6 December 2025

What Taiwan can and can't learn from Ukraine

Sean Durns

In some ways, the war in Ukraine resembles World War I. The latter was infamous for its static front lines, trench warfare, and the use of new battlefield weapons, from airplanes to mustard gas to advancements in artillery and small arms. It took time for many of the powers to adapt their 19th-century tactics to the new, and more monstrous, terrain of the 20th.

At war’s end, both winners and losers sought to imbibe its lessons. Some, notably France with its Maginot Line fortifications, learned all of the wrong ones. Many expected the next war to also be primarily static. Others recognized that new technologies would allow for wars of maneuver and offense. Militarily, World War II bore scant resemblance to its predecessor. Those who clung to old tactics and outdated technologies paid a heavy price.

The war in Ukraine has been marked by constant evolution. In a recent report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mick Ryan, a retired major general in the Australian army, offered some takeaways from the conflict. One inescapable conclusion: Warfare by drone and other unmanned aerial vehicles is here, and it is here to stay. Both sides have attempted to adapt, with varying levels of success. Yet, as Ryan observes, “Ukraine is not a drone war, it is a war where drones have gained prominence. … Drones do not replace human capacity — they extend it.” Drones are not replacing soldiers on the ground, nor are they a substitute for war’s other basic commodities: artillery, tanks, logisticians, infantry, and engineers.

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