Cosimo Meneguzzo and Fabrizio Minniti
Russia’s battlefield endurance in Ukraine is determined not by the size of Soviet‑era stockpiles but by a temporary industrial window—a period when production plus imports outpaces daily shell consumption. In 2025 Russian factories churned out about seven million artillery, mortar, tank and rocket rounds, excluding guided multiple-launch rocket system and loitering munitions—roughly nineteen thousand rounds per day—while open‑source estimates put Russian expenditure at ten to fifteen thousand rounds per day. As long as production and imports meet or exceed consumption, Moscow can sustain the war and rebuild reserves. When throughput falls below usage, the window closes and operational tempo shrinks.
Allied strategy, therefore, should not be guided by counting stockpiles, but by measuring—and taking steps to influence—throughput. Public intelligence reports, defense journalism, and other open‑source data combine to offer a view of that throughput. In some instances, audited totals are available; elsewhere educated estimates are necessary. But by combining these and acknowledging the distinction, it is possible not only to identify a range of the most likely current throughput, but also to assign a degree of certainty to it. The industrial window concept can then be applied to both Russia and its opponents, highlighting how cross‑theater demands shape ammunition availability and offering practical implications for planners.
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