Indian Strategic Studies: 03/28/26

28 March 2026

A Contest of Wills: China and the Quad

Nathan Kepner-Roberts

The United States is at an inflection point; a rising China and a shifting political landscape in the Western Hemisphere have created great strategic tension in Washington. China remains the pacing threat, but senior leaders’ focus is shifting to affairs in the Western Hemisphere. Defending the Homeland will include improving US posture in the Indo-Pacific as expanding Chinese power may reach uncomfortably close to Guam or even Haiwaii sooner rather than later. In varying degrees of virulency, a considerable portion of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) supports a restoration of Chinese power and the burial of the century of humiliation. This creates an environment and opportunity for Beijing to take advantage of a distracted international body to rewire the world to its benefit. The US and its partners have the tools, such as existing partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, to guard against Chinese aggression but must change how it uses them. To defend the Homeland and ensure “a free and open Indo-Pacific,” the US should confront the China challenge by working with Allies and Partners to transform the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) from an informal security cooperative into a community of collective defense.

China’s Localization Drive in Semiconductors Gains Impetus from Allied Chip Export Controls

Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell

U.S. and allied export controls on advanced semiconductor technologies, imposed beginning in 2022, were designed to constrain China’s AI and high-end chip development. While progress on these goals has been limited, the controls have clearly accelerated Beijing’s long-standing drive for semiconductor self-reliance. The initial round of controls restricted transfers of advanced logic chips used to train and operationally use AI models and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) used to make those devices.

The controls have subsequently been expanded to additional device, design, and SME categories. While the controls have disrupted Chinese access to leading-edge chips and equipment, their principal effect has been to accelerate the adoption and use of indigenous equipment and products, giving new impetus to coordinated state and industry efforts to localize semiconductor design and manufacturing. The Chinese government has reportedly directed domestic enterprises to acquire domestic devices and SME that are less advanced than foreign alternatives in order to advance national self-sufficiency.

Chinese Eyes, Iranian Missiles: Intelligence Cooperation in the US/Israel–Iran War 2026

Tahir Azad

The 2026 war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran exemplifies one of the most technologically intricate wars in contemporary Middle Eastern history. The capability of Iran to execute accurate missile and drone strikes on Israeli urban centers and American military installations in the Gulf region astonished numerous military analysts. The accuracy unveiled in these missions indicates the existence of advanced targeting systems, satellite navigation, and real-time intelligence networks. Despite Iran’s development of an indigenous missile program over the past thirty years, critics increasingly contend that its recent operational achievements cannot be attributed purely to domestic technological capabilities. A burgeoning corpus of evidence indicates that China has significantly contributed intelligence support, satellite navigation, radar systems, and electronic warfare technologies that augment Iran’s targeting capabilities.

The alliance between China and Iran is founded on extensive geopolitical interests. Iran is a pivotal ally in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a significant energy provider, and a crucial geopolitical counterbalance to U.S. dominance in the Middle East. China’s technology collaboration, especially in space-based information and navigation systems, may facilitate Iran’s execution of precision warfare against the US and Israeli sites while circumventing direct military engagement.

China Is Squeezing Southeast Asia

Jessica C. Liao and Zenel Garcia

Southeast Asia should be benefiting from China’s rise. Beijing has made the region’s growth a priority: Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s Maritime Silk Road—the nautical pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s global infrastructure and investment program—put Southeast Asia at the heart of Beijing’s geoeconomic strategy and made it a prime target for development opportunities. Southeast Asia has attracted roughly $126 billion in Chinese investment in the last decade, and in 2020, the region surpassed the United States and the European Union to become China’s largest trading partner. As Washington revives tariff threats and

What is Xi Jinping Learning from the Iran War?

Mick Ryan

There’s probably no foreign leader who is paying more, is looking more intently about Putin’s experience in Ukraine over the last 11 and a half months than Xi Jinping. I think he was surprised and unsettled, to some extent, by the very poor performance of the Russian military, of many Russian sophisticated weapon systems as well, and trying to draw the lessons from that about his own military modernisation and on specific issues like Taiwan. CIA Director Burns, 2 February 2023, J. Raymond “Jit” Trainor Award Ceremony, Georgetown University.

Just as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine provided China with a real time laboratory on the political and military lessons of modern war, so too the current U.S.-Israeli war against Iran is providing Beijing with real-time insights into how American power is exercised. This includes the military domain, how U.S. alliances function under stress, and how the information environment shapes perceptions of conflict. For President Xi Jinping, who has talked constantly about China’s unfinished business in Taiwan, the lessons are crucial.

The Right Plan, the Wrong Clock: How the Iran War Exposed Europe’s Air Defense Timeline

Miro Sedlák

The Iran conflict has turned a theoretical vulnerability into an operational crisis. Europe has the right plan. It just doesn’t have the time.

A few days into Operation Epic Fury – the joint US-Israeli campaign to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, missile production, and proxy networks – the war against Iran is already rewriting the economics of air defense. Not on a think tank whiteboard, but in real time, over real cities and under real missile threats. Not on a whiteboard in a think tank. In real time, over real cities, with real missiles.

Iran’s retaliatory strategy since the joint US-Israeli strikes began on February 28, 2026, has been neither reckless nor desperate. It is arithmetically precise. Tehran is launching mixed salvos – waves of $20,000 Shahed-136 one-way attack drones interleaved with ballistic missiles – across an unprecedented number of theaters simultaneously. The intent is not to overwhelm any single target. It is to drain the defender’s magazine. And it is working.

New weapons and technologies making their debut in the war against Iran

Frumentarius

As the nearly month-long Israeli-American war against Iran approaches the end of its first month, let’s briefly examine some of the weapons systems, tactics, and strategies being employed by both sides in this first prolonged war since the Russia-Ukraine conflict kicked off in 2022. The latter can be seen as a watershed conflict in terms of the proliferation and prominence of unmanned systems (drones) employed in war. It was the First Drone War, as it were, and the 2026 Iran conflict can now accurately be described as the Second Drone War – although missiles are also featuring prominently, as well.

On the American-Israeli side, some of the innovative weapons and tactics being used include sophisticated and layered interceptor air defenses and directed high-energy weapons systems. Specifically, the U.S. military’s HELIOS and ODIN laser systems, and the Israeli Iron Beam, have been used successfully to take down Iranian attack drones. Such laser systems will surely feature in future military conflicts as more militaries develop their own versions.

Why Iran just committed a dramatic strategic error!

Donald Vandergriff

Iran launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs, ~4,000 km range) toward the joint US-UK military base there on or around March 20, 2026, in the ongoing Iran-US-Israel conflict. Neither missile hit the target: one failed in flight, and the other was intercepted (or at least engaged) by a US warship using an SM-3 missile.

The missiles achieved nothing militarily. Diego Garcia — a remote but critical US-UK hub for bombers, submarines, and operations in the Indian Ocean — suffered no hits, no casualties, and no disruption. This contrasts with Iran’s earlier regional strikes (e.g., on Israel or Gulf targets), where at least some effects were claimed. A failed strike on such a high-profile, distant target simply highlighted the limits of Iran’s missile reliability and accuracy against modern defenses.

The Forever War Playbook Returns

Alexander Langlois

Former President George W. Bush once famously botched an old cliché as his administration painstakingly attempted to sell what would eventually be the illegal 2003 invasion of Iraq, stating “Fool me once … shame on … shame on you. Fool me … you can’t get fooled again.” Today, as the U.S. and Israel wage war on Iran, this hapless statement should serve as a lesson – that sloppy attempts to justify and rebrand military intervention abroad in the name of unachievable goals are likely to produce catastrophe.

Yet the same tactics and mistakes that characterized the misadventure in Iraq have returned in full force just weeks after the first Israeli and American bombs struck Iran. Take Vice President JD Vance’s words, for example: “The idea that we’re going to be in a Middle Eastern war for years with no end in sight — there is no chance that will happen.” Or consider the shaky response from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in which the Department of Defense’s number three official argued that operations against Iran are not “interventionism” or a “forever war.”

‘Operation Hidden Hand’: Iran-Russia military axis comes into view

Gabriel Honrada
Source Link

Emerging reports of Russian intelligence support to Iran in its war with the US and Israel are raising critical questions about the scope, credibility and strategic implications of deepening Russia–Iran military cooperation.

This month, reports citing US officials and sources familiar with intelligence assessments say Russia has provided Iran with targeting data on US troops, warships and aircraft in the Middle East, marking the first indication of Russia’s indirect involvement in the conflict.

What Trump May Do if He Loses in Iran

Suzanne Nossel

U.S. President Donald Trump doesn’t like to lose. And as his chances of pulling off a win in the war on Iran look increasingly slim, the world may soon face the prospect of a volatile president confronting a foreign-policy dilemma that is utterly out of his control. To be sure, Trump may yet pull off a feat that is lauded by geopolitical analysts as advancing U.S. interests and justifying the human, economic, and political costs of the war. But as Trump finds himself in an increasingly tight corner, it’s time to anticipate how he might react to the specter of failure in Iran—and prepare for the possibility that his response could make the conflict even more dangerous.

The challenges of the Iran war seem to mount by the day. While the U.S. military, working together with the Israel Defense Forces, has been largely successful in destroying Iran’s air defense, naval, and ballistics capabilities, the country’s political system and sources of economic leverage have proved far less tractable. There is also the matter of Iran’s remaining fissile material and nuclear capabilities—not to mention the risk that Tehran emerges from the conflict determined that it can only properly defend itself with nukes. Hopes of either a mostly seamless Venezuela-style transition to a pliable leader or a widespread people’s revolution have faded.

US' and Iran's options for ending war narrow the longer it goes on

Amir Azimi

For weeks, the US and Israel have insisted that Iran's military capacity has been severely degraded. US President Donald Trump and his defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, have repeatedly claimed that sustained strikes have crippled Iran's command structure and weakened its ability to respond. Yet the opposite appears to be happening. The escalation continues faster, sharper, and with fewer clear exit points.

It emerged on Saturday that Iran had launched two missiles towards the US-UK base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, a distance of around 3,800km (2,300 miles). Although the missiles did not reach the island, the incident has raised fresh concerns about Iran's capabilities. Until now, its missile range was widely believed to be about 2,000km.

Iran’s Next Move: How to Counter Tehran’s Multidomain Punishment Campaign

Benjamin Jensen

Iran has adopted a multidomain punishment campaign to counter U.S. and Israeli attacks. An oil tanker does not have to sink for a weakened Iran to gain leverage. It only has to turn around. A liquefied natural gas terminal does not have to be destroyed by a barrage of drones. It only has to stop loading ships long enough to jolt markets, raise insurance costs, and create enough economic pain among energy-importing states to pressure the United States and Israel to end military strikes. From missiles to cyber-enabled wiper attacks that destroy computer systems and botnets that amplify propaganda, coercion takes many forms in modern war.

This is the logic of a multidomain punishment campaign. When a state cannot win a direct military contest, it looks for ways to impose costs indirectly by holding civilian and economic systems at risk from multiple domains. The goal is not battlefield decision. It is political pressure: to make the costs of continuing a campaign feel larger, wider, and harder to control. The objective transcends brute force and simply destroying critical infrastructure to create psychological and political pressure.

Easier to Kill Than to Text: A Mandate for Information Warfare Reform

Robert W. White

The nature of global confrontation has fundamentally changed. It is now evident that the primary instrument of national power is the power of the national narrative; its foundation: diplomacy, information, military and economics (DIME). From the deception plans of the American Revolutionary War to the integration of space, cyberspace, drones and artificial intelligence (AI), the US military’s capabilities have evolved, but our core structures for manning and employing them have not kept pace. From the halls of academia to the front lines of statecraft, a clear consensus has emerged: we are in a persistent, global war of narratives. This is a battle of “narratives,” where adversaries seek to break beliefs, shape perceptions, sow division, and achieve their objectives before a single shot is fired.

This call for change is not novel; it echoes a growing sentiment within professional military education advocating for “a return to information warfare” as a primary, not supporting, effort. This is the true nature of “gray zone” confrontation as it allows adversaries to avoid direct conflicts with the well-resourced US Department of War, a murky battlespace where ambiguity is a weapon, the line between peace and war is deliberately blurred, and our policies, systems, processes, and bureaucracy are exploited by our adversaries.

Fault Lines in the Horn of Africa: The Gulf States, Turkey, and Israel Battle for Red Sea Influence

Liam Karr

Key PointsThe Gulf states and Turkey have become increasingly involved in the Horn of Africa, effectively splitting the broader Red Sea region into two coalitions: an Emirati-backed, Israeli-supported axis of revisionist state and nonstate actors arrayed against a coalition of status quo African states aligned with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Growing competition between these factions has raised the risk of a full-blown regional proxy war on both sides of the Red Sea. The United States cannot watch a proxy war unfold among US partners in the Red Sea. This would undermine US interests in maritime security, counterterrorism, and containing Iran, and it would allow malign actors such as Iran, Russia, al Qaeda, and ISIS to expand their influence.

Iran toughens negotiating stance amid mediation efforts, sources say

Parisa Hafezi and Angus Mcdowall

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi adjusts glasses during a press conference following talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, Russia, December 17, 2025. REUTERS/Ramil Sitdikov/Pool/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

DUBAI, March 24 (Reuters) - Iran's negotiating posture has hardened sharply since the war began, with the Revolutionary ‌Guards exerting growing influence over decision-making, and it will demand significant concessions from the United States if mediation efforts lead to serious negotiations, three senior sources in Tehran said.

In any talks with the U.S., Iran would not only demand an end to the war but concessions that are likely red lines for U.S. President Donald Trump - guarantees against future military action, compensation for wartime losses and formal control of the Strait of Hormuz, the sources said.

Why the Iran War Should Not Cause Higher Gas Prices in the US

Frank N. Newman

The Iranian IRGC is using the closure of the Strait of Hormuz to put economic pressure on the U.S., especially through higher gas costs for Americans. But America does not depend on oil sent through that passage, and the closure does not provide any good reason for U.S. gasoline prices to increase.

Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and Bahrain have no alternative to shipment through the Strait of Hormuz. But that oil is shipped largely to Asia–notably China, India, and Japan. Only very small portions of the oil shipments sent through the Strait are destined for the U.S. There is no reason for U.S. consumers to face big increases in gas prices just because supplies from the Middle East to Asia have been impeded.

Iran Conflict Disrupts Central Asian Trade Routes

Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Central Asian states have maintained neutrality while calling for de-escalation of the conflict in and around Iran. The conflict is indirectly impacting Central Asia, causing regional instability and economic uncertainty.

The conflict has disrupted vital trade and transit routes linking Central Asia to global markets via Iran, causing shortages and logistical delays while testing Central Asia’s resilience to energy price increases Escalation in the Persian Gulf, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz, has increased the importance of routes such as the Middle Corridor, which bypasses both Russia and Iran. This shift may reshape regional logistics, requiring major infrastructure investment.

European Union and Azerbaijan Deepen Strategic Cooperation

Vasif Huseynov

European Council President António Costa’s March 11 meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev highlighted Baku’s growing role in the European Union’s efforts to diversify energy supplies and expand European connectivity with the South Caucasus.

Azerbaijan has increased natural gas exports to Europe since 2022 and now supplies 12 European countries with gas primarily via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline. Closer cooperation with Baku helps the European Union diversify energy supplies and reinforce stability across a region increasingly central to Europe’s security and economic interests. It helps Azerbaijan expand energy exports and connectivity projects.

Iran’s Escalation Strategy Won’t Work

Raphael S. Cohen

The Iranian regime’s military strategy has always involved an underlying bet that it could control escalation. For the better part of half a century, this gamble mostly paid off. Whether it was taking hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, bombing U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut and Air Force housing in Saudi Arabia, or funding proxies from Afghanistan to Gaza to Iraq, Iran’s actions have, until very recently, never triggered serious blowback.

This month, Iran placed its biggest bet yet on its ability to control escalation. But this time, it appears headed toward calamity.

In recent bouts with the United States, Iran sought to control escalation spirals and pursued a rather restrained tit-for-tat use of violence. After the United States killed Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani in 2020, Iran launched a missile strike on two U.S. military bases in Iraq, which notably did not kill any Americans. Similarly, after Operation Midnight Hammer last June, in which the United States struck Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran responded with another missile strike—this time at a U.S. air base in Qatar, again choreographed to make a point but not prompt a wider conflict. During these previous iterations, Iran seemingly cared more about the public statement made by its missiles rather than any actual military effect.

Israeli Settlers Carry Out Wave of Attacks on Palestinian Villages in West Bank

Rebecca Schneid

Israeli settlers set homes on fire, smashed cars and beat several people in a wave of attacks on Palestinian villages in the occupied West Bank this weekend, witnesses and local rights groups said.

The Palestinian WAFA news agency reported that settlers stormed the village of Fandaqumiya and the town of Seilat al-Dahr, south of Jenin, late on Saturday. Other attacks were reported in the agricultural regions of Masafer Yatta and the Jordan Valley.

In the village of Fandaqumiya, a group of settlers set vehicles ablaze and smashed windows on houses, WAFA reported, citing local sources. In the central West Bank, at least three people were injured in a stone-throwing attack. In various parts of Nablus, 30 settlers targeted the al-Masoudiya archaeological area and set fire to a tourist tent, the agency reported.

Why U.S. Victory in Iran Would Be Bad for Washington—and the World

Howard W. French

The current situation in the United States, like that of the United States in the world, is by no means normal. This should summon the American public and world opinion to take what may seem to be an unusual, even uncomfortable, position: Under the disturbing present circumstances, one should simply not wish for a U.S. victory in the country’s 3-week-old war against Iran.

So that there is no moral confusion about this statement, I must make explicit what I am not calling for: I do not wish for the death or injury of U.S. soldiers. Nor do I wish for the destruction of the state of Israel, whose right to security I have supported in column after column.

Electrostates vs. Petrostates China is building a new green bloc, while the United States is doubling down on oil.

Nils Gilman

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney didn’t come to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January to offer hope. He came to pronounce a death. The liberal international order—that elaborate architecture of institutions, norms, and U.S.-guaranteed public goods constructed in the aftermath of World War II—was over, he announced, and the rupture was irreversible. But Carney’s eulogy, sober and precise as it was, understated the depth of the break.

U.S. President Donald Trump isn’t merely ending a set of diplomatic arrangements or a particular configuration of great-power relations. He is presiding over the end of the fossil-fueled model of industrial civilization that made the liberal order possible, profitable, and, for a time, politically sustainable. Trump didn’t initiate the decline of fossil fuels’ global metabolic hegemony; it was instigated by the manifest instability posed by climate change and rivalrous oil-access impediments like the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. But he has ensured a rivalrous competition, rather than a smooth transition, to replace it.

Discovery Before Disaster: The Louisiana Maneuvers and the Untested Warfighting Concepts of Today’s Army

Matthew Revels and Eric Uribe

This slogan is among the Army’s favorites, yet its application at the operational level remains uneven. Brigade combat teams rotate through combat training centers, maneuvering largely in isolation while simulated adjacent formations execute scripted roles that fails to introduce the friction that defines the real world’s battlefields. To compensate for the absence of field training at echelons above the brigade level, the Army increasingly relies on command post and simulation-based exercises. While such exercises are valuable for refining staff processes, they cannot replicate the uncertainty, degraded communications, and cumulative friction inherent in multidivision operations. The result is a training system optimized for confirmation rather than correction.

The Army’s shift toward preparing for large-scale combat operations has necessitated that the combat training centers reorient from training brigades on counterinsurgency doctrine to implementing the Army’s new operational concept, multidomain operations. Doctrine manuals make it clear that divisions and corps are the central maneuver elements under the new concept. To better align with its operational doctrine, the Army developed the Army of 2030 plan to reorganize the force, shifting responsibility away from brigade commanders by allocating additional resources to division and corps commanders, effectively centralizing an increasing number of resources and assets within higher echelons to limit brigade commanders’ span of control.

Begging Hamas to Disarm - The Misguided Approach of Trump's 'Board of Peace'

Khaled Abu Toameh

Hamas leaders have instead proposed long-term truces (5-10 years) rather than total decommissioning of arms. Another thing the "Board of Peace" and Mladenov do not seem to understand is that Hamas uses ceasefires with Israel to rebuild, regroup, and restock its arsenal and tunnel networks.

To ask Hamas politely to disarm is fantasyland.

The notion that the "Board of Peace," no matter how well-intentioned, can persuade Hamas to relinquish its arsenal through dialogue alone ignores decades of evidence to the contrary.

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