Caught Between India’s Military Ambitions and Green Promises: The Future of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands

Genevieve Mallet

Source Link

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands stretch across the Bay of Bengal, between the Indian mainland and the Strait of Malacca. Of the 836 islands and rocky outcrops that make up the archipelago, only 31 are inhabited, home to around 400,000 people. Known for their turquoise waters, dense forests and multicoloured pigeons, the islands are also home to six indigenous tribes, including the isolated Sentinelese.

Yet beyond their natural beauty, the islands have become central to India’s maritime strategy and development ambitions, placing them at the heart of a growing tension between environmental preservation, renewable energy goals and military expansion.

In 2021 the Indian government announced the Great Nicobar Island Development Project, a plan to construct an international Container Transshipment Terminal, a civil and military airport, a township, and a 450 MVA gas and solar based power plant by 2050. In February of this year, the National Green Tribunal cleared the way for this ₹92,000 crore (USD $10 billion) mega-infrastructure project, citing its “strategic importance”, despite the risks posed to the islands’ biodiversity and indigenous populations.

China’s National Party Congress 2026: defence remains a priority amid fiscal challenges

Lucie Béraud-Sudreau

Source Link

On 5 March, Premier Li Qiang delivered his government work report at the opening session of the National People’s Congress (NPC). The speech contained economic growth targets for 2026, including for 4.5% real-terms growth in GDP, the slowest since 1991.

This more modest economic objective is unsurprising in the light of the current headwinds in the Chinese economy. As highlighted in recent IISS Charting China analysis, the government is grappling with weak consumer confidence, high urban unemployment and a falling property market. The goal also aligns with the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections. The IMF’s January 2026 forecasts indicated an estimated 4.5% GDP growth in 2026, followed by a slowdown to 4% in 2027.

The central bank’s governor, Pan Gongsheng, and Minister of Finance Lan Foan reportedly indicated in 2025 that China would require an annual growth rate of at least 4.17% over the next decade to become a medium-level developed country in terms of GDP per capita by 2035. GDP targets are therefore unlikely to dip significantly below 4.5% in the near term.

Iran: Relearning the Importance of Waging a War, Not Just Fighting One

James Michael Dubik

Source Link

Our operations in Iran are again teaching that war involves more than fighting. Wars must be fought and waged. Fighting is a necessary part of war, and the U.S. military is very good at it. Our military won every tactical engagement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. American citizens have every reason to ask, therefore, if we fight so successfully, why did we lose in Vietnam and Afghanistan and why was success in Iraq so limited? And will the same thing happen in Iran?

These are questions are about America’s war-waging capacity. Fighting succeeds when military forces integrate and synchronize, among themselves and with allies, seven important battlefield functions—intelligence, maneuver, fires (air and ground), protection (from enemy ground, air, cyber, and space threats), mobility/counter-mobility, sustainment, and command and control. Successful fighting requires that all seven stay in synch, as much as possible, from start to finish. This requires constant adaptation because fighting is unpredictable. Change, fear, fog, friction, and surprise are the only constants in fighting. Perfection is never the standard; being better than your enemy is. Even allowing for inevitable mistakes, the U.S. military, fighting as a joint force and usually with coalition partners, are expert professionals at fighting well.

The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence

Nicole Grajewski and Ankit Panda

Source Link

Although it was the United States and Israel that instigated attacks on Iran on February 28, leaders in Tehran deserve some of the blame for failing to effectively deter their adversaries. As the now deceased commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, once put it, maintaining deterrence is like riding a bicycle: “You have to keep pedaling all the time, or else the bicycle will fall.” Over the past three years, Iran has started to lose its balance; now it has tipped over.

In recent decades, Tehran developed what it believed was a system of layered deterrence. It invested in conventional forces and air defenses to protect its nuclear program and retaliate against Israel and U.S. bases throughout the region. Through a sprawling network of partners known as the axis of resistance—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Houthi forces in Yemen, and Shiite militias in Iraq—Iran promised to escalate any attack on its homeland into a regional affair. And Iran’s nuclear program would function as the ultimate backstop. Tehran hoped that the mere development of an advanced civil nuclear program—not an actual weapon—would make the country too dangerous for adversaries to ignore, even as the ambiguity of the program would make it hard for adversaries to justify an attack against it. If necessary, Iran’s civilian nuclear program could be quickly repurposed for military use.

WARDEN’S FIVE RINGS AND REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN

Jacob Stoil 

Source Link

In 1995 Colonel John Warden published The Enemy as a System, in which he posited a five-ring model for understanding and targeting enemy states, with leadership at the center and fielded forces as the outermost ring. In between were rings representing the population, infrastructure, and resources like energy. His work followed the tradition of B.H. Liddel Hart’s The Strategy of Indirect Approach and Giulio Douhet’s Command of the Air in searching for a way to defeat an enemy without the costly and ultimately attritional endeavor of grinding down their military to achieve victory. The result of this model was the concept that when properly applied, the use of airpower could allow the United States to bypass the outermost rings and target the enemy leadership directly. This “decapitation” would at the very least cause complete strategic paralysis in the enemy and possibly even cause regime collapse but in either case, it would bring victory.

The war in Iran began with one of the most effective decapitation strikes in history, but while it may have caused temporary paralysis, it neither brought down the regime nor brought victory. This is because while Warden’s five ring model may apply, the importance of the rings changes radically based on the nature of the state and the system. Bringing down a robust regime like Iran is still possible but requires a radically different approach from defeating a fragile one.

Broader Lessons of the Middle East War

Alan Dowd

Source Link

The U.S. and Europe spent much of the last 20 years trying to induce and incentivize Iran to behave like a normal country. In response, Iran trained, funded and equipped Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq; supported brutal dictators (Syria) and undermined nascent democracies (Iraq); continued its drive for nuclear weapons; locked out IAEA inspectors; harbored al-Qaeda’s leader; used proxies to kill Americans; attacked international shipping; bankrolled the beastly Hamas assault of October 7, 2023; tried to assassinate a former U.S. president; and massacred 36,000 of its own people.

In response to the U.S.-Israel air campaign, Iran would be justified to strike Israeli and U.S. military targets. But in keeping with its outlaw nature, Iran sprayed the entire region with terror weapons—striking desalination facilities in Bahrain; unfettering Hezbollah (again) to pound Israel with rockets; hitting civilian airports in Azerbaijan, the UAE and Kuwait; bombing hotels in the UAE and Iraq; attacking commercial ships; firing cluster-munitions at population centers.

How Iranian Missiles Could Secure Israel-GCC Normalization

Joseph Epstein

Source Link

Three weeks ago, it would have been unthinkable for Al Jazeera to run an op-ed arguing that the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran was working. The Qatari state-funded outlet has been at the vanguard of the information war against Israel since the Hamas terror attacks of October 7, 2023. Indeed, it employed at least six journalists who simultaneously served as operatives in Hamas’ military wing and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, giving terrorist fighters cover as credentialed press.

Yet on March 16, Al Jazeera published exactly that article—written from Doha by an academic living under Iranian missile alerts. When the house organ of Qatari soft power begins making the case for American and Israeli war aims, something fundamental has shifted.

U.S. Risks Repeating Its Iraq Errors in Iran

Robert Ellis

Source Link

George Santayana’s sage observation, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” has come back to haunt us. In this case, the Trump administration’s war with Iran is a repeat performance of the war with Iraq in 2003, but with a global impact.

Robert Draper’s definitive account, To Start a War, is a helpful reminder. The book deals with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s “Sisyphean quest” to bring down Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein, which culminated in the invasion of Iraq. The process involved convincing the Bush administration as well as the American public that Saddam was behind the 9/11 attacks and in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

What constitutes victory in an ‘asymmetric’ war with Iran?

Ned Temko

Source Link

“Gone” was President Donald Trump’s verdict this week on the state of Iran’s navy, its air force, its anti-aircraft batteries, its radar installations – and “perhaps most importantly, its leaders.” And on all of the above, with just a bit of his trademark hyperbole, he was absolutely right. Yet even with tit-for-tat attacks on energy facilities threatening to widen the conflict further, Mr. Trump has been making another, broader claim: “We won.”

Why We Wrote This

In the “asymmetric” Iran war, victory looks different for each side: The U.S. and Israel must decisively win – or convincingly claim they have – while the Iranian regime only has to survive.

And that isn’t true. At least not yet.

Nearly three weeks into the conflict, he has come face-to-face with the sobering complexities of what security experts call “asymmetric war” – an overwhelmingly powerful military force pitted against an ostensibly far weaker adversary.

Ukraine Wants to Cash in on Iran’s Drone Threat

Sam Skove

Source Link

Iran’s aerial assault on Arab Gulf states—now in its third week—has been dominated by waves of Shahed drones, which are cheaper and easier to mass produce than the ballistic missiles Tehran has also launched. So much so that data released by several Gulf states indicate they have thus far faced roughly three Iranian drones for every ballistic missile.

Ukraine, which has been dealing with similar drones from Russia over four years of war, is looking to cash in on that experience—in terms of earning both goodwill and actual investment by dispatching teams of experts to the Middle East and fielding requests to its companies making counterdrone technology.

How the Iran War Could Hit AI—and Then the Economy

Andrew R. Chow

Source Link

The AI industry, and specifically its data center investments, are essentially holding up the U.S. economy, accounting for ‌39% of U.S. GDP growth in the first three quarters of last year, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The Iran War could threaten that growth in several ways. Paul Kedrosky, an investor and research fellow at MIT’s Institute for the Digital Economy, tells TIME that the onset of the war has made him “vastly more” concerned about the systemic economic risks related to AI, because “the consequences are unknowable in terms of how this ripples through this highly interconnected energy and information grid.”

Energy— Many AI data centers, which train AI systems like ChatGPT and process their queries, are powered by natural gas. While Iran’s first big resource strain has been on oil, gas facilities have been targeted in the Gulf. Analysts say they could take months to repair, leading to higher gas prices worldwide. European natural gas prices surged by as much as 30 percent on Thursday.

The Industrial Window of War: How to Measure Russia’s Munitions Throughput—and How to Disrupt It

Cosimo Meneguzzo and Fabrizio Minniti

Source Link

Russia’s battlefield endurance in Ukraine is determined not by the size of Soviet‑era stockpiles but by a temporary industrial window—a period when production plus imports outpaces daily shell consumption. In 2025 Russian factories churned out about seven million artillery, mortar, tank and rocket rounds, excluding guided multiple-launch rocket system and loitering munitions—roughly nineteen thousand rounds per day—while open‑source estimates put Russian expenditure at ten to fifteen thousand rounds per day. As long as production and imports meet or exceed consumption, Moscow can sustain the war and rebuild reserves. When throughput falls below usage, the window closes and operational tempo shrinks.

Allied strategy, therefore, should not be guided by counting stockpiles, but by measuring—and taking steps to influence—throughput. Public intelligence reports, defense journalism, and other open‑source data combine to offer a view of that throughput. In some instances, audited totals are available; elsewhere educated estimates are necessary. But by combining these and acknowledging the distinction, it is possible not only to identify a range of the most likely current throughput, but also to assign a degree of certainty to it. The industrial window concept can then be applied to both Russia and its opponents, highlighting how cross‑theater demands shape ammunition availability and offering practical implications for planners.

My Introduction to Michael Smith's “Accountability Is Not Dead—It’s Just Selective,”

Donald Vandergriff

Source Link

Michael Smith’s latest article, “Accountability Is Not Dead—It’s Just Selective,” strikes at the heart of a profound crisis in contemporary American institutions. Smith rightly observes that what was once a foundational principle, personal and institutional accountability rooted in rigid standards, has devolved into selective enforcement where rules apply only to some.

As he powerfully states, “When the rules only apply to some people, they aren’t rules anymore. They’re preferences.”¹ This selective accountability is not merely a media failing, as illustrated by the CNN episode involving Abby Phillip and Ana Navarro during coverage of the recent ISIS-inspired attack in New York. It is a symptom of a deeper cultural and structural decay that permeates our society, including our most critical institution: the United States military.

Influence by Design A Network Strategy for Integrated Deterrence

Robert S. Hinck

Source Link

The 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy place integrated deterrence as the centerpiece of U.S. strategy. Integrated deterrence—which “entails working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, all instruments of U.S. national power, and [America’s] network of Alliances and partnerships”—is to be tailored to specific circumstances and applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors’ perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint.1 As this lengthy description suggests, integrated deterrence draws on multiple approaches to deterrence to create a holistic strategy in pursuit of American national interests.2 It represents a far broader view than previous U.S. approaches to deterrence—one that can succeed if made actionable.

While the strategic vision laid out in the NDS is praiseworthy in its scope and direction, criticisms remain.3 First, operational concerns include the apparent tasking of the Department of Defense (DOD)—now the Department of War (DOW)—with the execution of integrated deterrence. This tasking is problematic given the stated intent to align all instruments of national power, not just the military. It also leads to doubt as to whether the interagency community is capable of coordinating a unity of effort

Japan’s Next Moonshot: Leadership in High-Performance Computing Coupled with Quantum Computing Technology

Ulrike Schaede

Source Link

Through public-private collaboration, Japan is pushing the technology frontier in next-generation high-performance computing (HPC) and quantum computing, beyond current-generation artificial intelligence (AI). Sizable investments are beginning to yield results, from building the infrastructure for next-generation hardware to new start-ups. This new moonshot leverages Japan’s long-standing core competencies in high-level precision manufacturing, hardware excellence, system-level engineering, computing design innovation, and industrial policy. It is also a central piece in Japan’s response to the rise of geoeconomics. Rather than viewing the world in only zero-sum terms, Japan’s positioning begins with a conviction that nobody can win alone in the new world of HPC and quantum computing. To balance power relations in the U.S.-Japan security umbrella, Japan’s national economic security strategy is centered on forging inextricable tie-ups with the United States.

Japan’s New Moonshot: Quantum and High-Performance Computing

AI is on everybody’s mind, in Japan just as much as everywhere else. While Japan may have been late in developing its own AI, there is now substantial investment and activity around domestic AI design. These are often specialized to certain areas; for example, the NEC cotomi focuses on helping companies accelerate their digital transformation. In October 2025 a new government push was announced to build more domestic AI in order to reduce dependency on U.S. and Chinese AI models.[1]

Starlink Has Privatized Geopolitics

Robert Muggah 

Source Link

Starlink is far more than a commercial connectivity service. It is strategic infrastructure that increasingly shapes how wars are fought, how states manage internal unrest, and how criminal networks operate in ungoverned spaces. What makes Starlink so politically consequential is not just its globe-spanning reach but also the governance model behind it.

A private company is now a gatekeeper in orbit, helping decide who connects as well as where, under what conditions, and with what technical constraints. In a growing number of conflicts, these decisions carry military and political effects that states struggle to replicate or control. If many strategic supply chains now depend on private firms, Starlink is an unusually concentrated case of private discretion over public security functions.

After Chagos Deal, PRC Seeks to Alter Indian Ocean Balance

Source Link

Mauritius supports the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on virtually every geopolitical issue while receiving Chinese diplomatic and economic support for its own priorities, particularly over its claim to sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. This allows Beijing to secure reliable political backing and a strategically positioned partner in the Indian Ocean at relatively low cost, strengthening its influence in a region where U.S. and Indian interests intersect.

Beijing has built a substantial economic and institutional presence in Mauritius. Through a landmark 2019 free trade agreement, the first Beijing signed with an African state, and Chinese state-led investments, it has amassed long-term economic leverage and strategic access abroad. Huawei is the island’s primary partner for surveillance, connectivity, and digital infrastructure. Concentrating these partnerships under one vendor lowers technical barriers to potential data access or network exploitation.

Credibility vs. Speed: Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Information War

Ashraf Aldmour

Source Link

The Gaza conflict underscores a central fact of modern war. The decisive contest is often fought in the information environment, where attention, emotion, and perceived legitimacy shape what governments can do and what publics will tolerate. US doctrine increasingly treats information as a foundational element of military activity and calls on the Joint Force to operationalize informational power to shape perceptions and behavior through the Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE) and the DoD OIE Strategy. Operations in the information environment are defined as integrated actions intended to affect drivers of behavior by informing audiences and influencing relevant actors, as described in a CRS report.

That environment was especially contested in Gaza because the war unfolded under intense global visibility and constant online scrutiny. Every strike, casualty report, and humanitarian convoy could trigger immediate diplomatic pressure and rapid amplification on social platforms. In practice, Israel and Hamas ran parallel campaigns to shape interpretation, mobilize supporters, deter adversaries, and limit external intervention. Hamas was a central driver of messaging from Gaza, but it was not the only source. 

Seven U.S. allies back potential Strait of Hormuz coalition

Barak Ravid

Source Link

Seven U.S. allies announced in a joint statement on Thursday their support for a potential coalition to reopen the strait of Hormuz for commercial ships and oil tankers. Reality check: The statement does not include any commitment to send naval vessels or other resources to make that happen. For now, it's largely a gesture to placate President Trump, who has railed against allies for declining to help secure the strait and warned that a failure to do so could undermine the future of NATO.

Why it matters: The strait closure has become the main crisis for the White House in the war.As long as the Iranian blockade holds and Gulf oil remains trapped, President Trump can't end the war and declare victory even if he wants to.

Driving the news: The White House has been trying both military and diplomatic means to unlock the Hormuz crisis.The U.S. military is conducting strikes on Iranian anti-ship positions along the shores of the Strait of Hormuz to decimate Iran's ability to attack oil tankers.

Meanwhile, the White House and State Department have tried to build a coalition of countries to provide ships, other military assets and political backing for a mission to escort ships or otherwise provide a secure route for shipping in and out of the Gulf.

The Weight of War and Reclaiming Combat Agility

Source Link

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Aaron McClendon argues in this latest Special Warfare Journal article that the U.S. Army must prioritize mobility and agility over excessive protection and equipment as it transitions from the Global War on Terror to large-scale combat operations. McClendon explains that modern soldiers carry significantly heavier loads than previous generations, which degrades mobility, increases fatigue, and reduces lethality.

He situates this problem within a broader institutional transition in which the Army must rethink doctrine, force structure, and sustainment practices. Overreliance on protection, logistics, and technological solutions can create vulnerabilities rather than advantages. Ultimately, McClendon contends that combat effectiveness depends on an agile force capable of rapid maneuver, risk acceptance, and operational adaptability in contested environments.

Chinese Eyes, Iranian Missiles: Intelligence Cooperation in the US/Israel–Iran War 2026

Tahir Azad

Source Link

The 2026 war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran exemplifies one of the most technologically intricate wars in contemporary Middle Eastern history. The capability of Iran to execute accurate missile and drone strikes on Israeli urban centers and American military installations in the Gulf region astonished numerous military analysts. The accuracy unveiled in these missions indicates the existence of advanced targeting systems, satellite navigation, and real-time intelligence networks. Despite Iran’s development of an indigenous missile program over the past thirty years, critics increasingly contend that its recent operational achievements cannot be attributed purely to domestic technological capabilities. A burgeoning corpus of evidence indicates that China has significantly contributed intelligence support, satellite navigation, radar systems, and electronic warfare technologies that augment Iran’s targeting capabilities.

The alliance between China and Iran is founded on extensive geopolitical interests. Iran is a pivotal ally in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a significant energy provider, and a crucial geopolitical counterbalance to U.S. dominance in the Middle East. China’s technology collaboration, especially in space-based information and navigation systems, may facilitate Iran’s execution of precision warfare against the US and Israeli sites while circumventing direct military engagement.

A Contest of Wills: China and the Quad

Nathan Kepner

Source Link

The United States is at an inflection point; a rising China and a shifting political landscape in the Western Hemisphere have created great strategic tension in Washington. China remains the pacing threat, but senior leaders’ focus is shifting to affairs in the Western Hemisphere. Defending the Homeland will include improving US posture in the Indo-Pacific as expanding Chinese power may reach uncomfortably close to Guam or even Haiwaii sooner rather than later. 

In varying degrees of virulency, a considerable portion of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) supports a restoration of Chinese power and the burial of the century of humiliation. This creates an environment and opportunity for Beijing to take advantage of a distracted international body to rewire the world to its benefit. The US and its partners have the tools, such as existing partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, to guard against Chinese aggression but must change how it uses them. To defend the Homeland and ensure “a free and open Indo-Pacific,” the US should confront the China challenge by working with Allies and Partners to transform the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) from an informal security cooperative into a community of collective defense.

Space Force to refine ‘orbital warfare’ maneuvers with new prototype

Nicholas Slayton

Source Link

Space Force guardians have been expanding their terrestrial and orbital infrastructure for months, and this month they gained a new asset: a prototype that will let them train in the kind of “orbital warfare” the service wants to master.

Launched from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida, on Feb. 12 and designated USSF-87, it was originally announced to be carrying two Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) assets — themselves meant to help with space-based surveillance — but there was one more onboard. Combat Forces Command Commander Lt. Gen. Gregory Gagnon told journalists at the Air and Space Forces Association’s Air Warfare Symposium about the third, and gave some initial details on how it will be used by Space Force guardians. Air & Space Forces Magazine first reported on the news.

How the US Is Squandering Its Science and Technology Advantage

Eleanor Hardegree

Source Link

The Stimson Center publishes the Red Cell series. Drawing upon the legacy of the CIA’s Red Cell—established following the September 11 attacks to avoid similar analytic failures in the future—the project works to challenge assumptions, misperceptions, and groupthink with a view to encouraging alternative approaches to America’s foreign and national security policy challenges. For more information about the Stimson Center’s Red Cell Project, see 

Since the second Trump administration began in early 2025, funding cuts to scientific research have disrupted the work of many US universities and government agencies. These cuts have worrying implications for critical research, the economy, and the future of US scientific talent. Reducing resources at a time when China is forging ahead—if not already ahead—in certain emerging technologies risks US science and technology (S&T) leadership. Against this backdrop of increased competition with China, the United States is bizarrely abandoning its advantages in basic research, higher education, and the ability to attract international talent, in stark opposition to the American approach to the USSR during the Cold War.