Donald Bolduc
A Failure of Epic Proportions
The testimony of General Milley and General McKenzie in front of the House Armed Services Committee yesterday was tough to watch. The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was undoubtedly a failure of epic proportions, resulting in a national security debacle that will have lasting consequences for years to come; how the withdrawal and the Non-Combatant Evacuation were executed and the poor interagency coordination should have led to the immediate firing of senior leaders on the military and civilian side of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and within the National Security Council Staff. However, instead of being held accountable for their actions, these leaders were allowed to remain in their positions and, in some cases, even promoted, further perpetuating a culture of cover-ups and incompetence.
The testimony yesterday was very different from previous testimony and public statements. Both generals blaming the Department of State was inappropriate. Those of us who know the importance of interagency coordination, Joint Force Operations, and executing Non-Combatant Evacuations (NEO) understand that the success and blame do not fall on the shoulders of one agency. I have participated in five NEOs at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, and I know it takes a team effort. I understand that the planning, coordination, approvals, political considerations, security, and resources necessary to conduct an NEO is a comprehensive undertaking by the interagency, Joint Staff, and the host nation. Two operations were happening in Afghanistan simultaneously: a NEO and a withdrawal. The failure of civilians, general officers, and admirals at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels must be addressed. Blaming one administration over another is political and only prevents the American people from hearing the truth.
We Need Accountability
What we need now is not more finger-pointing but proper accountability and a commitment to transparency. In his testimony, General Milley failed to take responsibility for the failures that led to the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, instead choosing to shift blame onto the State Department. While accepting responsibility for the military side of the operation, General McKenzie also attempted to deflect blame onto others. It is unacceptable for leaders to claim responsibility while simultaneously pointing fingers at their colleagues.
According to assessments by the Heritage Foundation (https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/executive-summary), since this failure in Afghanistan, we have the weakest military since World War II. Our foreign policy has left the world in turmoil, and our national security apparatus is ineffective at best and cannot provide security here at home or abroad. We also have a Congress that cannot fulfill its duties, making it the most ineffective Congress since the Great Depression. This is the fault of the civilians and military leaders that comprise our national security team and their hand-picked successors.
It is time for the truth to come to light and for those responsible for this failure to be held accountable. The American people deserve leaders willing to take responsibility for their actions and make the necessary changes to ensure that such a debacle never happens again. We must demand transparency and accountability from our leaders and hold them to the highest standards of integrity and competence. Only then can we begin to rebuild our national security apparatus and restore the American people’s trust in our government.
Our Mission Was Over in 2002
In several articles and assessments, I suggested that we had completed the military mission in Afghanistan by June 2002. We had a government in place in Kabul, Hamid Karzai had appointed all his provincial governors, and the security situation was satisfactory. If we had let the Afghans do it the Afghan way, the Taliban would not have resurged during our attempt to do nation-building and create an Afghan government, national military, national police force, and other Western-type organizations from 2002 to 2005, making an insurgency that became problematic until 2010.
In 2010, General McCrystal changed the strategy to a bottom-up comprehensive strategy. This is how Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police were created and approved by the Afghan government. With the support of Admiral Olsen, Admiral McCraven, General Petraeus, and General Allen, this program would achieve unprecedented security gains the Afghan way. By 2013, we could finally see a light at the end of the tunnel. The Special Joint Operations Task Force assessed with the assistance of RAND analysts that by 2015, security in the rural areas would be under the control of the Afghan government. Knowing all this, we changed the strategy. I articulated this in a meeting with Denis McDonough, Obama’s Chief of Staff, the ISAF Commander (General Dunford), and the IJC Commander (LTG Milley). Despite the evidence and a victory in sight, the strategy was changed. I was told after the meeting that I just committed career suicide.
The Obama administration’s shift in strategy and operational approach in Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014 had significant consequences for the outcome of the war. The change from a focus on rural security, as exemplified by the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs, to a downsizing of troops and a top-down counterterrorism approach had a detrimental impact on the progress that had been made in securing rural areas and weakening the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The key to security in Afghanistan is the rural areas. The Taliban knew this, and this is where they focused.
Village Stability Operations
The Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs developed and implemented between 2010-mid-2013 were instrumental in securing 90% of the rural areas in Afghanistan from 2010 to mid-2013. These Afghan-led programs were sustainable by the Afghan government at the local level. These programs were effective in grinding down the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s ability to fight effectively, and the Afghan Local Police, in particular, posed a significant threat to the insurgent groups. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership acknowledged the effectiveness of these programs and expressed their frustration at their inability to defeat them.
In November 2012, a member of the Coalition Forces exchanged greetings with a leader from the village of Jani Khel, Afghanistan, during a shura aimed at validating the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in the region.
The decision to shift away from these successful programs and towards a downsizing of troops and a top-down approach undermined the progress that had been made in securing rural areas and weakening insurgent groups. This strategic shift contributed to the ultimate failure of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and the chaotic withdrawal that followed.
It is essential to recognize the importance of successful strategies and programs like the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police in achieving progress in conflicts like Afghanistan. Learning from past successes and failures is crucial in shaping future strategies and avoiding similar strategic missteps.
The decision to change strategy and operational approach in Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014 ultimately led to reversing the security situation in rural areas, which had previously been secured through programs like the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police. The shift in strategy allowed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to regain control of these areas, leading to increased casualties among U.S. and coalition forces.
How did this happen? The leadership in key positions within the Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Security Council during the Obama Administration comprised the same leadership in the Biden Administration, only in positions of higher authority. President Trump appointed General Milley, but Milley was a key decision-maker in Afghanistan’s strategy in 2013. Many of the same individuals involved in the decision-making process that led to the strategic shift in Afghanistan remained in positions of responsibility. This contributed to the failed strategy and the inability to address Afghanistan’s deteriorating security situation effectively.
The Rise of ISIS
The rise of ISIS in Afghanistan after the strategy shift further complicated the situation and added to the challenges faced by U.S. and coalition forces in the region. The failure to adapt and adjust the strategy in response to changing circumstances ultimately led to a protracted and costly conflict with no clear path to success. The grinding to a halt of military operations during the COVID-19 pandemic allowed the Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIS to expand. They did not need to conduct combat operations to influence the populace. They did it in the local areas using the tried and tested tactics of intimidation, murder, and beatings, and it worked.
The lessons learned from Afghanistan’s strategic failures emphasize the importance of consistent and coherent decision-making and the need to continually reassess and adapt strategies in response to evolving threats and challenges. It is crucial to have leadership willing to acknowledge mistakes, learn from them, and make necessary changes to achieve strategic objectives effectively.
For transparency and accountability, Americans must be aware of the failures within the Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Security Council Staff across multiple administrations regarding the Afghanistan conflict. I was a general then, and I admit I was part of these failures that resulted in a protracted and costly conflict over two decades. Service members were engaged in tactical operations that did not lead to a meaningful strategic victory.
Acknowledging and taking responsibility for these failures is an essential step towards learning from past mistakes and ensuring that similar errors are not repeated in the future. As a general or admiral, the first step is to recognize your role in the failure and highlight the shortcomings in policy, strategy, and operational approaches that have contributed to the prolonged conflict in Afghanistan. This climate does not exist in the military. No one is willing to admit mistakes. Loyalty to the GO/FO club is essential to continued success. If you are a contrarian, you are done.
We Must Learn From the Past
Moving forward, it is imperative to critically evaluate past strategies and operational approaches, identify the root causes of failure, and implement necessary reforms to prevent such failures from occurring again. This process requires a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. foreign policy objectives, a clear understanding of the complexities of conflicts like Afghanistan, and a commitment to developing effective and sustainable strategies that prioritize long-term stability and security.
It is essential to honor and recognize the dedication, bravery, and sacrifices of the men and women who served in Afghanistan over the past two decades. These service members, along with our Afghan partners, NATO allies, and the Afghan people, demonstrated unwavering commitment, courage, and professionalism in carrying out their duties under challenging circumstances. They deserve our gratitude and respect for their selfless service and sacrifices on the battlefield.
How the withdrawal from Afghanistan was executed has raised legitimate concerns and has led to a sense of disappointment and betrayal among many who were involved in the conflict. Acknowledging the shortcomings and mistakes in the withdrawal process is crucial, and offering a sincere apology to all those affected by the chaotic and disorganized withdrawal is an essential step towards accountability and healing.
As a nation, we must learn from the mistakes made during the withdrawal and ensure we uphold our commitments to our allies and partners. Moving forward, it is essential to prioritize the well-being and support of our veterans, Afghan partners, and all those affected by the conflict and work towards fostering a more constructive and transparent approach to international engagements.
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