SWJ Blog Post | July 6, 2014
A Primer For Fixing Iraq’s Battered Army
James “Jamie” E. Hayes III
The Iraqi Army’s recent humiliation at the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has indeed sent shock waves through the national security community. Policy-makers and pundits alike are scrambling for potential solutions to this new crisis. Drone strikes? Massive influx of U.S. aid? Do nothing at all? The Iraqi Army commander is no doubt feeling the crushing weight of this frenzy. Between fielding angry phone calls from Prime Minister Maliki and attempting to rally his dispirited troops, this poor guy is probably wondering just what the hell he can do to get out of his current predicament.
With that in mind, I have a suggestion for the proper U.S. response. It isn’t Apache gunships, or Predators, or even the advisors that President Obama most recently ordered back into theater. Rather, I would send the Iraqi commander a history book. Specifically, Field Marshal William Slim’s Defeat into Victory, the classic account of the British 14th Army’s reversal of fortunes in Burma (now Myanmar) during World War II. In 1942, Field Marshal Slim faced many of the same challenges now confronting his 21st Century Iraqi colleague. The Japanese had soundly defeated Slim’s larger yet tactically deficient army, leaving him with some stark choices. Reorganize and reform his army or be utterly destroyed. Change the paradigm or die.
Indeed, Defeat into Victory is a veritable primer for how to turn a defeated, rag-tag army into a first-class fighting force---all while maintaining contact with the enemy. Here are but a few of the pearls that the Iraqi commander could glean from this treasure of military writing:
- Leadership: Field Marshall Slim knew that competent and confident leadership was the key to winning. After the 14th Army’s initial defeats, Slim cleaned house by firing his division and brigade commanders who looked good on the parade field but then wilted under the rigors of actual warfare. The Iraqi Army commander should do the same. Regardless of top-cover from Prime Minister Maliki, the Iraqi Army commander should dismiss his politically-connected yet incompetent subordinate commanders and replace them with the first-rate officers---many of them Sunni and Kurd--- purged after the U.S. departure in 2011.
- Training: Field Marshal Slim realized that his early defeats were due to the British Army’s complete unpreparedness for jungle warfare. In his book, Slim provides extensive detail about re-training his forces and transforming them into a hardened, battle-ready organization. Slim believed that training was more than just mastering tactical and technical skills; in his eyes, realistic exercises forged unit cohesion and confidence. U.S. forces attempted to instill a similar ‘continuous-training’ mindset in the Iraqis before their 2011 departure to no avail. The world saw the fruits of this reluctance to train when unprepared Iraqi units melted before the numerically inferior ISIS forces in Mosul and Tikrit. Perhaps that bitter experience, reinforced by Slim’s book, could finally drive the message home to the Iraqi commander.
- Regaining the Initiative: Field Marshal Slim’s Defeat into Victory describes how the British 14th Army eventually knocked the Japanese back on their heels, gaining time and space to prepare for a general offensive to retake Burma. While Slim was no fan of special operations forces, he nonetheless employed the Chindits, a long range penetration unit made of specially trained British, Gurkha and Indian volunteers, to wreck havoc on Japanese supply lines and rear areas. The Iraqi army commander also has such a tool at his disposal---the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Brigade. As one of the few Iraqi units still in fighting shape after the ISIS onslaught, the U.S. Special Forces-trained ISOF Brigade would be the force of choice to conduct direct action raids against the terrorists’ vulnerable lines of communication along Iraq’s Highway 1. Doing so would force ISIS into a defensive posture, thereby permitting both the Iraqi government and Army to adequately prepare for a counterattack against the Islamic extremists.
- Relationships: Field Marshal Slim knew the value of partners. In his book, Slim describes the great efforts to maintain working relations with the Nationalist Chinese armies fighting their common enemy. He valued this relationship with the Chinese so much that he assigned one of his most talented generals to serve as his liaison with them rather than command one of the 14th Army’s fighting units. The Iraqi army commander faces a similar opportunity with the Kurds, in particular the commander of the Kurdish peshmerga militia. Undoubtedly, the Kurds and their formidable peshmerga fighters will play a key role in either subduing ISIS or keeping them fixed in place near the Sunni Triangle. Therefore, the Iraqi commander, in spite of the political sensitivities, would be well served to reach out to the Kurdish commander with the purpose of building a solid military-to-military relationship. Given the current state of play, a similar liaison mission with the recently-mobilized Shia militias would also be helpful in coordinating and synchronizing future operations. The Iraqi commander needs to put his best men on it, and quickly.
Obviously, the suggestions presented here are a bit tongue-in-cheek. I am under no illusion that the mere introduction of a military classic such as Defeat into Victory, however pertinent to the situation, will turn the tide against ISIS. Larger decisions, such as Maliki’s political reconciliation with the Sunnis and Kurds, need to come into play in order for Iraq to survive. However, from a military standpoint, the Iraqis’ appreciation of Field Marshal Slim’s seminal work would reinforce the most universal aspects of armies at war. That is, defeated military organizations can turn things around if their leadership focuses on the troops and their fighting capabilities rather than the politics. I volunteer my copy.
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