28 April 2026

The Timber Mafia of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa


In Arandu Gol, a government document put the army on record. The forest inventory settled the rest.

In August 2021, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa cabinet, chaired by Chief Minister Mahmood Khan, approved Rs525 million for the transportation of 1.494 million cubic feet of illegally logged timber out of Ara…

The Other China Flash Point Like Taiwan, the South China Sea Could Spark a U.S.-China War

Henrietta Levin

When imagining how the U.S.-Chinese relationship might devolve into war, experts often cite Taiwan as the most obvious flash point. In recent years, after all, China has escalated its campaign of coercion against the island democracy, lobbing missiles over it, staging a blockade during live-fire military exercises, and threatening catastrophic punishments against third countries that expand ties with Taipei. Although the United States does not have a defense treaty with Taiwan, Beijing’s aggression against the island—paired with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reported desire to be capable of invading by 2027—has prompted the U.S. military and policy community to accelerate steps that would strengthen cross-strait deterrence.

But if conflict does break out in the Western Pacific, it is more likely to erupt southwest of Taiwan, in the South China Sea, where numerous countries jostle over competing maritime claims and divergent visions of sovereignty, regional order, and international law. Beijing claims about 90 percent of the South China Sea, including waters off the coasts of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

The Iran War Is a Win for China

Andrew P. Miller

President Donald Trump was meant to meet with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, at the end of March to stabilize the world’s most consequential bilateral relationship. But as the Middle East burned, energy prices skyrocketed, and the bodies of U.S. service members returned to the United States, Trump reached the conclusion that a trip to Beijing for a high-profile meeting would not be a good look. On March 16, he postponed the trip until May. The fact that he failed to foresee this collision of crises when he originally announced the summit—just eight days before he launched his

Iran Conflict Holds Lessons for U.S., Adversaries, INDOPACOM Commander Says

Patricia Kime

While the war in Iran has siphoned assets from the Pacific and is using “finite levels” of munitions, it is also providing valuable lessons that will ultimately strengthen regional defense, Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo said Tuesday.

The San Diego-based Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and components of the Japan-based Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, embarked with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, were retasked from the Pacific to the Middle East to support Operation Epic Fury, the U.S.-Israeli offensive against Iran.

“I’m not saying that some Indo-PACOM forces have gone and that it’s nothing at all. But we have been able to account for those forces that are in [U.S. Central Command],” Paparo told lawmakers Tuesday during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. “And there’s no substitute for the combat experience those forces in CENTCOM are conducting.”

The US no longer leads The changing context for UK defence policy

Lawrence Freedman

One of the most important tasks of political leaders at times of crisis is to explain to the public the seriousness of the situation and possible courses of action. Perhaps the government assumes that the nature of the current crisis is self-evident, that it is understood that so long as the Strait of Hormuz remains closed the conditions of life not only in the UK but around the world will worsen.

The future of US-Iranian negotiations remains clouded in uncertainty but even if an agreement on the Strait is reached soon, it will take months before the backlogs are cleared and supply lines get back to normal. The crisis however goes much deeper, because the current situation is the result of a catastrophic set of errors by the Trump administration. We have been witnessing the astonishing picture of one of the greatest powers the world has ever known wilfully weaken and undermine itself so that it no longer is either willing or able to play its accustomed role in the international system.

Why Are the Saudis Sitting Out the War With Iran?

Steven A. Cook

Already grappling with economic pressures, the Saudis have been forced to cut spending and extend timelines for major projects that were supposed to be physical manifestations of the kingdom’s transformation. The Public Investment Fund will now focus its attention on alternative energy, advanced manufacturing, logistics, water and renewables, tourism, and Neom, the futuristic city the Saudis are constructing along the country’s northwestern coast. Also, in what should be a surprise to no one in light of the current conflict, Riyadh will continue to invest in its own defense industrial base and diversify its weapons procurement. Saudi authorities are planning to pull the plug on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s upstart golf league and have already sold off 70 percent of the country’s prized Al Hilal soccer club.

Before Defeating an Enemy, Be Very Certain

Allyson Christy

Ending a war before defeating the enemy increases the risk for renewed confrontations. That should be anticipated from the start. An adversarial regime will maintain power, and while a cessation of hostilities ideally follows ceasefire, negotiations and agreements, it is very likely temporary. Unless its leadership and high command hierarchy and arsenal are weakened, the regime is unlikely to be destabilized. This outcome is predictable given the current Iran conflict.

Because the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) oversees a lethal three-part security apparatus separate from its regular Army, it not only functions as a bulwark for the regime’s repressive control but projects its Quds Force to regional and global asymmetric and terrorist operations. Change for the Iranian people also requires more than negotiations. The IRGC also directs a ruthless domestic militia linked to suppressing public dissent; its Basij force also harshly enforces a strict morality code.

Iran Is Calling the Shots Now

Michael Hirsh

No, Iran is not yet “another Vietnam.” There are no U.S. ground forces taking unsustainable casualties, no headlines tallying the week’s dead, no massive anti-war protests in U.S. streets. And of course, rather than a beaten-down Lyndon Baines Johnson, the current U.S. president is bragging that he’s only been at this war a few months and, by the way, he would have won Vietnam “very quickly.”

But the pressure that Tehran is applying to Donald Trump suddenly feels very much like what flummoxed LBJ in Vietnam. Specifically, it resembles the winning strategy so doggedly pursued by Ho Chi Minh, the iconic North Vietnamese leader.

What to learn from Iran’s outperformance in its meme war with the US

Meg Tapia

Iran has suffered greatly from US bombing, but it has been outmanoeuvring the superpower in the information domain.

Each of the two countries is using internet culture against the other during hostilities that began on 28 February, but Iran’s meme warfare is stronger. It is strategically coherent, well targeted and culturally universal. Iran has integrated state messaging with organic content, driving attribution uncertainty, which is itself a strategic asset.

Iran’s superior online technique is a defining, frontier warfighting function that is exposing the limits of the raw volume of the US approach.

What Does Landpower Bring to an Air and Naval Fight?

John Spencer 

Operation Epic Fury has objectively been a remarkable display of deep strike, naval control, and the rapid suppression of Iranian capabilities with airstrikes and sea-launched weapons. It is no surprise that the public narrative defines it as an air and maritime campaign. That view is incomplete.

The campaign demonstrates something more important about modern war: Even in a fight centered on airpower and naval dominance, the joint force cannot succeed without landpower. For two decades after 9/11, air and naval forces played a supporting but indispensable role in land-centric wars. In Operation Epic Fury, the roles have shifted, but the reality has not. From the operation’s beginning, Army capabilities were not additive or symbolic. They were essential to protecting the force, enabling joint operations, and delivering effects that air and naval power alone could not achieve. Examining how landpower made the joint campaign possible is vital for understanding how ground forces and their unique capabilities will contribute in other theaters where airpower and seapower will be central—like the Indo-Pacific.

How China and Russia Can Exploit the Iran War

Jon B. Alterman and Ali Vaez

The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran has presented Russia and China with a significant opportunity. Both Moscow and Beijing see the conflict as a chance to undermine U.S. interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. Both are keen to exploit the war to sap U.S. power, gain intelligence on U.S. military systems, and erode the U.S.-led order. Both see a wide variety of potential options for doing so, diplomatic and military, overt and covert. And so far, both countries are succeeding.

The quagmire endured by Russian forces in Ukraine offers a model for the sorts of damage Moscow and Beijing hope to inflict on the United States. The U.S. government has backed Kyiv since the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 for reasons beyond supporting a smaller democracy against its bigger authoritarian neighbor. The war in Ukraine helps tie down a U.S. adversary, degrades Russian power, and costs the Kremlin tens of billions of dollars every year.

Washington’s ‘psyop’ propaganda push could backfire, analysts say Amid slipping global approval, the US is risking its credibility by turning to tactics it once condemned

Nayan Seth

Washington’s reported plan to have embassies team up with the American military’s “psyops” department to boost the US’ image could backfire and actually damage the country’s credibility, according to analysts. The strategy amounts to using “propaganda to fight the truth”, according to Tad Stoermer, a historian and former lecturer at Johns Hopkins University.

Amid slipping global approval, the US is looking to employ shadowy tactics that it previously condemned. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told embassies and consulates to launch coordinated campaigns to boost the country’s image and counter “anti-American propaganda”, according to a March 30 cable that was obtained by The Guardian.

PRC’s Photonic Chip Push Signals Leapfrogging Moment

Sunny Cheung

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has gone from a single pilot production line to a string of headline breakthroughs in photonics technology since 2024. Beijing has framed progress by researchers at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Tsinghua University, Fudan University, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) as a way around U.S. chip sanctions.

Photonic chips, which move information using light rather than electricity, are faster, run cooler, and—crucially for Beijing—do not depend on the cutting-edge factory equipment that the United States has blocked the PRC from buying. PRC labs are at or near the global frontier in several photonic research benchmarks, but the United States and Taiwan still dominate the parts of the photonic supply chain that turn lab demonstrations into viable, scalable products.

A Grand Strategy of Consolidation How Trump Can Revitalize American Power

A. Wess Mitchell

The country’s new defense strategy envisioned a dramatic shakeup. It prioritized the homeland and repositioned forces that had patrolled distant frontiers for nearly a century. It handed the task of securing farther-flung defensive perimeters to allies, many of which appeared unprepared to take on the burden. Establishment experts were appalled. Hawks warned that the new strategy would embolden adversaries and advocated for the old approach of being strong everywhere at once.

The year was 1904, and the country was the United Kingdom. It faced a dilemma broadly similar to the one the United States now confronts. Its empire was the world’s strongest power. Its navy had more warships than the next two largest navies combined. But its strategic situation was deteriorating. Britain’s economic primacy was beginning to slip as rising powers surpassed it in industrial production. Imperial Germany was building a blue-water fleet.

Can Saudi Arabia Keep Hedging?

Maria Fantappie

Over the course of six weeks of war between Iran, Israel, and the United States, Saudi Arabia’s restraint has perplexed some onlookers. After all, the war almost immediately spilled into the Persian Gulf. Iran’s retaliatory attacks on infrastructure in Gulf countries—and then Tehran’s closure and Washington’s subsequent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—ended a security paradigm that had dominated for decades and facilitated the astonishing rise of the Gulf’s economies. Although Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. forces to use its bases, it refrained from directly responding to Iran’s strikes.

Russia Struggling to Compete in Rare Earths

Anna J. Davis

Russia is attempting to enter a rare earth elements (REEs) and critical minerals competition that is already taking shape without it by engaging in state‑driven projects. It is signaling to compensate for restrictions in its own processing capacity, capital, and market access.

People’s Republic of China and U.S. partnerships across rare earth and critical mineral supply chain development are a major loss for Russia, which is losing the ability to retain influence in countries thought to be in its economic orbit. Russia is pursuing REE initiatives that stretch beyond its industrial base and capabilities, including plans to develop a major manganese deposit in Ukraine’s occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast.

Seeing the Cyber in Economic Statecraft

Jason Blessing

Americans lost nearly $21 billion to cybercrime in 2025, a new record for cyber-enabled economic losses. Private sector losses to malicious cyber activity regularly exceed $200 billion in a given year. Alongside criminal groups, state-sponsored hackers are increasingly targeting America’s pocketbook. Neither the economic sphere nor cyberspace are classic terrestrial warfighting domains. Yet war is being actively waged through both realms and national cyber security is vital to the prosperity and protection of today’s hyperconnected economy.

China is both the greatest economic threat and the most active and persistent cyber threat to the United States. Both its economic and cyber statecraft campaigns reach deep into America’s government, private sector, and critical infrastructure. These two efforts overlap: Cyber espionage, digital theft, and supply chain compromises are key pillars of China’s strategy to undermine the U.S. economy. Addressing this challenge requires marshaling economic and cyber power into cohesive, coordinated campaigns.

How Big a Threat Are Iranian-Backed Cyberattacks?

Timo Lenzen

On April 7th, when the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a warning that cyber actors affiliated with the Iranian regime had gained access to internet-connected programmable logic controllers (P.L.C.s), small computers used by myriad American critical-infrastructure sectors—including municipal energy, water, and wastewater agencies—to automate their systems, Operation Epic Fury 

was in its thirty-eighth day. April 7th was also the day that President Donald Trump declared both a “total and complete victory” over Iran and a fragile two-week ceasefire while negotiators attempted to hammer out a peace plan. The CISA advisory, which noted that the Iranian-linked cyber actors were “conducting this activity to cause disruptive effects within the United States,” was a blunt reminder that, in the digital age, the battlefield has expanded to encompass the geography of everyday life.

Warfare of Position: When the Decisive Struggle Precedes the First Shot

Douglas S. Wilbur

Years before the advent of violence during the 1948 communist insurgency in the British colony of Malaya, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had already transformed the political landscape through a deliberate information warfare campaign. The MCP set up a secret parallel government by infiltrating civil society groups like village associations. They radicalized people by indoctrinating them through propaganda that manufactured compelling political narratives. The MCP used these networks to establish a de facto parallel administration that collected taxes, operated courts, distributed food, enforced discipline and mobilized labor. All while promoting propaganda that increasingly portrayed the British as illegitimate and incapable of governing rural communities.

These activities were not peripheral political agitation; they systematically reshaped how key communities interpreted the established government’s legitimacy. By the time armed conflict began, many rural populations already viewed MCP cadres as defenders of local interests and the British administration as distant, coercive, or predatory. This resulted in a serious disadvantage for the colonial administration once the violent phase of the revolution began.

Falklands is a pressure point for the UK – and the US knows it

Joe Inwood

If you need evidence of the geopolitical waves caused by the US war with Iran, the fact that they have now reached the shores of this remote archipelago provides it.

For as long as the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, known in Argentina as Las Malvinas, has been an issue, the official US position has been one of neutrality, while recognising de facto British control. Unofficially, however, they have offered diplomatic and, on occasion, military support to the UK. This was most evident in the events surrounding the Argentine invasion of 1982, which cost the lives of 255 British servicemen, three islanders and 649 Argentinian personnel.

How North Korea Won

Jung H. Pak

The 75th anniversary of the Korean Workers Party in October 2020 was not the festive affair that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un wanted it to be. Despite the fireworks, military flyover, and procession of new intercontinental missiles, Kim appeared to wipe away tears when he approached the lectern and apologized to the crowd: “My efforts and sincerity have not been sufficient enough to rid our people of the difficulties in their lives.” The COVID-19 pandemic had been tough for most countries, but it seemed especially portentous for North Korea, which was largely food-insecure, home to a notoriously dilapidated public health-care

Employing the American uncontrolled narrative for national security

David Maxwell

I recently attended the 3d Annual National Center for Narrative intelligence Summit at Ole Miss in Oxford, Miss. These thoughts were inspired by so many outstanding speakers and discussions both formal and informal. I believe we have to outcompete the authoritarian axis of the CRInK--China, Russia, Iran and north Korea by projecting the superior American narrative.

Some will criticize this narrative as naรฏve wishful thinking and unsupportable in the climate of today's divisive American political environment. That may be so, but I will stand by our American values.

Are America and China Condemned to Repeat History?

Elizabeth D. Samet

History, in the hands of a policymaker, can be a dangerous thing. When officials recruit the wrong historical analogy—or misinterpret an apt one—in the decision-making process, the consequences can be catastrophic. During the Vietnam War, to take one notable example, some American leaders perceived in North Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh another Adolf Hitler. The comparison helped fuel the United States’ misadventures in Southeast Asia by making any accommodation in Vietnam tantamount to the notorious appeasement of the 1938 Munich Agreement. This case became a central example in Ernest May’s 1973 cautionary tale, “Lessons” of the Past. May advocated for more nuanced approaches to historical precedents and argued that analogies might be used responsibly and effectively “to point out criteria for a choice rather than to indicate what the choice ought to be.”

Thirteen years later, in 1986, May teamed up with Richard Neustadt to publish Thinking in Time, a how-to for decision-makers. Instead of searching for perfect analogies, May and Neustadt proposed, policymakers might find more success by looking for not only the similarities but also the crucial differences between the present and potential historical parallels.

Every AI Model Is Saying The Same Thing. That Should Terrify You.

Jason Snyder

The $242 billion bet on artificial intelligence this quarter has a problem nobody wants to name: It's making us all agree.

Every major AI system on the market was trained on the same internet, optimized by similar processes and rewarded for producing answers that people rate highly. Which means they are all, at a structural level, converging on the same conclusions. You are not getting multiple perspectives when you consult multiple AI tools. You are getting the same perspective, wearing different fonts.

This is not a glitch. It is not a temporary limitation waiting to be solved by the next model generation. It is a structural property of how these systems work. And the sameness it produces is spreading well beyond the tools themselves, into the writing we publish, the decisions we make, the ideas we think are our own.

Artificial Staff, Human Command: An AI Integration Experiment

Chris Lajeunesse, Joseph Palazini and James Tulskie

It was the twelfth hour of the planning cycle when our lead plans officer stood between a whiteboard and a map, pulled on a headset, and started describing a complex defensive operation. He talked through the scheme of maneuver in sequence—terrain, routes, phase lines, objectives, support-by-fire positions, transitions, branches. The intelligence and fire support officers interjected with detail where their warfighting functions were involved. Over a twenty-minute period, a transcription tool captured every word. Thirty minutes later, the staff had a first-draft brigade operations order in correct doctrinal format—drafted not by any officer in the room, but by an artificial intelligence tool trained on the structure of Army operations orders, working from the transcript of what the humans had actually said.

This one use of artificial intelligence characterized our rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The three of us served on the staff of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division—the Rakkasans. Across the rotation, we integrated artificial intelligence tools into the military decision-making process, the seven-step planning methodology the Army uses to convert higher headquarters guidance into an executable order. The results were three complete brigade operations orders, each produced in roughly twenty-three hours—compliant with the one-third/two-thirds rule that reserves two-thirds of planning time for subordinate units—a pace that significantly exceeds what most brigade staffs achieve under the pressure of a combat training center rotation.