Manufacture the Appearance of Mass Support

Kazem Kazeriouian, Franck Radjai and Ela Zabihi

On the afternoon of February 14, 2026, anyone browsing MSN, Microsoft’s news aggregator would have encountered a concentration of content about a single political figure: Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last shah. The articles came from credible outlets such as Reuters, The Hill, Real Clear Politics, and AFP. Their headlines formed a coherent narrative arc that Pahlavi was urging humanitarian US intervention in Iran. They claimed that a quarter of a million people had rallied for him in Munich and that world leaders were listening. Interspersed among these were nostalgic photo galleries of Tehran before 1980, videos about Iran before the Islamic Revolution from Manoto TV, and military explainers mapping US bases in the Middle East or recounting how America obliterated half of Iran’s navy in eight hours.

Taken together, delivered simultaneously on a single user’s feed, they created a three-act persuasion architecture designed to prime, justify, and sell a specific political product. This is not a story about media bias. It is a story about how the infrastructure of the modern information ecosystem can be weaponised to manufacture the appearance of consensus, and how in the case of Iran that manufactured consensus may serve the very regime it claims to oppose.

War Never Turns Out Like You Plan

In the early hours of the campaign’s opening night, planners in Washington and Jerusalem were watching the same screens. Satellite feeds confirmed what intelligence analysts had assessed for months: key elements of Iran’s military command structure were exposed. Target packages that had been refined through weeks of planning were now moving toward execution. Within minutes, the first wave of strikes moved toward their targets.

Operationally, the plan was elegant. The targets were well chosen. The timing precise.

But the most important question confronting the people in those rooms was not whether the strikes would succeed. It was what would happen if they did.

The One Variable That Could Decide the War

Missy Ryan and Nancy A. Youssef

When General Mark Milley outlined the U.S. Army’s future priorities in 2017, he said that new long-range missiles, improved tanks, and better-armed, better-trained infantrymen were vital to America’s domination of the next major conflict. But those plans, the then–Army chief and soon-to-be chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, came with an important caveat: The upgrades would be useless unless the military came up with a more effective air defense. “None of the above,” he noted, “will matter if you are dead.”

The Trump administration is finding out just how much air defense matters in its war with Iran. The open-ended campaign poses the biggest-ever test of America’s 21st-century sky shield, a network of weapons to protect against incoming missiles, drones, and ordnance.

Top Pentagon official assures Congress that Iran is ‘not another Iraq War’

George Headley

WASHINGTON – At a contentious House Armed Services Committee hearing with the Pentagon’s No. 3 official, lawmakers in both parties vented frustration Thursday over being kept out of the loop on major military operations. Many aired concerns that the 5-day-old conflict with Iran will deplete stockpiles, lead to a prolonged war and distract attention from other U.S. adversaries.

Elbridge Colby, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, assured lawmakers the conflict will end far more quickly than the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, which lasted nearly nine years. And he asserted there’s a “very plentiful supply” of munitions. Colby – avoiding the term “war” in referring to the hostilities with Iran – has long argued for limiting U.S. commitments in the Middle East to focus resources on deterring China.

Iran and the Taliban: An Axis of Convenience the United States Cannot Ignore

Wahab Azizi, Christopher P. Costa

At a time when Washington is deemphasizing the Middle East—while remaining committed to Israel’s security—it is crucial to pay closer attention to Iran’s evolving relationship with the Taliban. Iranian leadership remains committed to the destruction of Israel, and the Taliban are hostile toward Israel as well. Beyond ideology however, the deeper concern for U.S. policymakers is how Tehran and Kabul are aligning pragmatically to undermine American influence in South and Central Asia.

For nearly a quarter-century after the September 11 attacks, U.S. policy rested on a useful assumption: that Iran and the Taliban were irreconcilable enemies whose ideological and sectarian differences would prevent meaningful cooperation. That assumption was convenient for a time—but it is no longer valid.

How Israel’s ‘Buffer Zone’ Plan Could Redraw The Map Of Southern Lebanon

Najia Houssari

Lebanon faces what officials described as “one of the most dangerous moments in recent memory” after Hezbollah launched attacks on Israeli forces from areas both south and north of the Litani River, triggering a renewed Israeli air and ground campaign. Announcing its ground incursion into southern Lebanon, Israel said it aims to establish what it called a permanent “security zone” along the border.

The exact depth of the proposed zone remains unclear, but its humanitarian cost is already emerging. More than 80 towns and villages have been emptied following successive evacuation orders, forcing tens of thousands of residents to flee north of the Litani River. Orders to vacate have also reached Beirut’s southern suburbs, where residents have been told to leave their homes and not expect to return until Israel decides the time is right.

Transcript: Iran war risks turning into a battle of endurance

Gideon Rachman

This is an audio transcript of The Rachman Review podcast episode: ‘Iran war risks turning into a battle of endurance’ Gideon Rachman Hello and welcome to The Rachman Review. I’m Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator of the Financial Times. This week we’re looking at the war on Iran, launched by the United States and Israel. My guest is Emile Hokayem, director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies here in London. The latest war began with a strike on Tehran that killed much of Iran’s senior leadership. But what happens next?

The US–Israel campaign in Iran – further assessments

Michael Carpenter

The implications of the war against Iran for transatlantic relations will become clearer as the United States–Israel campaign progresses. The European response to the US–Israel strikes on Iran has so far been cautious. Most European governments have distanced themselves from the operation, calling for restraint and a return to diplomacy. European leaders have mostly stressed the critical importance of resolving the nuclear issue and have made clear their preference for a return to negotiations. Many have also explicitly signalled to domestic audiences that this is not their conflict. A small number of European governments have welcomed Iranian Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei’s removal, though Canada’s prime minister, Mark Carney, is the only transatlantic leader to have publicly supported a governance transition in Tehran.

For many Europeans the Iran war is further evidence of the fundamental unpredictability of the administration of US President Donald Trump (even if war seemed increasingly likely in recent weeks). Trump had pledged during his 2024 presidential campaign to avoid Middle Eastern wars, and both he and Vice President JD Vance have sharply criticised previous US leaders for the mere possibility of contemplating a conflict with Iran. The administration’s National Security Strategy also explicitly de-prioritised the Middle East in favour of renewed attention to the Western Hemisphere. Yet despite being released only a few months ago, it too is proving a poor guide to the administration’s next moves. Europeans are therefore concluding they must look beyond Washington's rhetoric and focus on actions.

Epic Fury: The Campaign Against Iran’s Missile & Nuclear Infrastructure

Ms. Bingen: The president then outlined several objectives for the campaign that include destroying Iran’s missile and nuclear infrastructure, naval assets, and proxy forces. So six days in, let’s take stock of where the campaign is at and specifically examine the strategic forces-related dimensions of it. What has defined the campaign thus far? What are the prospects for eliminating Iran’s missile and nuclear threats? What does a prolonged campaign mean for U.S. munitions, inventories, missile defense capacity, and force readiness? And what are the broader regional and global implications of the conflict?

I’m Kari Bingen, director of the Aerospace Security Project. I’m joined by Heather Williams, director of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues, and Tom Karako, director of the CSIS Missile Defense Project, to answer these questions. Welcome back to the HTK Series, devoted to talking about strategic forces issues of the day. HTK stands for Heather, Tom, and Kari, but for the defense wonks out there it also stands for hit to kill. We will take audience questions, so please submit those online via the event page.

The US Has Enough Missiles for This War But Not the Next One

Thomas Black

The decline of missile stockpiles, which spurred the Department of Defense’s arm-twisting in January for Lockheed Martin Corp. and RTX Corp. to boost production, is worsening by the day.

Modern warfare is all about missiles, interceptors, stealth aircraft and drones. Thanks to companies like Lockheed, RTX, Northrop Grumman Corp. and other defense companies, the US military has at its disposal the most sophisticated and capable of these offensive and defensive weapons. The downside is that they are expensive to operate and complex to manufacture.

What AI Models for War Actually Look Like

Will Knight

Anthropic might have misgivings about giving the US military unfettered access to its AI models, but some startups are building advanced AI specifically for military applications. Smack Technologies, which announced a $32 million funding round this week, is developing models that it says will soon surpass Claude’s capabilities when it comes to planning and executing military operations. And, unlike Anthropic, the startup appears less concerned with banning specific types of military use.

“When you serve in the military, you take an oath you're going to serve honorably, lawfully, in accordance with the rules of war,” says CEO Andy Markoff. “To me, the people who deploy the technology and make sure it is used ethically need to be in a uniform.” Markoff is hardly a regular AI executive. A former commander in the US Marine Forces Special Operations Command, he helped execute high-stakes special forces operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. He cofounded Smack with Clint Alanis, another ex-Marine, and Dan Gould, a computer scientist who previously worked as the VP of technology at Tinder.

Risk Beneath the Waves Safeguarding Subsea Cables For a Secure Global Network

Romina Bandura

Fiber-optic subsea cables are critical to meeting the unprecedented demand for data in the cyber age.

With the global demographic and technological shifts currently underway, this infrastructure will become even more important in the coming decades, as more people than ever before access and depend on the internet.

Massive investments in energy systems, digital infrastructure, and other supporting capabilities will be required to meet this demand. Greater resources for protecting and repairing these vital networks will also be essential for the continued security of internet infrastructure.

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