Indian Strategic Studies: May 2026

1 May 2026

Japan and China Are Edging Dangerously Close to Conflict

Deng Yuwen

On April 17, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Ikazuchi transited the Taiwan Strait. It was the second such passage by a Japanese warship in 10 months, yet Beijing’s response was far harsher this time. Relations between Beijing and Tokyo have degenerated sharply since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments last November that Japan could come to Taiwan’s defense if China attacked.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, and Eastern Theater Command all put out statements condemning Japan after the April transit, telling it to “step back from the brink” and warning it to “return from the wrong path,” while Jun Zhengping, a People’s Liberation Army-linked social media account, warned that Japan was playing with fire. At the same time, the Eastern Theater Command launched combat readiness patrols in the East China Sea and sent warships near Okinawa.

Sun Tzu’s Advice for Donald Trump

STEPHEN S. ROACH

Amid a series of massive, illegal policy blunders, US President Donald Trump has set his sights on stabilizing relations with Chinese President Xi Jinping at their May summit. But it will probably go poorly because Trump is incapable of understanding the importance of strategy, a lesson that China's leaders have long grasped.

NEW HAVEN—Rumor has it that last year, US President Donald Trump delayed his so-called Liberation Day tariff announcement by a day, to April 2, because he didn’t want his unconstitutional trade “emergency” to come across as an April Fools’ Day hoax. This year, Trump defied the calendar with an address to the nation on April 1, touting yet another unconstitutional act—a war with Iran conducted without congressional approval.

The Staged Death of China’s Military-Civil Fusion

Ryan D. Martinson

On March 13, 2026, China issued the outline for its 15th Five-Year Plan — a core document defining Chinese government policies into the next decade. In the hierarchy of Chinese sources, Five-Year Plan outlines rank among the most “authoritative” in that they are issued by the government, directly reflecting its will and aspirations. This places them in a special class that includes white papers, work reports, and, perhaps above all, the words of Xi Jinping. Among analysts of Chinese affairs, authoritative sources are generally regarded as the most valuable documents for deciphering Beijing’s intentions.

For years, MCF has been a major irritant in China-U.S. relations, given that it requires China-based companies, research organizations, and individuals – including those with substantial U.S. ties – to engage in activities that support China’s military development. This is the second consecutive Five-Year Plan outline with little or no reference to MCF, suggesting that Beijing has abandoned this controversial policy. If true, this could reflect an effort by China to dial down tensions with the United States – a rare good news story in an age of growing antagonism and rivalry.

Faisal Islam: Why the UAE's exit from Opec is a big deal

Faisal Islam

It is a very big deal that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has announced its abrupt exit from Opec, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The Emiratis were members even before they became a nation state in 1971. Opec is the organisation of mainly Gulf oil exporters, which for many decades controlled the price of crude oil by decreasing or increasing production and allocating quotas across its membership. It had a vital role in 1970s oil crises, which in turn transformed global energy policy.

While Opec production is dominated by Saudi Arabia, the UAE had the second highest spare production capacity. In other words, it was the second most important swing producer, capable of increasing production to help ease prices. Indeed it is precisely this that led to long-term reconsiderations of the UAE's position. Put simply, the UAE wanted to use the considerable capacity it has invested in.

Light speed weapons? Directed energy and the future of the ADF

Malcolm Davis

Directed energy weapons (DEW), including high energy laser and high-power microwave weapons, are increasingly important in counter-drone tasks across air, sea and land. Technical challenges remain in optimising DEW technology as a viable military capability but DEW capabilities have the potential to create an inflection point in warfare as they offer virtually instantaneous effects at very low cost per shot compared with traditional missiles and, with a stable power source, they have effectively unlimited ‘magazines’.

US Operation Epic Fury and Israel’s Operation Roaring Lion show the need to invest in cheaper and more sustainable DEW capabilities which may not replace but will reduce reliance on expensive missile defence interceptors such as Patriot

Iran Is More Unified Than Ever

Ali Hashem

TEHRAN—Many policymakers in Washington seem to believe Iran has lacked clear leadership during the war. Leading the way has been U.S. President Donald Trump, who argues that there is no one in Iran for the United States to negotiate a peace deal with. After the attack that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, he even suggested that he should help choose Iran’s next leader.

The suggestion from the U.S. government is that Iran is divided, unstable, and without direction. Recent events in Tehran tell a different story.

The Jeddah Departure

The Gulf Cooperation Council meeting in Jeddah on Tuesday had been choreographed for weeks. Six heads of state, a single communique, an image of Arab unity in the face of an Iranian blockade entering its third month: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain arrived with pre-cleared talking points on the collective defense of the Arabian Peninsula. The United Arab Emirates arrived with a different script. Before the closing statement could be drafted, the Emirati delegation announced that effective May 1, after fifty-nine years of membership, the country would leave the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its expanded alliance, OPEC+, the coordinated framework that has bound Riyadh, Moscow, and Abu Dhabi to a shared production discipline since 2016.

Energy Minister Suhail al-Mazrouei described the move, in a measured statement read on Emirati state television, as “a sovereign national decision aligned with our evolving energy profile.” West Texas Intermediate crossed one hundred dollars a barrel within the hour, the first triple-digit print since April 10.

Why Iran Isn’t Blinking Yet

Keith Johnson

The Trump administration believes that the two-week-old, semi-porous U.S. blockade of Iranian shipping will soon bring Tehran to its knees by forcing it to shut down oil wells as it runs out of storage space for crude it can no longer ship. That looming production shutdown, the administration believes, threatens Iran with permanent, severe damage to a major part of its economy, and explains why Washington appears content to wait for an Iranian surrender that has yet to materialize in the eight-week war.

Special Edition on Iran: Going Straight to the Strait

Richard Haass

Iran has reportedly proposed to the United States that the two countries focus on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and postpone consideration of Iran’s nuclear program and other issues. The United States should accept this approach and suggest that these negotiations commence as quickly as possible.

Postponing discussion of the nuclear issue makes good sense. There are times when adding issues to a negotiation can create tradeoffs that make agreement less difficult. This is not one of those times. Previous negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have taken years. They are both highly technical and deeply contentious. The gap between the United States and Iran on the basic elements of any accord – what should be done with the nearly one thousand pounds of enriched uranium in Iran; whether Iran should have a right to enrich uranium and, if so, how much and to what level; what, if any, moratorium there should be on future enrichment and how long it should last; and what should be done regarding inspections – precludes any rapid agreement.

The shadow fleet is undermining the maritime order more brazenly than ever

Elisabeth Braw

In 2026, the Baltic Sea countries, France, India, and others have inspected and detained more shadow-fleet vessels than in prior years. In response, Russian military vessels have begun escorting shadow vessels through the English Channel and Baltic Sea. Some Iranian shadow vessels have been able to sail despite the war in Iran and Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. A not insignificant number have also managed to evade the United States’ blockade of Iranian ports.

Since the end of 2022, the shadow fleet—a large and growing group of ships that sail outside the official shipping system—has been in the news because of its role transporting sanctioned Russian oil. In March 2026, Iranian shadow vessels began attracting attention as well, as they have been able to keep sailing despite one and then two blockades amid the war in Iran.

Redefining Energy Security

RICHARD HAASS and CAROLYN KISSANE

In the aftermath of COVID-19, firms shifted from a “just in time” model to a “just in case” approach that sought to strengthen resilience. With oil and gas infrastructure becoming a primary military target, energy systems must now undergo a similar transition.

NEW YORK—It is too soon to know when or how the war with Iran will end, or what its geopolitical or economic consequences will be. But one thing is already certain: What is meant by energy security must be rethought.

Has America Fought Well in the Iran War? With Mick Ryan

Mick Ryan

Major General Mick Ryan, Australian Army (retired), Senior Fellow for Military Studies at the Lowy Institute, adjunct fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and author of the Futura Doctrina Substack joins the show to dissect the current state of the war in Iran. Is this conflict entering a postmortem phase, or are we still in the middle of it? How has America performed so far? How does this war connect to the Pacific theater? Are we adapting for a broader global conflict, and are our adversaries adapting as well?

Trump Is Dissatisfied With Iran’s Plan to Reopen Strait of Hormuz

Tyler Pager and Julian E. Barnes

President Trump has told advisers he is not satisfied with Iran’s latest proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and end the war, according to multiple people briefed on discussions in the White House Situation Room on Monday. The proposal also called on the United States to end its naval blockade but would have set aside questions about what to do with Iran’s nuclear program, according to U.S. and Iranian officials familiar with details of the negotiations.

Iran has repeatedly rejected American proposals to suspend its nuclear program and hand over its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. It is not clear precisely why Mr. Trump is not satisfied with the proposal, but he has repeatedly insisted that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons. A U.S. official also said that accepting it could appear to deny Mr. Trump a victory.

The Forces of Scarcity Hitting Asia May Soon Spread Across the World

Damien Cave

When the war in Iran started on Feb. 28, Asia expected to see serious, gradual impacts from losing access to a huge portion of the world’s oil and gas. But the conflict’s economic and social impacts have hit the region harder and faster than officials and experts expected. Many countries across the Asia-Pacific are experiencing sudden jolts of disruption that they are struggling to manage, with some comparing the crisis’s breakdowns and scope to the Covid pandemic.

Even if there is a peace deal soon, the future of this industrious region that has driven global economic growth for decades will likely include months of canceled flights, surging food prices, factory pauses, delayed shipments and empty shelves for products long considered quick and easy to buy worldwide: plastic bags, instant noodles, vaccines, syringes, lipstick, microchips and sportswear.

Google staff urge chief executive to block US military AI use

Stephen Morris

More than 560 Google employees have signed an open letter to chief executive Sundar Pichai urging him to refuse to let the US government use its AI technology for classified military operations. “We want to see AI benefit humanity, not being used in inhumane or extremely harmful ways,” read the letter, which was sent to Pichai on Monday. “This includes lethal autonomous weapons and mass surveillance, but extends beyond.”

“The only way to guarantee that Google does not become associated with such harms is to reject any classified workloads,” it continued. “Otherwise, such uses may occur without our knowledge or the power to stop them.” Big tech companies are under pressure to take a stance on military and intelligence use of their AI products after a clash between the Pentagon and AI start-up Anthropic.

AI Ambitions in a Thirsty Region: Water, Data Centers, and South Asia’s Digital Future

Farwa Aamer

South Asia’s push into artificial intelligence (AI) comes with both promise and pressure. In a region already facing chronic water stress, the rapid technological expansion and the rise of AI data centers risk adding new strain to limited resources if growth is not carefully managed. The challenge for South Asia is not whether to pursue AI-led development, but how to do so in a way that is sustainable over the long term.

This paper argues that water must be treated as a central consideration in digital infrastructure planning. Practical steps are well within reach: adopting more water-efficient cooling technologies, siting data centers with local water conditions in mind, and better aligning energy and water policies to reduce overall resource use. At the same time, stronger regional cooperation on shared water systems and more meaningful engagement with local communities will all be essential to avoiding competition and conflict and ensuring more equitable outcomes.

America Is Fighting the Wrong Drone War

Javid Ahmad

OPINION – For two decades, U.S. drones hunting terrorists across the mountains of South Asia were the symbol of American military power: precise, lethal, and unmatched. That era is now over. Drones are no longer exquisite tools of counterterrorism and have evolved into something far more common and destabilizing: cheap, expendable, and mass-produced tools of attrition. Despite pioneering the technology, the United States is now poorly positioned for the version that matters most. Critical mass is being replaced by a strategy of 'death by a thousand cuts,' as quantity assumes a quality all of its own.

From Ukraine to the Persian Gulf, and increasingly along America’s own borders, expendable drones are reshaping battlefields and quickly rewriting how modern wars are waged. These platforms aren’t winning wars outright, but they are doing something just as important: straining defenses, exhausting budgets, and outlasting the very systems that were designed to counter them. Right now, the United States is least prepared for that reality, and its adversaries know it.

Fusion on paper or in practice? Making the cloud work for ISR and NATO

Martin Zuber and Trey Herr

NATO’s eastern flank faces a transformed operational environment defined by persistent hybrid threats that expose critical gaps in intelligence fusion and response timelines. Airspace incursions, undersea-cable sabotage, cyber intrusions, information campaigns, and targeted GPS jamming are not just isolated events, but elements of a sustained Russian strategy to probe defenses, test resolve, and impose continuous strain on a NATO systems architecture designed for episodic crises rather than persistent, multi-domain competition below the threshold of armed conflict.

The Alliance’s core challenge is not sensing capacity. NATO and its members field capable Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms across all domains. The problem lies in speed, integration, and trust. Data remains fragmented across national systems, shared selectively, and processed through architectures ill-suited for today’s tempo of operations. Without corresponding investments in shared infrastructure, paired with clear standards, adopting emerging technologies and modernizing systems risk amplifying friction rather than reducing it.

Choke Points and the Future of Naval Power

Gary Anderson

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Choke points were a key for the United States in bottling up the Russian navy in the event of conflict, but since the end of the Cold War, freedom of navigation had been assumed. All that changed during the Iran conflict. Both sides have closed the Straits of Hormuz using military means. Petroleum and natural gas products bound for Europe and China can’t get out, but Iran also can’t export those products due to the American naval blockade. Other than Iran, the nation that has been most hurt by the two blockades has been China.

We should be sending her a clear message: invade Taiwan, and we can do it again both in the Straits of Hormuz and the Red Sea. That alone would virtually ensure a cut-off of 90 percent of China’s oil and natural gas imports, a crippling blow to her military as well as her civilian economy. That is real deterrence.

As Cease-Fire With Iran Wavers, US Expands Its Military Footprint – Analysis

Frud Bezhan

As its cease-fire with Iran falters, the United States is significantly expanding its military capabilities in the Middle East, giving Washington the option of escalating the two-month-long conflict. The US military deployed a third aircraft carrier strike group with thousands of elite troops to the region on April 24, marking the largest buildup since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In force since April 8, the truce paused a costly war that has rattled international energy markets and upended the global economy. But Washington and Tehran have accused each other of violating the cease-fire and attempts to negotiate an end to the war are deadlocked.

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