Indian Strategic Studies: 05/03/26

3 May 2026

Gurudwara Violence In The West – Analysis

Nijeesh N

In a shocking incident marking a disturbing escalation in violence linked to sections of the Sikh diaspora in the West, two Indian men – Rajinder Singh and Gurmit Singh – were shot dead by an unidentified assailant shortly after exiting a warehouse functioning as a gurudwara – Gurudwara Mata Sahib Kaur Ji – following a Vaisakhi gathering at Covo in the Bergamo province of Italy, on the night of April 17, 2026. According to reports, the assailants approached the victims, fired multiple shots, and fled the scene by car, along with three accomplices. A third individual was also grazed by gunfire.

Authorities have released limited information, maintaining strict confidentiality; however, investigators are reportedly examining the possibility of a targeted, “coldly planned execution.” Sources indicate that three Indian nationals from the Sikh community are under investigation. Citing an eyewitness, local reports suggest that the shooter may have been “an Indian from Antegnate” and a frequent visitor to Gurudwara Mata Sahib Kaur Ji. One of the victims, Rajinder Singh, had previously served as president of a Sikh cultural association and was involved in the gurudwara’s management.

The Army Needs an Asymmetric Warfare Group Again — More Than Ever

For several years, I have been wrestling with a problem the Army never fully resolved after it deactivated the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) and after the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) evolved into JIDO and was absorbed into the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s broader mission set. JIDO’s transition under DTRA preserved some warfighter-support functions, but it also placed the counter-improvised-threat mission inside a much larger institutional structure.

Those of us who worked with AWG, or alongside its offshoots in the counter-IED fight, have long believed its role was not a wartime luxury. It was an indispensable function: a field-connected organization built to observe change, understand it quickly, and help the institution adapt before the next formation paid the price.

Chips, Code And Command: India’s New Architecture Of Power – OpEd

Advocate Sanhita Pandey

India’s technological journey in defence has entered a decisive new phase where it is defined not by dependence, but by design, development and dominance. The country’s entry into the elite league of nations capable of indigenously developing Gallium Nitride (GaN) semiconductor technology marks more than just a scientific milestone as it signals a structural shift in how India approaches national security and technological growth.

GaN-based chips, which are far superior to traditional silicon in speed, efficiency and thermal performance are the backbone of next-generation radar, electronic warfare systems and communication platforms. By mastering this capability, India is no longer just participating in global defence innovation but it is actively shaping it.

Central Asia’s Next Growth Story Runs on Water It Does Not Have

Vlad Paddack and Sobir Kurbanov

MINEX Kazakhstan 2026, held in Astana on April 15-16, brought together roughly 1,000 participants from the mining industry, government ministries, diplomatic missions, financial institutions and media for the largest extractive-sector gathering in Central Asia. The forum’s theme, “Kazakhstan’s Mineral Resources: Reforming for Value in a Multi-Vector Reality,” framed two days of discussion around how the country positions its critical minerals endowment against a tightening global competition for supply.

Much of the debate focused on the investment climate, royalty reformm and processing incentives. Less of it focused on the constraint that is becoming a first-order concern for the sector: water. The analysis below draws on a presentation delivered at the forum on April 16 by Nightingale Int. Fellows Vlad Paddack and Sobir Kurbanov on water security risks facing Central Asia’s mining sector and the broader industrial strategy built around it.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Bangladesh, 10 Years Later

Md. Himel Rahman

On October 14, 2016, during the historic visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Bangladesh, Dhaka and Beijing formally upgraded their relationship to a Strategic Partnership of Cooperation, and Bangladesh became a participant in the Chinese-financed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since then, several Chinese-sponsored major infrastructure projects have been completed in Bangladesh, and several more are underway.

On July 11, 2024, Dhaka and Beijing further elevated their partnership to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership. Even the subsequent political upheavals in Bangladesh – including the July Uprising that removed the Hasina government less than a month later, the formation of the interim government, and the victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 2026 general elections – have not hindered Bangladesh’s continued participation in the BRI.

How Pakistan Became the Iran War’s Unlikely Peace Negotiator

Joshua Kurlantzick

As the United States and Iran inch toward a peace deal, Pakistan has emerged as an unlikely but indispensable mediator in the negotiations. It has hosted high-level talks in Islamabad and shuttled proposals between the two sides as they work toward a lasting ceasefire.

It’s a remarkable role change for Pakistan. For years, the country has been viewed as a pariah state. Just saying its name brought to mind political instability, military rule and harsh crackdowns on freedoms [PDF], support for terrorist groups, domestic insurgencies in Balochistan province, and the constant threat of war with neighboring India. The country had few real partners other than China, to whom it owed nearly $70 billion, and it has had a massive list of International Monetary Fund debt bailouts dating back decades.

The Limits of Pakistan’s New Counterterrorism Doctrine Against the TTP

Bantirani Patro

That cross-border air strikes have become an integral part of Pakistan’s counter-insurgency playbook is clear from the number of such attacks that have taken place in recent years. The most recent was in late February 2026, in which multiple Afghan cities, including Kabul and Kandahar, were attacked, resulting in intense border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces that continued into the month of March. As both sides battled each other, the Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif declared an “open war” on Afghanistan.

Yet the Pakistan Army’s approach to countering the group within its own territory has garnered comparatively less attention. This is equally important, if not as sensational, due to the lack of an overt regional aspect. Alongside air strikes designed to penalize the Afghan Taliban for their continued support of the Pakistani Taliban, Pakistan has concurrently pursued security operations at home to contain the group’s activities. This piece clinically examines these small-scale operations and argues that they have laid bare Pakistan’s interprovincial tensions – which will encumber concrete action against the TTP – and that they are, by themselves, insufficient to counter militancy.

A Farewell to Arms? Challenges and Preconditions for Hezbollah’s Demilitarisation

Inna Rudolf

This briefing note considers whether Hezbollah can be sustainably demilitarised amid the current US-Israel-Iran escalation and its spillover into Lebanon, and what minimum preconditions would be required for demobilisation to hold.

Based on recent interviews with Hezbollah members, southern residents and Lebanese officials, it moves beyond binary debates about the decommissioning of weapons to highlight the environment (bi’a) of structural grievances, state absence, and perceived threats to dignity and security, which have sustained armed mobilisation.

Could Russia Mediate the Conflict Between Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Muhammad Murad

After Qatar, Turkiye, and Saudi Arabia failed to bring peace between the two neighboring countries, China ramped up its mediating efforts and brought both parties to the negotiating table earlier this month in Urumqi. Although Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi called the results of the Urumqi talks positive, the situation between Kabul and Islamabad has remained tense, casting doubt on Beijing’s influence in both countries. There have only been temporary ceasefires and no clear end to the conflict.

Russia is latest country to offer, however cautiously and conditionally, to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Given that previous efforts have not been able to deliver, Russia seems to be treading carefully. In mid-April, Russian Special Representative to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov said that Moscow is ready to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan if asked by both countries. In a recent interview, Kabulov described the situation as “regrettable.”

Minerals Diplomacy Meets Market Reality: The Case of Pakistan

Meredith Schwartz and Gracelin Baskaran

The world is facing a new foreign policy landscape—one in which critical minerals are becoming ever more central to economic statecraft. Washington is increasingly shaping partnerships not only around traditional geopolitical alignment but also around the scale, quality, and accessibility of countries’ resource endowments. Within this evolving framework, Pakistan has emerged as an unexpected beneficiary. Despite long-standing challenges in Pakistan’s investment climate and security posture, its untapped geological potential has drawn renewed attention as the United States seeks to diversify supply chains and reduce reliance on dominant producers.

The United States is at a critical juncture in its relationship with India and Pakistan, and deepening ties with one may risk alienating the other. India offers long-term strategic, economic, and geopolitical value. It is increasingly central to the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy as a democratic counterweight to China and could respond to closer U.S.-Pakistan cooperation by deepening its strategic autonomy, expanding defense and energy ties with Russia, and slowing cooperation in critical domains such as supply chains, technology, and defense industrial integration.

Is China Winning the 2nd Space Race?

It’s 2041 and at the Artemis Base Camp on the rim of the Shackleton Crater, an American space mining engineer and his Japanese colleague are sipping coffee, scowling at the latest headline: Elsewhere in the Aitken Basin, the Chinese have found yet another rich deposit of Helium-3, not far from their International Lunar Research Station, the one they constructed with the Russians in 2036.

This hasn’t happened yet, but it’s not science fiction. It’s the genuine ambition of the United States and China — among others — to establish a permanent presence on the moon with the explicit mission of mining – and exploiting – lunar resources.

The Risks of Chinese-Produced Cellular Modules

Jack Burnham

When a doorbell, refrigerator, or thermostat in the United States is connected to the internet, it may already be sending data to the Chinese government. These “smart” devices rely on a component known as a cellular module to connect to the internet over cellular networks. Two Chinese firms, Quectel and Fibocom, already control nearly half the global market for cellular modules. Congressional investigations and independent reporting suggest their units may pose a national security threat.

Not just America’s homes, but also its power grids, ports, hospitals, transportation networks, and ship-to-shore cranes increasingly rely on cellular modules. In theory, these modules can shut down their host devices in addition to collecting massive amounts of data. This is possible because manufacturers of cellular modules maintain remote access to the devices to provide software and firmware updates “over the air.”2 If Beijing consolidated control of U.S.-based modules, it could disrupt an American military mobilization in response to Chinese efforts to coerce Taiwan. Or, amid a crisis, Beijing could hold Washington hostage by threatening to cause massive economic disruption.

China, Iran, and the Limits of Strategic Partnership Amid War

Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal

The Iran war has exposed the fragility of the Middle East security environment and its direct implications for Asian powers, particularly China. While Beijing has long benefited from a U.S.-led security order, the current escalation highlights the challenges China faces, especially as it continues to refrain from offering any security commitments to Iran. China’s ties with Iran remain significant but limited, while its deeper and more diversified partnerships with Gulf states reflect clearer long-term priorities.

The war has raised questions about the nature of relations between China and Iran while amplifying concerns over the vulnerability of Chinese investments and energy security. Although China continues to rely on restraint and backchannel diplomacy, growing instability, particularly risks to Gulf infrastructure, threatens China’s interests in the region. In this context, Iran’s ties with China remain complicated, especially as Iran continues to prefer a hostile approach.

It’s Not Just War That’s Making the U.A.E. Leave OPEC

Vivian Nereim and Ismaeel Naar

As Saudi Arabia prepared to host a summit of Gulf Arab leaders on Tuesday, political commentators in the neighboring United Arab Emirates began furiously dropping hints online that major news was coming.

For weeks, Emirati officials had been openly expressing frustration with their Arab neighbors, complaining about their weak stance toward Iran, which had fired thousands of missiles and drones at Gulf countries in response to U.S. and Israeli bombing. Analysts wondered if the Emirates would demonstrate that displeasure at the summit.

Then, just as the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, commenced the meeting, the Emirati government dropped a bombshell from hundreds of miles away: It announced that it was leaving OPEC, a cartel of oil-producing countries that wields sway over global energy prices.

Missiles, Guns, Lasers . . . and Nets: The Case for Passive Drone Defenses

William Mayne

Of all of the modern war lessons that have emerged from more than four years of war in Ukraine, the rapid rise of weaponized drone technology and the necessary race to develop systems to counter them has arguably received the most attention—and the most resourcing by militaries around the world seeking to address it. Notable examples like fiber-optic drones, which are impervious to electronic warfare countermeasures, and Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, which used hidden drones to attack Russian strategic airfields, have exposed vulnerabilities to military forces operating from static, easy to identify locations.

For US forces, the lessons learned vicariously through the war in Ukraine are being reinforced by the combat operations in the Middle East they are now engaged in. The threat of weaponized drones is quickly shifting from academic to existential for units deployed within range of Iranian and Iranian-aligned militia groups’ one-way attack and first-person-view drones in the Middle East. Despite a major push by the US armed services into counterdrone improvement, a simple, low-tech solution is being overlooked: the antidrone net.

Global Economy in the Shadow of War

After withstanding higher trade barriers and elevated uncertainty last year, global activity now faces a major test from the outbreak of war in the Middle East. Assuming that the conflict remains limited in duration and scope, global growth is projected to slow to 3.1 percent in 2026 and 3.2 percent in 2027. Global headline inflation is projected to rise modestly in 2026 before resuming its decline in 2027. Slowdown in growth and increase in inflation are expected to be particularly pronounced in emerging market and developing economies.

Downside risks dominate the outlook. A longer or broader conflict, worsening geopolitical fragmentation, a reassessment of expectations surrounding artificial‑intelligence‑driven productivity, or renewed trade tensions could significantly weaken growth and destabilize financial markets. Elevated public debt and eroding institutional credibility further heighten vulnerabilities. At the same time, activity could be lifted if productivity gains from AI materialize more rapidly or trade tensions ease on a sustained basis.

I Played Putin in a War Game. The Most Dangerous Period May Be Coming.

Alexander Gabuev

It was a bitter victory. After occupying a chunk of NATO territory in the Baltics, my team successfully converted the land grab into a diplomatic coup, winning major concessions from the United States that would refashion Europe’s security architecture in Russia’s favor. I was President Vladimir Putin, and I had just secured a big win for my project of Russian aggrandizement.

Thankfully, this was not reality. It was a war game organized by the German newspaper Die Welt and the German armed forces, designed to test Berlin’s readiness for a security crisis brought about by Russian aggression and American indifference. I’d been invited to represent my home country of Russia; there was a certain piquancy in playing the man whose invasion of Ukraine pushed me, as well as many of my friends and colleagues, into exile.

Theatre nuclear weapons in NATO’s deterrence: Towards the revival of flexible response

Jyri Lavikainen

This paper analyses the role of theatre nuclear forces in NATO deterrence in the current and future threat environment. Drawing on established principles of deterrence theory and nuclear strategy, it argues that credible extended deterrence rests on flexible response strategy and on the ability to deny an adversary victory while threatening it with unacceptable costs. This requires a full spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, as well as a credible and effective doctrine for their potential employment.

In the contemporary threat environment, characterized by the prospect of multi-theatre wars, NATO’s nuclear posture – premised on assumed conventional superiority – is insufficient. A credible flexible response strategy now requires the US and NATO not only to posture nuclear forces to counter limited Russian nuclear use, but also to ensure the defeat of Russia’s conventional forces. Such a mission would entail fielding larger and more diverse theatre nuclear forces. The paper reviews potential capability options and concludes that an additional in-theatre standoff nuclear capability is likely necessary for a credible flexible response strategy.

UN Peace Operations and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund

Lauren McGowan

As the UN reexamines the future of its peace operations amid shifting geopolitical dynamics and financial constraints, greater attention is being paid to how to leverage peacebuilding tools, including to support more coherent and sustainable transitions. In this context, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has emerged as a central instrument for bridging operational, programmatic, and financial gaps—particularly in settings where peace operations are drawing down or have recently withdrawn.

This policy paper examines the role of the PBF in UN peace operations contexts. Since its inception, the PBF has invested over $1.3 billion through nearly 700 projects in countries hosting UN peace operations. The paper finds that the PBF has been leveraged as a support mechanism, a strategic enabler, and a political tool. It also finds that the PBF has played an important role in supporting sustainable UN transitions. At the same time, while the PBF is a flexible and catalytic instrument, it is not a substitute for peace operations, and expectations regarding its role must remain realistic.

Google told staff it is ‘proud’ of Pentagon AI contract after internal backlash

Madhumita Murgia and Stephen Morris

Google has told its employees it “proudly” works with US military and will continue to do so, as the tech giant faces down opposition from hundreds of staff over a deal for its AI to be used in classified operations. Kent Walker, Alphabet’s president of global affairs, said in a memo to staff on Tuesday: “We have proudly worked with defence departments since Google’s earliest days and continue to believe that it is important to support national security in a thoughtful and responsible way.” “Staying engaged with governments, including on national security, will help democracies benefit from responsible technologies,” he added.

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