12 May 2026

Rethinking the Theory of Victory for the “Next War”

Col. Takayasu Iwakami

War ought never to occur. However, despite this widely held belief, the use of force continues to shape international politics across Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Even when one side renounces the intention to employ force, an adversary may still retain—and ultimately use—it, rendering national security unattainable through restraint alone. Thus, while preventing war remains paramount, responsible defense planning requires anticipating unforeseen contingencies and ensuring the ability to prevail should deterrence fail. This raises a fundamental question for any state seeking credible deterrence: What level of relative combat power must be sustained during peacetime to ensure reliable success in wartime?

Nowhere is this challenge more acute than in the Indo-Pacific. Japan confronts a rapidly evolving security environment marked by limited topographical depth, demographic constraints, and increasingly capable adversaries. For a nation that must deter aggression under such structural limitations, the question of force ratios is not abstract but existential. It directly shapes how Japan—and by extension, the US–Japan alliance—must prepare for deterrence and defense in a region where the balance of power is shifting.

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