How Pakistan won over Trump to become an unlikely mediator in the Iran war

Caroline Davies

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Pakistan's role as intermediary in this conflict took many by surprise.

But perhaps it shouldn't.

The head of its armed forces, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is in US President Donald Trump's favour. The US leader frequently refers to him as his "favourite" Field Marshal and has previously spoken about how Munir knows Iran "better than most".

Iran is not only a neighbour of Pakistan, with whom it shares a 900km (559 miles) or so border, but by its own messages also has a "brotherly" relationship with deep cultural and religious ties.

It also has no US air bases.

And unlike many of the usual intermediaries in the Gulf it has not yet been pulled into the conflict.

Crucially, it is willing to wade in - peace between the US and Iran by many accounts would be in its interest.

Still, there have been questions about how a country embroiled in conflict with two of its neighbours - Afghanistan and India - has positioned itself as a bringer of peace.

The country is currently bombing Afghanistan and tensions with India led to a fear of nuclear escalation only last year.

Pakistan has so far walked the tightrope between Iran and the US, passing messages between the two sides, hosting foreign ministers from other concerned Muslim nations and hitting the diplomatic telephones.

China 201

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China 201s are a series of concise, substantive briefs designed to support congressional staff and policymakers seeking a foundational background on key China-related issues. Drawing from previously published Commission Annual Reports, China 201s provide a quick reference to the Commission’s existing research on issues central to U.S.–China economic and security relations.

New briefs will be added to the series on a rolling basis, continuing to address the critical policy issues that define the U.S.-China relationship and U.S. national security.

The End Of The World According To Jiang

Jan Wellmann

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Nobody had heard of Jiang Xueqin eighteen months ago. He was a high school history teacher in Beijing, recording lectures on a whiteboard for teenagers who probably wanted to be somewhere else. Then the war started, and suddenly this man — BA in English literature, not a professor by any institutional definition of the word, expelled from China in 2002 for inconvenient journalism and somehow let back in without explanation — was on Tucker Carlson, on Breaking Points, in every algorithm simultaneously, two million subscribers materialized from nowhere, dubbed “China’s Nostradamus” by a media apparatus that didn’t stop to ask who let him back through the gate.

He called Trump’s return. He called the Iran war. He called JD Vance as running mate in May 2024, months before the announcement. He predicted the exact rhetorical framing Trump would use to justify the war, word for word, a year before Trump said it on television. Whether Jiang is an independent theorist who reads history better than everyone else, or a very well-positioned messenger delivering a script to a Western audience primed to receive it, remains the most interesting question nobody in his comment section is asking. Both options are on the table. Neither is comforting.

How The Middle East War Is Reshaping Energy, Trade, And Finance

Tobias Adrian, Jihad Azour, Nigel Chalk, Pierre-Olivier Bussières, Alfred Kammer, Abebe Aemro Selassie, Krishna Srinivasan and Rodrigo Valdés

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The world faces yet another shock. The war in the Middle East is upending lives and livelihoods in the region and beyond. It is also dimming the outlook for many economies that had only just shown signs of a sustained recovery from previous crises.

The shock is global, yet asymmetric. Energy importers are more exposed than exporters, poorer countries more than richer ones, and those with meager buffers more than those with ample reserves. Beyond its painful human toll, the war has caused serious disruption to the economies of the most directly affected countries, including damage to their infrastructure and industries that could become long-lasting. Although these countries are resilient, their short-term growth prospects will be negatively affected.

US Military Options For Kharg Island And The Strait Of Hormuz Under Review

Can Kasapoğlu

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The ongoing American–Israeli campaign against Iran has been operationally effective in degrading the Islamic Republic’s destructive military capabilities. Yet Washington will face difficulty compelling Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to stand down so long as Tehran retains the ability to disrupt maritime economic activity through the Strait of Hormuz.

The strait, while still susceptible to Iranian threats, remains the central vulnerability in the global economy. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, a substantial share of global shipping transited this narrow maritime corridor—including roughly one-quarter of global seaborne trade, one-fifth of the world’s oil supply, one-fifth of the world’s liquid natural gas (LNG), and a wide range of other critical goods such as fertilizers. This concentration of maritime traffic along predictable sea lanes has created a structural exposure: a disruptive and hostile actor with continued access to the strait can impose disproportionate effects on a global scale. Iran’s military and strategic approach to the current conflict rests squarely on this stark geopolitical reality.

Why Russia and China Aren’t Helping Iran

Justin Mitchell

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Iran is isolated, fighting a war for its survival. Yet China and Russia, Iran’s supposed partners, are conspicuously absent. Both countries condemned the attacks on Iran and called for an end to hostilities, but both stopped short of sending significant military aid. Meanwhile, the United States deploys additional personnel to the Middle East, including Marines and the 82nd Airborne Division, in preparation for a potential ground invasion.

Analysts comment that China’s lack of action is“the clearest sign of Beijing’s disorientation” and that Russia’s inability to aid a “key ally is undoubtedly embarrassing.” Rather than indifference or neglect, however, both countries have more disciplined definitions of their national interests that restrain them from direct involvement. Additionally, both powers are likely to gain strategic advantages the longer the United States is involved in the war.

The Iran Conflict Is Becoming a Russia-Ukraine Proxy War

Max Boot

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Max Boot is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He wrote this piece from Kyiv, Ukraine.

It has become common for major conflicts to become proxy wars, with outside powers intervening to help their friends and hurt their foes. The Soviet Union, for example, supplied North Korea and North Vietnam in wars against the United States. The United States returned the favor by supplying the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s in their war against the Red Army. The Iran war is no different. Both Russia and Ukraine are trying to use the Middle East conflict, which pits Israel and the United States against Iran, to their own advantage.

The Third Gulf War Follows Directly From the Last Two

Seva Gunitsky

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Time has a way of compressing history. The Hundred Years’ War was a series of three separate wars that must have felt as distinct to its contemporaries as the World Wars feel to us now. But those three wars were a long time ago, so we lump them together into one conflict. Besides, we are wise. We have seen the direction of History and know they were all fought over the unresolved question of England’s rivalry with France.

I suspect future historians will apply the same compression to the three Gulf Wars of the unipolar era. While 1991, 2003, and 2026 are distinct in many ways, they all revolve around repeated attempts by the hegemon to impose its order on a region that it appears to understand less and less each time.

How the US could try to seize Iran's Kharg Island

Frank Gardner

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US President Donald Trump has indicated that he may send troops to seize control of Iran's key oil export terminal at Kharg Island in the northern Gulf. So what's behind this, how would it work and what are the risks?

Kharg Island has long been Iran's chief outlet for its oil exports. The island sits offshore with waters deep enough to load product onto tankers known as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), which can hold around two million barrels. Around 90% of Iran's oil exports pass through Kharg.

During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s it was frequently bombed by the Iraqi Air Force and on 13 March this year the US struck what it said were 90 military targets on the island. It however spared the oil infrastructure.

The Real War for Iran’s Future

Afshon Ostovar

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On March 1, 2026, the Iranian government made it official. “After a lifetime of struggle,” a state broadcaster declared, “Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei drank the sweet, pure draft of martyrdom and joined the Supreme Heavenly Kingdom.” The broadcaster praised Khamenei for being “unceasing and untiring” and for his “lofty and celestial spirit.” As he read the announcement, people offscreen wailed. When he finished, he, too, broke down in tears.

Most Iranians probably didn’t cry when they learned of Khamenei’s passing. For over 35 years, Iran’s supreme leader ruled with an iron fist, repressing women, minorities, and anyone who dared challenge him. But the dramatic wording of the death announcement was, in a sense, warranted: more than anyone else, Khamenei is the architect of the Islamic Republic and all it has entailed. Although it was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who established the theocracy by seizing power during Iran’s 1979 revolution, it was his successor who transformed it into the country it is now. It was Khamenei who ensured that the supreme leader remained Iran’s paramount authority in practice, not just in principle. It was Khamenei who pushed Iran to pursue regional hegemony, thus committing it to perpetual conflict with Israel and the United States. And it was Khamenei who transformed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), once a military with an uncertain future, into the central pillar of the government.

‘Learn How to Fight for Yourself’: Trump Says U.K. and Others Should Go to Strait of Hormuz and 'Take' Oil

Olivia-Anne Cleary and Tiago Ventura

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President Donald Trump said nations that are struggling to get jet fuel due to Iran’s chokehold of the Strait of Hormuz should go to the vital waterway and “take” the oil. “All of those countries that can’t get jet fuel because of the Strait of Hormuz, like the United Kingdom, which refused to get involved in the decapitation of Iran, I have a suggestion for you: Number 1, buy from the U.S., we have plenty, and Number 2, build up some delayed courage, go to the Strait, and just take it,” he said Tuesday morning.

Continuing his message to nations who refused, beyond defensive measures, to actively get involved with the Iran war, Trump warned: “You’ll have to start learning how to fight for yourself, the U.S.A. won’t be there to help you anymore, just like you weren’t there for us.” Trump went on to claim that Iran has “been, essentially, decimated” and that the “hard part” has been done by the U.S.

Why Iran Thinks It's Winning

Karl Vick and Kay Armin Serjoie

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Iran’s leaders believe they are prevailing in the war, and not without reason, analysts say. A month into a conflict prosecuted by two far more powerful militaries, the Islamic Republic has not only survived, but appears poised to dictate the terms of how it ends. “Yes, military bases have been targeted. A lot of military commanders have been killed. But from their point of view, they are winning the war,” says Saeid Golkar, an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, and an expert on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). “They have been able to push Trump back to negotiating.”

After more than 16,000 airstrikes by the U.S. and Israel, the fulcrum of the war is not Iran’s battered military but, rather, the fate of the world economy. The Tehran regime regards the impact it has had on global oil prices as validation of its doctrine of asymmetrical warfare—relying not on tanks or battleships, but pinprick attacks targeting the fragile infrastructure of the Middle East’s petroleum industry.

A Toothless Iran? Missile and Drone Strikes Show It Can Still Inflict Pain.

Nicholas Kulish, Helene CooperIsabel Kershner and Erika Solomon

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An Iranian strike on an American military base in Saudi Arabia, injuring two dozen troops. Two drones targeting a port in Oman, and a strike on the Kuwait International Airport. Workers at an aluminum facility in Abu Dhabi wounded by a missile and drone attack.

President Trump has said that the United States has all but obliterated Iranian military abilities, portraying Iran as a defanged adversary. The U.S. military says that the number of attacks Iran has launched has declined by roughly 90 percent from the opening days of the war, and the Israeli military says it has rendered roughly 70 percent of Iran’s hundreds of missile launchers inoperable. But a series of attacks against Israel and Gulf countries in the past several days is only the latest evidence that Iran retains enough missiles and drones to destabilize the region and inflict a punishing cost on its foes, while signaling that, contrary to Mr. Trump’s declarations, it is still very much in the fight.

How the US could try to seize Iran's Kharg Island

Frank Gardner

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US President Donald Trump has indicated that he may send troops to seize control of Iran's key oil export terminal at Kharg Island in the northern Gulf. So what's behind this, how would it work and what are the risks? Kharg Island has long been Iran's chief outlet for its oil exports. The island sits offshore with waters deep enough to load product onto tankers known as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), which can hold around two million barrels. Around 90% of Iran's oil exports pass through Kharg.

During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s it was frequently bombed by the Iraqi Air Force and on 13 March this year the US struck what it said were 90 military targets on the island. It however spared the oil infrastructure. If the US does decide to invade Kharg Island then it would most likely be a temporary measure intended to put pressure on Iran by cutting off its fuel exports until it relinquished its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz - one of the world's busiest oil shipping lanes - and conceded to Washington's demands.

The Saudis found an escape hatch for some of the world’s oil. The Houthis could slam it shut

Anna Cooban

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The world, hungry for oil, got a modest reprieve earlier this month when Saudi Arabia began diverting millions of barrels of crude —ordinarily destined for ships transiting the blockaded Strait of Hormuz — to its Red Sea port of Yanbu. But over the weekend Iran-backed Houthi militants entered the war in an escalation that threatens to sever even that lifeline.

Anything that jeopardizes Saudi oil flows out of the Red Sea will put more upward pressure on global oil prices, said Richard Bronze, co-founder and head of geopolitics at research firm Energy Aspects. As many as 4.6 million barrels per day were loaded onto vessels at Yanbu over the past two weeks — more than three times the average over 2025, according to shipping data firm Vortexa.

Trump’s threat against Iran desalination plants would be a war crime, legal experts say

George Headley

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WASHINGTON – On Monday, President Donald Trump threatened to destroy all desalination plants in Iran. Strikes on water infrastructure relied on by civilians would violate international law, legal experts say Unless a plant supplies water only to a military base, said Marko Milanovic, a professor of public international law at the University of Reading, ordering such a strike would be “manifestly unlawful.”

“Desalination plants are generally civilian objects, and as such protected from attack,” he said. “They also enjoy special protection as objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.” Destroying infrastructure needed by civilians violates Article 54 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which lists “drinking water installations and supplies” as examples of targets that are off-limits. But enforcing international laws of warfare against a U.S. president would be nearly impossible, legal scholars said.

The risks of kinetic counter-proliferation

Daniel Salisbury

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Iran’s nuclear programme has featured repeatedly in stated rationales from the United States for recent US–Israel-led military operations against the country. Beginning in late February 2026, the US military has repeatedly struck Iranian targets, killing the country’s political leadership as well as destroying Iran’s missile capability, navy and other military forces.

The latest campaign takes place after the Twelve-Day War in 2025, in which Israel struck military and nuclear targets, and the US struck three key nuclear sites – Natanz, Fordow and Esfahan – in Operation Midnight Hammer. The following eight months saw limited Iranian efforts to reconstitute its programme, suggesting some degree of military success in rolling back Iran’s capabilities.

Advancing European Military Capacity in Space

Erin Pobjie

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European governments have announced ambitions to significantly build up their military space assets in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and Europe’s overdependence on the United States in the space domain. This report examines how European allies could strengthen their ability to operate in, through and from space in a European-theatre contingency.

Any major Russian military operation against one or more NATO allies would unfold in a contested space domain. Russian counterspace capabilities – including direct-ascent anti-satellite systems, jamming, cyber operations and on-orbit proximity activities – are already operational. European governments, armed forces and societies are dependent on space-enabled services, including satellite communications; positioning, navigation and timing through systems such as the Global Positioning System and Galileo; and Earth observation. These systems and their associated ground segments constitute critical assets and would be priority targets in a high-intensity conflict.

If the United States Storms Kharg Island: Why Amphibious Superiority Could Fail in the Persian Gulf

Eluvio Detritus

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On the surface, the U.S. military appears to enjoy almost textbook-level advantages in joint amphibious warfare: aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, V-22 Ospreys, CH-53Ks, LCAC hovercraft, nuclear submarines, long-range cruise missiles, plus airborne early warning, electronic warfare, and layered air defense. Any one of these elements, taken in isolation, would be enough to intimidate most regional militaries.

The problem is that the Persian Gulf is not a neutral battlespace. Its geography, climate, hydrography, channel width, density of coastal fires, and supply distances all compress the space in which U.S. advantages can be brought to bear. Capabilities that are highly lethal in blue water or open-ocean operations may become cumbersome and reactive in the Gulf, where maneuver room is limited, supply chains are stretched, and the operational window is far narrower.

How Geopolitics Overran Globalization

Eswar Prasad

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Not too long ago, globalization was seen by academics and policymakers as a powerful force bringing the world closer together and promoting economic prosperity and stability. The open flow of goods, services, money, natural resources, and people would benefit all countries and make it possible to transfer knowledge, ideas, and technology across national borders. Globalization promised to bridge divides between advanced and developing economies, binding them together in a mesh of shared interests. It seemed reasonable to assume that this would even foster geopolitical stability, as collective prosperity would incentivize countries to tamp down conflicts that could disrupt their economic.

A Monroe Doctrine for AI

Carl Meacham & Kai Golden

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Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently observed that American security and prosperity are inextricably tied to the Western Hemisphere. This will be even more true in the age of artificial intelligence, where the global race for supremacy will be won or lost in our own neighborhood. To prevail, the United States must ensure that the Americas, from Canada to Chile, run on American AI and U.S.-aligned AI infrastructure. The Monroe Doctrine, which barred foreign powers from encroaching in the Americas, is as relevant in the Age of AI as it was in the 19th and 20th centuries.

If China supplies Latin America’s AI infrastructure, it won’t just sell cloud services, it will set the technical standards, lock in long-term revenue streams, and embed political leverage into the region’s digital backbone. If the United States leads instead, it secures markets for its companies, reinforces a rules-based digital ecosystem, and anchors the hemisphere’s economic future in American innovation. This is not just a commercial competition; it is a contest that will determine the dominant superpower of the 21st century.

Iran in the Box: The Coercive Architecture of the 2026 Iran War and Its Strategic Implications

Lance Gordon

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The 2026 war between the United States–Israel coalition and the Islamic Republic of Iran followed decades of unsuccessful efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear and regional military programs through negotiation, sanctions, and limited military action. Agreements slowed elements of the program but did not eliminate enrichment capability, ballistic missile development, or the proxy network that allowed Tehran to project power while avoiding direct state conflict. The dispute persisted because the parties held incompatible positions on whether Iran could retain near-weapons-grade enrichment.

By the mid-2020s, the issue had become urgent. Intelligence assessments indicated that Iran could produce weapons-grade uranium within days, enabled by stockpiles enriched to 60 percent and reduced international monitoring after limits on International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Reporting also pointed to continued work relevant to weaponization. Israeli leaders viewed these developments through a doctrine that existential threats must be stopped before they become operational. Iran continued to support Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis, creating a regional network able to operate under a potential nuclear threshold.

Testing The Limits of Aegean Deterrence, Gray Zone Warfare, & Sovereignty

Elias Diakos

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In April 2022, several public, official, and military sources reported Turkish fighter aircraft conducted overflights above Greek islands in the eastern Aegean. The move exemplified grey-zone tactics: sustained pressure below armed conflict. These actions constituted national airspace violations rather than mere FIR rule violations. Flight Information Region (FIR) is an internationally designated airspace within which a state provides air traffic and flight information services. Entering national airspace at low altitudes over inhabited islands left no room for misinterpretation. The Hellenic Air Force deployed pairs of F-16s to intercept. An official incident was recorded. In line with established practice, standard diplomatic protests were lodged, and the day fortunately ended without further escalation.

In 2022, according to HNDGS data, there were 11,256 violations of national airspace, 234 overflights above islands, and 333 engagements between Greek and Turkish aircraft. In total, 2,758 aircraft were involved. The numbers do not point to a “crisis,” but rather patterns of routine activity. Turkey’s April 2022 airspace violation occurred during a period of heightened tension. Greece had recently reinforced its military presence in the Aegean, prompting Turkey to respond with a show of force just short of direct engagement. However, persistent hostilities of this nature pose the constant risk of escalation while shifting the dispute from national airspace to the issue of sovereignty itself.

Why U.S. Special Operations Forces Will Focus More On The Cyber Domain

Zita Ballinger Fletcher,

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United States Special Operations Command will prioritize cyber warfare in response to the increasingly sophisticated technology of adversaries, military leaders told members of Congress during a House Armed Services Committee hearing on March 18 in Washington, D.C. Derrick Anderson, U.S. assistant secretary of war for special operations and low-intensity conflict, and U.S. Navy Admiral Frank M. Bradley, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, told lawmakers that Special Operations Forces need to maintain a competitive edge in disruptive technology to succeed in the modern threat environment.

Special Operations Forces are tasked with using finesse, intelligence and elite military skills to complete a wide array of covert operations, including dismantling terrorist networks and working proactively to thwart hostile actions, while building strong relationships with U.S. allies and partners. Anderson testified that Special Operation Forces comprise less than 3% of the U.S. military and have been operating on a shoestring budget since 2019 that is “roughly equivalent to the procurement cost of a single aircraft carrier,” while expected to deliver exceptional results on high-risk global missions.

Review: Raising the Bar – The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art in U.S. Army Doctrine

David Maxwell

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Colonel Kevin M. Benson’s Raising the Bar: The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art in U.S. Army Doctrine, 1983–1994 is more than a history of a military school. It is a study of intellectual reform inside a great institution, key for the U.S. armed forces’ development. The book shows how ideas, when paired with disciplined education, can reshape doctrine and change the conduct of war.

I have to admit my professional bias. I graduated from The Advanced Military Studies Program of SAMS in 1996, and I believe it shaped my thinking for the remainder of my Army career to this day. Benson tells the story of how the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) emerged at a moment of doctrinal crisis. In the late 1970s, the Army struggled with the limits of tactical thinking. The service had mastered the mechanics of battle but often failed to connect tactical actions to strategic objectives. Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege saw the gap. Drawing lessons from World War II and from the disproportionate number of Command and General Staff College graduates who later became senior commanders, he argued that the Army required a cadre of officers educated in the operational level of war.

Corporate AI as the Military’s Weakest Link

Michael Cody

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The military doctrine now seeks to employ artificial intelligence as part of its operational arsenal, framed largely as a question of speed, efficiency, and competitive necessity. This framing is familiar and, in some ways, understandable. Large institutions tend to adopt new technologies first as tools, only later as systems that require governance of their own. The problem is not that the Department of Defense is experimenting with generative models, but that this experimentation is already being normalized as routine infrastructure rather than treated as a fragile and high-risk intervention. Defense reporting indicates that the Department is already tracking more than one million unique users on its enterprise generative AI platform within months of launch, a scale that would have been unthinkable for experimental systems only a few years ago. That imbalance matters, because data control, operational language, and internal reasoning patterns are not abstract assets. They are the connective tissue of military power, and once they are externalized through probabilistic systems, they cannot simply be pulled back inside by policy assurances or procedural checklists.

It is important to be clear about what this concern is not. This is not an argument about model autonomy, emergent behavior, or speculative future intelligence. The dominant risk does not arise from what large language models might decide to do on their own. It arises from how humans use them when they become convenient. The Department of Defense has decades of experience managing classified information, enforcing compartmentalization, and responding to breaches. There is no reason to believe that this institutional knowledge has vanished.