25 April 2026

The Origins and Fate of Digital Sovereignty

ROBIN RIVATON

Among the world’s major economies, only China and Russia have managed to build digital industries that stand apart from American platforms. Once foreign incumbents reach critical mass, local firms have little room to scale, leaving most countries without a viable path to technological autonomy.

PARIS—In June 2023, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman visited New Delhi to address entrepreneurs and investors. Asked whether three Indian engineers with $10 million could build something comparable to OpenAI, his response was blunt: it was “totally hopeless” for startups with limited resources to compete with established players in developing foundation models. Nineteen months later, the Chinese startup DeepSeek demonstrated that a leading model could be trained at a fraction of the cost that many in Silicon Valley had considered essential.

Dependence Without Trust: The Drivers of Pakistan-UAE Divergence

Muhammad Faisal

While the recent Middle East conflict brought to the fore fissures in Pakistan-United Arab Emirates ties, the underlying discontent had been building for years. It is rooted in strategic divergences over regional issues, unmet expectations of political support, and the inability of either side to shape the other’s behavior to advance their respective national security interests. Despite persistent mistrust, both sides prioritized leadership-level, personalized engagements to bridge differences and find pathways for cooperation where possible.

For Pakistan’s state and society, ties with the UAE have been important in different ways. For successive governments, the UAE has remained a crucial source of emergency financial support, a stable source of remittances given that the country hosts a significant Pakistani diaspora, and a supporter of Pakistan’s engagement across the Gulf region. For Pakistani elites, Dubai has emerged as a second home where their wealth is invested; for the Pakistani middle class, finding employment in the UAE is a pathway to entering the international labour market; and for Pakistani workers, securing semi-skilled jobs is often a ticket out of generational poverty at home.

The Dalai Lama’s Succession Battle: The Stakes for Tibetans and Beijing

Saransh Sehgal

As the 14th Dalai Lama enters the later years of his life – he turns 91 in July – the question of succession is no longer a distant concern. It is an unfolding reality that will shape the future of Tibetan Buddhism, the trajectory of regional politics, and the global conversation on the balance between spiritual authority and state control of Tibet.

For over six decades, Tenzin Gyatso, the exiled 14th Dalai Lama, has anchored the Tibetan cause, using his global stature as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate to transform what began as a Himalayan territorial dispute into a worldwide movement. The looming succession crisis is thus no longer a matter of private theological debate within the walls of the Buddhist monasteries. It has transformed into a high-stakes geopolitical flashpoint, pitting the ancient traditions of Tibetan Buddhism against the rigid legal framework of the Chinese government.

An ‘Open for Open’ Hormuz Deal Could Break the Iran Stalemate

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

Talks to end the war with Iran appear to be hopelessly stalled. But there is a way forward if the United States agrees to pare down its immediate demands to focus on the most important issue confronting the world: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the conduit for 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas. An “open for open” formula, under which both sides end their blockades of the strait, could offer a way out of the negotiating stalemate evident this weekend.

President Donald Trump announced on Sunday that U.S. negotiators would head to Islamabad, Pakistan, for a second round of negotiations with Iran on Monday. “We’re offering a very fair and reasonable DEAL,” he said, adding menacingly, “and I hope they take it because, if they don’t, the United States is going to knock out every single Power Plant, and every single Bridge, in Iran.”

The Iran War Is Highlighting—and Expanding—Authoritarian Collaboration

Joshua Kurlantzick

The Iran war appears no closer to ending, despite a ceasefire and ongoing negotiations, and Tehran seems emboldened by these developments. Part of Iran’s calculus may be that it can take advantage of the leverage it has over the global economy—demonstrated by its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz—and effectively outlast the White House’s economic pain threshold. (Iran had opened the strait during this ceasefire, and then it quickly closed it again.)


But Iran has also benefited significantly from autocratic partners’ help. China and Russia, among others, have continued to provide critical support to Iran during the war, sometimes using existing hard-to-track trade and shipping methods that these countries have perfected. Since the war started, China has provided Iran with satellite navigation, radar systems, and electronic warfare technologies, and appears ready to supply shoulder-fired missiles that would upgrade Iran’s anti-air defenses. It also has continued to buy Iran’s oil, providing it with critical cash through a network of tankers designed to avoid sanctions. Iran itself, without help from China, has utilized these types of false-registered tankers to back other autocrats, such as by supplying Iranian fuel to the junta in Myanmar.

Trump’s Iran Ceasefire Has Been Extended. So Has the Hormuz Standoff.

Mariel Ferragamo

President Donald Trump extended the ceasefire between the United States and Iran on April 21, just as the truce was approaching its expiration. He announced the extension would last until the Iranian negotiators could reach a “unified proposal” for peace talks, which had reached a standstill. Iran again closed the Strait of Hormuz hours after both countries announced last week that it was reopened, continuing a cycle of disruptions of the waterway that has become a focal point of their war.

The United States and Iran agreed to a ceasefire on the evening of April 7 after nearly six weeks of fighting that had disrupted global energy markets and spread through much of the Middle East. In the hours leading up to the ceasefire announcement, Trump threatened that “a whole civilization will die tonight” if Iran didn’t reach an agreement with the United States.

From Ceasefire to Settlement? The Prospects of a U.S.–Iran Deal

Arsalan Bilal

U.S. President Donald Trump has indicated that he might travel to Islamabad soon if Washington and Tehran succeed in reaching a peace deal. His remarks come after the marathon negotiations between top-level delegations from the two countries in Islamabad, amid a ceasefire that paused an intense weeks-long regional war. While those negotiations failed to deliver a breakthrough, can renewed diplomacy translate into a durable peace?

I argue that both sides have strong incentives to seek a deal despite their shared mistrust, but certain structural hurdles and unaddressed questions complicate the prospects for a truce that offers long-term dividends. Between pressures for de-escalation and impediments to compromise, regional and global stability hangs in the balance.

‘Hormuz moment’ could herald decline of US dominance: Citic Securities analysts

Frank Chen

With global attention fixed on the US and Iranian shipping blockades in the Strait of Hormuz and how many vessels have traversed the critically important waterway, a leading Chinese investment bank has been calculating the long-term gains and losses and how they could rewrite the global economic order.

The United States was on the horns of a dilemma over the strait that might herald an acceleration of Washington’s strategic retreat and its increasingly transactional relationships with other powers, Beijing-headquartered Citic Securities said in a report.

Comparing the situation to the “Suez moment” in the 1950s – when Britain lost control of the Suez Canal along with its global superpower status – Citic Securities analysts wrote on Saturday that a similarly consequential “Hormuz moment” could be a watershed for America’s global supremacy.

Back to Basics at the U.N.

Daniel Forti

Diplomats at the United Nations will soon hold formal hearings with the current candidates for the organization’s next secretary-general. They will discuss topics ranging from climate change to human rights. But many participants will be listening most closely to what the would-be leaders have to say about the U.N.’s mandate to maintain international peace and security.

Both the U.N.’s current secretary-general, Antรณnio Guterres, and its member states have downplayed peace and security in discussions about the organization’s future. They believed that, in a period of big-power competition, the U.N. was better positioned to help broker agreements on issues like climate change, artificial intelligence, and pandemic response.

The U.S. Army’s Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) System – Analysis

Andrew Feickert

Improved Chinese and Russian long-ranged artillery systems, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the proliferation of special munitions have renewed concerns about the potential operational impact of Russian and Chinese fires against U.S. forces. In response, the U.S. Army is improving the ability to deliver what it refers to as long-range precision fires (LRPF) by upgrading current artillery and missile systems, developing new longer-ranged systems (including hypersonic weapons), and modifying existing air-and sea-launched missiles for ground launch.

The Mid-Range Capability (MRC) system is part of the Army’s LRPF modernization portfolio and is intended to hit targets at ranges between the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) system. The MRC system leverages existing Raytheon-produced SM-6 missiles and Raytheon-produced Tomahawk cruise missiles modified for ground launch. The MRC system is also known as the “Typhon” missile system (Figure 1).

The Third Option: How the CIA’s Paramilitary Arm Shapes the Battlefield


Guy McCardle’s “Discover the Secret World of CIA’s Elite Paramilitary Operatives,” published on SOFREP, pulls back the curtain on the CIA’s Special Activities Center (SAC) and its role as the principal instrument of American covert action abroad. The SAC traces its lineage directly to the OSS, inheriting the doctrine of sabotage, subversion, and intelligence collection behind enemy lines that shaped modern unconventional warfare.

The SAC is divided into four principal branches: the Ground Branch, staffed by veterans of units like Delta Force and the SEAL Teams; the Air Branch, which historically ran operations through front companies like Air America during Vietnam; the Maritime Branch, drawing from naval special warfare; and the Political Action Group, which executes psychological operations and covert influence campaigns. Candidates who fill these billets have typically “served in a Special Operations unit for longer than four years and have seen combat,” reflecting a deliberate selection standard that places fieldcraft and hard experience above all else.

Can U.S. Blockade Iranian-Linked Ships Anywhere in the World? Yes, But …

Ephrat Livni

The United States military last week extended its blockade on vessels coming in and out of Iranian ports to the waters of the wider world, declaring that it would pursue any ship aiding Iran, regardless of location on the high seas or flag. The U.S. “will actively pursue any Iranian-flagged vessel or any vessel attempting to provide material support to Iran,” Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Thursday, noting that the American troops beyond the Middle East will engage in operations to thwart Iranian shipping.

The extension of the blockade comes as the economically vital Strait of Hormuz remains all but closed to commercial traffic and the two-week cease-fire between the United States and Iran nears an end. The move aligns longstanding American economic policies targeting Iran with the current military campaign against it, maritime and military law experts say.

How to Fight an Economic War

Edward Fishman

The World Economic Forum at Davos is rarely the site of geopolitical rupture. But this year, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stood before the assembled executives and dignitaries to declare the end of an era. Globalization, with its promise of win-win cooperation, had given way to intensifying economic warfare. “Great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited,” he said. “You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration, when integration becomes the source of your subordination.”

In Carney’s telling, the giants are on the march, leaving everyone else little choice but to band together in self-defense. Yet his narrative, however resonant, obscures a more volatile reality: in this age of economic warfare, even the great powers feel increasingly insecure. Nations big and small have awoken to their vulnerability to foreign economic coercion—and the fear this realization has unleashed is pushing policy in unexpected directions.

The Iran War Is an Expectations Game

Dominic Tierney

On April 8, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week cease-fire. But despite two days of negotiations in Islamabad and speculation about a second round of talks, the two sides have so far failed to reach a deal to end the war. This is perhaps because they have each already repeatedly claimed complete victory. When asked, on April 11, about the progress of the Islamabad talks, U.S. President Donald Trump said, “Regardless of what happens, we win. We’ve totally defeated that country.” Several days prior, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council declared that the United States has suffered “an undeniable, historic, and crushing defeat.”

At first, sorting through these competing claims of victory might seem to demand an impartial tally of each side’s material gains and losses. But there is no objective way to judge who wins and who loses a war. Instead, victory is in the eye of the beholder. Material outcomes are just one among several factors that shape wartime narratives of success and failure. Other dynamics, including psychology, optics, and media and political spin, also skew the narrative. The dominant story that emerges about who won and who lost can in turn have powerful political effects. It may even matter more than events on the battlefield.

The United States Withdraws from Syria | State of Play

Mona Yacoubian and Will Todman

On April 16, 2026, the United States handed over its last major base in Syria to the interim Syrian government, marking a significant milestone in the interim government’s efforts to reassert control throughout Syria. The withdrawal ends more than a decade of U.S. presence in Syria, as U.S. forces were first deployed to combat ISIS in 2015. A U.S. Central Command spokesman underscored that the withdrawal was “conditions-based,” signaling U.S. confidence that Syrian authorities will be capable of addressing any lingering ISIS threat. The United States will continue to support counter-ISIS operations through “partner-led counterterrorism efforts,” training, intelligence, and logistics.

For its part, the Syrian government announced that it has assumed full responsibility for combating terrorism and celebrated the move as another step toward reasserting sovereignty over its territory.

China, The United States, And Japan Held Most Strategic Oil Inventories In 2025 – Analysis


In the 1970s, the United States and other OECD countries established strategic oil stocks aimed at mitigating the impact of supply disruptions. In March 2026, the United States, along with other members of the International Energy Agency, agreed to a coordinated emergency release of strategic oil stocks following the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

In this article, we examine strategic global oil inventory levels as of December 2025, before the coordinated emergency release. We plan to update our assessment of inventories periodically in our Short-Term Energy Outlook beginning in May 2026.

We estimate that as of December 2025, the three largest strategic oil inventories were held by China, which added large volumes to its strategic oil inventories in 2025; the United States; and Japan. Other significant strategic inventories are held by countries in OECD Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Iran’s Strait of Hormuz Gambit and the Limits of U.S. Military Power

Daniel Byman

The current standoff between the United States and Iran is no longer a clash of capabilities but rather a struggle of political endurance and bargaining leverage. The United States began the conflict with broad, but often unclear, goals that included stopping Iran’s nuclear program, weakening Iran’s missile and conventional military capabilities, and regime change. It is now a contest involving maritime coercion, domestic political constraints, and even great power competition. The result is a war whose trajectory is less defined by battlefield outcomes than by each side’s expectations about the other’s willingness to bear costs.

At the operational level, the conflict has settled into a paradoxical equilibrium: Iran has sought to disrupt global energy flows through a de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States has responded by “blockading the blockaders,” blocking traffic to and from Iranian ports. Tehran’s tool kit—drones, naval mines, and swarming small boats—imposes risk and uncertainty, even if it is no match for the U.S. Navy.

In the Iran War, the US Needs Strategic Patience

Joe Zacks

Leo Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace, “Everything comes in time to him who knows how to wait…There is nothing stronger than these two: patience and time.” This adage is apt for the current moment in the war with Iran. The US naval blockade near the Strait of Hormuz flips Iran’s own strategic script back on the regime. It turns the economic hardship that Tehran intends to inflict on the world back to its source, and the result will be the United States and Iran negotiating a settlement to the current conflict.

For the United States to get what it wants and needs in a deal will take strategic patience and time—two commodities in needlessly short supply here. Unfortunately, this means that worldwide gas prices will continue to increase and fertilizer and other essential commodities will remain in short supply for the foreseeable future. We need to be ready to accept this. Regardless of whether one supported this conflict or not, it is too late to turn back the clock.

Nordic Nukes: Seeking Strategic Agency in Uncertain Times

Astrid Chevreuil 

Following French President Emmanuel Macron’s March 2 speech at รŽle-Longue, most Nordic countries—Sweden, Denmark, and Norway—have expressed interest in an additional European nuclear protection, to complement U.S. extended deterrence. For the Nordics, once the world’s most vocal advocates for nuclear disarmament, the recent transition to a formal reliance on nuclear deterrence, and primarily U.S. extended deterrence, has been a profound strategic coming of age. Yet this pivot has birthed a unique dilemma: These states have anchored their survival to NATO’s nuclear posture at the exact moment the U.S. National Defense Strategy has begun to increasingly prioritize domestic interests over international commitments.

Consequently, the nuclear debate in the Nordic countries has reached a historical fever pitch. Spanning the traditional NATO umbrella, the provocative concept of an indigenous “Nordic Nuke,” and the European path of Macron’s forward deterrence, these discussions signal a move beyond traditional disarmament to champion a more autonomous form of strategic thinking.

The Global AI Threat Has Arrived

S. ALEX YANG and ANGELA HUYUE ZHANG

The ability of Anthropic’s new AI model, Claude Mythos Preview, to find vulnerabilities across major operating systems and web browsers has dangerous implications for today’s highly interconnected world. Instead of merely securing its own firms, the United States must address the problem through diplomacy, particularly with China.

LONDON/LOS ANGELES—Anthropic’s new AI model, Claude Mythos Preview, has alarmed business leaders and policymakers around the world because of its extraordinary ability to find and exploit vulnerabilities in major operating systems and web browsers. Even the Trump administration, which has feuded with Anthropic in recent months over certain military uses of its models, now seems keen to work with the company to protect critical government infrastructure from cyberattacks.

How Big of a Threat Is Mythos?

Rishi Iyengar

It sounds like the beginning of a nightmare scenario that artificial intelligence doomsayers have been warning about: This month, Silicon Valley AI company Anthropic said it had developed a model so dangerous that the company had decided against releasing it to the public.

The model, known as Claude Mythos Preview, is a general-purpose language model like Anthropic’s Claude or OpenAI’s ChatGPT. But during testing, it showed an ability to find and exploit so-called “zero day” vulnerabilities—an industry term that refers to previously undiscovered holes in a system’s software. The model “could reshape cybersecurity” because it found “thousands of high-severity vulnerabilities” in “every major operating system and web browser,” Anthropic said. It made those claims in a blog post announcing that it would open up Mythos only to a few dozen companies and critical infrastructure operators. That collective, which Anthropic named Project Glasswing, includes Amazon Web Services, Apple, Google, JPMorganChase, Microsoft, and Nvidia as companies that will receive early access to the model to patch vulnerabilities in their systems.

The problem with Europe's Big Tech breakup: It’s still hooked

MATHIEU POLLET and ANOUK SCHLUNG

Inside Amsterdam’s red-brick city hall, Alexander Scholtes, the official who spearheaded the Dutch capital’s push to break up with U.S. technology, looked down at his tablet.

How often does he still rely on Big Tech? “Right now, all the time,” he said, waving the device loaded with Microsoft software — an active reminder of a hard reality that stretches far beyond his city. European governments are actively trying — and struggling — to move away from American tech amid mounting fears that U.S. President Donald Trump could weaponize years of heavy reliance.

In the AI propaganda war, Iran is winning


In previous decades, propaganda for murderous Middle Eastern regimes tended to be unpersuasive. As American forces rolled into the Iraqi capital in 2003, Saddam Hussein’s information minister, Muhammad Saeed al-Sahaf, stood on a roof and claimed that “Baghdad is safe…the infidels are committing suicide by the hundreds on the gate.” He added that God was “grilling their stomachs in hell”. Behind him, television audiences could see Iraqi soldiers fleeing for their lives.

The Shadow of the Military in Modern South Asia

Paul Staniland

Over the past two decades, scholars and analysts have devoted much of their attention to democratic backsliding, illiberal democracy, and competitive authoritarianism—all processes through which elected leaders can threaten democracy by undermining democratic institutions and practices. Related to the rise of backsliding is the fact that military coups also declined sharply after the end of the Cold War. Many of the classical praetorian militaries of the Cold War era—those that seized power regularly or for long periods, whether in Brazil, Nigeria, Turkey, or Indonesia—were brought under civilian control. After the Cold War, the military coup seemed to have fallen out of favor; the key threats to democracy were from politicians, not generals.

In South Asia, concerns about democratic backsliding and competitive authoritarianism were often raised during the 2010s and 2020s in relation to the governments of Narendra Modi in India, Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, and Mahinda Rajapaksa and then Gotabaya Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka. Even though scholars and analysts often disagreed about how apt these labels were in particular cases, the “liberal democracy versus democratic backsliding” dichotomy came to dominate much of the debate about political trends in the region.

‌Armor-Infantry Integration Lessons Learned

LTC Dan Krueger

Throughout the latter stages of 2024 and early 2025, 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment had a unique opportunity to train and fight an opposing force (OPFOR) alongside the Booker Test Detachment, an armor company of tanks known as Charlie Company, 73rd Armor Regiment. Though the M10 Booker program was ultimately canceled, the training and testing period of over six months enabled a rare, sustained relationship between a light infantry battalion and an armored force. While it is common to have a similar task organization at a combat training center (one that incorporates non-organic armored platforms), we found that integration did not come easily. Indeed, such partnerships must be cultivated and sustained for effective combined arms maneuver.

This article briefly highlights 10 areas worthy of leaders’ attention moving forward.

Increased protection and speed led to opportunity when leveraged appropriately. We continually referred to the Booker by its original name “mobile protected firepower”: these three important words gave the necessary symbiotic relationship between any mounted and dismounted force. The “mobility” came in the form of a fast-moving asset that could gain an advantageous position or exploit opportunity in a fraction of the time of our light Infantrymen. While our battalion typically used the M10 in a support role, we experimented with using it to quickly assault objectives and open routes. Moreover, we found that we could rapidly reinforce areas where our forces were more or less successful in making gains against a free-thinking OPFOR.