Russia's Great-Power Problem

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-great-power-problem-11553?page=show

Russia has territory, resources and a sizable nuclear arsenal, for all that is worth today, but it lacks real economic strength. Can it correct this deficiency?

Dmitri Trenin

October 28, 2014

Those who may have hoped to hear a conciliatory message from President Putin at the Valdai Club meeting in Sochi last week were disappointed. The speech was almost immediately dubbed Munich II—both in Russia and in the West. Putin appeared a wartime president, defying the U.S.-dominated global system, and supremely self-confident. He did talk about the need to agree on common global rules of the game and the relevant mechanisms for enforcing them, but this part of his remarks sounded like Sunday preaching. Basically, he demanded that the United States learn the art of self-limitation, make room for others in this world and mind its own business.

Emotionally, the centerpiece of Putin’s intervention was the lack of respect in the West for Russia and its interests: a recurrent theme with him for the better half of the decade. Essentially, he told the international audience of scholars and journalists: when Russia called itself the Soviet Union, was arming itself to the teeth with nuclear weapons and had leaders like Nikita Khrushchev, who famously banged his shoe at the UN General Assembly and came close to banging the United States with nuclear-tipped missiles, Moscow was respected, and its interests taken into account—if anything, out of fear. Now that Russia has shed communism, gotten off the backs of a dozen satellites, allowed its own fourteen borderlands to form independent states; embraced capitalism and begun moving toward democracy, its interests are being wholly ignored.

This diagnosis is generally correct, but the analysis needs to go deeper. Putin, a self-avowed student of history and a champion of the Westphalian tradition in international relations, certainly understands that the balance of interests—a phrase he should not have borrowed from Mikhail Gorbachev—rests on the balance of power or equivalent. This, by the way, is well understood in Beijing, where I heard—also last week—that the talk of multipolarity is just talk, for the lack, now or in the foreseeable future, of multiple poles. In reality, the world was moving toward new bipolarity, this time between the United States and China, with all other countries aligning themselves with either of the two poles. Thus, Europe and Japan would side with the United States; and Russia would go to China.

Ukraine’s Elections Mark a Historic Break With Russia and Its Soviet Past

Simon Shuster

Oct. 27, 2014

http://time.com/3541977/ukraine-break-with-soviet-past/ 

A woman leaves a polling booth as she votes during the parliamentary elections in Kiev, Ukraine, on Oct. 26, 2014Vladimir Simicek—Isifa/Getty Images

With more than half the votes counted in the country's parliamentary ballot, an unprecedented national consensus has emerged in support of a lasting break with Moscow and a turn toward European integration 

On Sunday night, as the votes in Ukraine’s parliamentary elections were being tallied, President Petro Poroshenko went on television to congratulate his citizens on the successful ballot and, citing early results, to highlight one of the milestones the country had crossed: Ukraine’s Communist Party, a political holdover from the nation’s Soviet past that had always championed close ties with Russia, had failed to win a single parliamentary seat. 

“For that I congratulate you,” the Ukrainian leader told his countrymen. “The people’s judgment, which is higher than all but the judgment of God, has issued a death sentence to the Communist Party of Ukraine.” For the first time since the Russian revolution of 1917 swept across Ukraine and turned it into a Soviet satellite, there would be no communists in the nation’s parliament. 

Their defeat, though largely symbolic, epitomized the transformation of Ukraine that began with this year’s revolution and, in many respects, ended with the ballot on Sunday. If the communists and other pro-Russian parties had enormous influence in Ukraine before the uprising and a firm base of support in the eastern half of the country, they are now all but irrelevant. The pro-Western leaders of the revolution, by contrast, saw a resounding victory over the weekend for their agenda of European integration. “More than three-quarters of voters who cast their ballots showed firm and irreversible support for Ukraine’s course toward Europe,” Poroshenko said in his televised address. 

With half the ballots counted on Monday, his political party was projected to get the most votes and more than a quarter of the seats in parliament. The party of his ally, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, was in a close second place, setting them up to form a ruling coalition of Westernizers and Ukrainian nationalists. They will likely need no support from the shrunken ranks of the pro-Russian parties in order to pass legislation and constitutional reform. 

In many ways they have Russian President Vladimir Putin to thank for that success. Since the revolution overthrew his allies in Ukraine in February, Putin has alienated most of the Ukrainian voters who had previously supported close ties with Moscow. His decision to invade and annex the region of Crimea in March, when Ukraine was just emerging from the turmoil of the revolution, awakened a hatred toward Russia in Ukraine unlike any the two countries had seen in centuries of unity and peaceful coexistence. Putin’s subsequent support for Ukrainian separatists, who are still fighting to turn the country’s eastern provinces into protectorates of Moscow, sealed the divide between these once fraternal nations. 

Nowhere has that been more apparent than in the results of Sunday’s ballot. The only party that made it into parliament with an agenda of repairing ties with Moscow was the so-called Opposition Bloc, which was forecast to take fourth place with less than 10% of the vote. Only a year ago, its politicians were part of the ruling coalition in Ukraine made up of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions, whose leader, Viktor Yanukovych, had won the presidential race in 2010 on a platform of brotherly ties with Russia. Now Yanukovych, who was chased from power in February, has taken refuge in Russia at Putin’s invitation, while his Party of Regions was so certain of defeat in this weekend’s elections that it decided not to run. Whatever chance remained for Putin to keep his allies in power in Ukraine now looks to have been lost, and with it he loses his dream of forming a new political alliance made up of the biggest states in the former Soviet Union. 

Russia’s Policy in the Middle East and the Fight Against Extremism

Alexey Malashenko

OCTOBER 28, 2014

PROJECT ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB SPRING (POMEAS) 

SUMMARY

Over a few months the Islamic State has asserted itself as the strongest—militarily and politically—extremist organization in the Middle East. Russia must develop a policy to deal with the Islamic State.

In early September 2014, the Islamic State (IS) posted a video message on the internet addressed to Vladimir Putin and Bashar Al-Assad. They warned Putin: "Your throne has already teetered . . . and will fall when we come to you . . . Vladimir Putin, the aircraft you sent to Bashar, we, with the grace of Allah, will send back to you."1 In that "message" the Islamic State also promised to "liberate Chechnya and the Caucasus."2 

Over a few months the Islamic State has asserted itself as the strongest – militarily and politically – extremist organization in the Middle East. In summer 2014, it took control over some 30 percent of Syrian and Iraqi territory. The Islamic State finds allies in Central Asia, Turkey and Indonesia, to say nothing of the Middle East. It enjoys the solidarity of Boko Haram – the most powerful sub-Saharan extremist group based in Nigeria. Islamic State leaders declare commitment to spread their activities to Pakistan, where they are supported by a Taliban splinter group Jamaat ul-Ayrar. IS cells are active in Peshawar, its presence has been noted in Srinagar, capital of Jammu and Kashmir. The Islamic State threatens to project its activities to the US and Europe. Its official spokesman Mohammad al-Adnani stated that IS was ready to "raise the banner of Allah over the White House."3 This threat, of course, should hardly be taken seriously. But it would be a fallacy to ignore such challenges, especially as they come from religious fanatics. 

An explosion of religious extremism was a culmination of the Arab Spring and for many politicians it came as a surprise – like the Arab revolutions themselves. However, as early as 2011 in the context of widespread euphoria over the imminent democratization of the Arab world some experts warned that the "Spring" might be followed by a "hot Islamist summer."

UNDERSTANDING THE IS 

Unlike Al-Qaeda the IS is not prone to "dramatic" terrorist attacks like those of September 11; its leadership puts an emphasis on the creation of efficient military forces able to combat regular enemy armies. At the territories, it controls the Islamic State, establishes a quasi-government infrastructure, and imposes Sharia laws. 

The IS is kind of an "International"; its members come from some eighty countries.4 Most of them are citizens of Arab and Moslem states, but there are also quite a few Europeans. According to one estimate, by early September 2014, the number of European fighters was about 2000. Four hundred of them came from France, a roughly equal number from Britain. Other reports give a different figure: only from Britain some 1500 militants went to fight in Iraq and Syria, with another 2000 from France, a thousand from Germany and several hundred from the United States. The estimated number of Russian citizens varies from 300 to 2000, and some of them, like a Chechen named Abu Omar al-Shishani, who was killed in summer 2014, have risen to the rank of local commanders. Hundreds of militants represent Central Asia. Estimates of the total number of IS fighters vary from 12000 to 30000. 

The IS is a part, a "tip" of an extremely broad religious and political phenomenon named Islamism, which includes many national, regional and global groups, parties and movements. Without a detailed classification they can be roughly divided into the moderate, "moderately radical", radical and extremist categories. A dialogue with the first three ones is possible and even necessary. With the last, extremist trend that includes the IS, it is practically out of the question. The problem, however, is that there are no unsurmountable divides between the four categories: "moderate radicals" can often take more radical, and eventually extremist positions. In my opinion this was the case with the IS, created in 2006 (then it was called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). 

Broken and Unreadable IN SEARCH OF THE ELUSIVE NARRATIVE

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Everything boils down to perceptions. A recent Pew poll revealed that nearly 60% of Americans believe the U.S.-led airstrikes against the Islamic State are failing. Even more would give the operation a negative review overall. An even higher majority don’t believe we have a clearly defined goal.

The air campaign, now in its third month in the skies over Iraq and Syria,averages just seven sorties a day, but is delivering ordnance at a significant rate, estimated to cost between $200 to $300 million a month. Even with limited effectiveness, the airstrikes should be gradually degrading ISIS capability. This week’s strikes in Kobani have reportedly killed more than 600 ISIS militants, allowing Kurdish fighters to rally in defense of the city.

But in the eyes of the public, we’re losing. Why?

Because we don’t have a narrative. And it’s not that ISIS is beating us to the microphone, we’re not even trying. When we do get to the microphone, the result is often broken and unreadable. The administration that blazed a trail to the White House in 2008 with an unprecedented social media campaign now struggles to define a consistent – and convincing – narrative for what we’ve dubbed “Operation Inherent Resolve.”

The public needs to understand what we’re doing and why. They need a voice of calm reason. What we’ve offered instead is incoherent resolve.

In the past generation, we’ve made great inroads toward cementing the link between tactics and strategy. From AirLand Battle doctrine to the recent publication of the Army Operating Concept, the services have applied an incredible amount of intellectual capital toward translating “tactical victories into strategic success.” But still we flounder. Why?

“We don’t have a link between strategy and policy,” according to retired Marine Lt. Gen Paul Van Riper, speaking recently on a panel addressing war termination at the Dole Institute of Politics at the University of Kansas. “I don’t think we’ve defined our national interests.” Where NSC-68 defined our national security objectives through several administrations, we now publish a new National Security Strategy every four years, Van Riper added. That singular lack of focus prevents us from linking strategy to policy and, in turn, from building a coherent narrative that supports our national security objectives.

Awkward.

Now, circle back on our airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. Are they successful? Well, that depends on how we define success. Are they effective? Again, that depends on what “right” looks like in the aftermath of a strike. Can wedestroy ISIS? That depends on whether you can actually destroy an idea. Will we follow ISIS to the “Gates of Hell”? Yeah, that one was a rhetorical question.

US OFFICIALS: Ground Offensive Against ISIS 'Months' Away In Iraq

PHIL STEWART

OCT. 24, 2014

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Thomson ReutersA Kurdish Peshmerga fighter launches mortar shells towards Zummar, controlled by Islamic State, near Mosul

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE Florida (Reuters) - Iraqi forces are months away from being able to start waging any kind of sustained ground offensive against the Islamic State and any similar effort in Syria will take longer, officials at the U.S. military's Central Command said on Thursday.

In Iraq, the timing will depend on a host of factors, some out of the military's control - from Iraqi politics to the weather. Iraqi forces also must be trained, armed and ready before major advances, like one to retake the city of Mosul, which fell to the Islamic State in June."It's not imminent. But we don't see that that's a years-long effort to get them to a place to where they can be able to go on a sustained counter-offensive," a military official said, instead describing it as a "months-long" endeavor.

The officials, briefing a group of reporters, said the priority in Iraq was halting the Islamic State's advance but acknowledged Iraq's western Anbar province was contested, despite U.S.-led air strikes.

Iraq's main military divisions in Anbar - the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and twelfth – have been badly damaged. At least 6,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed through June and double that number have deserted, say medical and diplomatic sources.

Asked about whether U.S. military advisers in Iraq might head to Anbar, the first official acknowledged discussions were underway broadly about efforts to enable the Iraqis "as far forward as we can" but did not disclose details. The official said talks were also underway with coalition partners about where their advisers might be placed.

Anbar's dominant Sunni population resented former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's Shi'ite majority government but the officials saw positive signs among tribes since Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi was sworn in this September.

AP/Hussein MallaIn this Wednesday, Sept. 3, 2014 file photo, Lebanese Sunni gunmen hold their weapons during the funeral procession of Sgt. Ali Sayid, who was beheaded by Islamic militants.

Who Are the Soldiers of the Islamic State?

by: ARON LUND

OCTOBER 24, 2014

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In September, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that the Sunni extremist group known as the Islamic State—an al-Qaeda offshoot currently controlling vast swaths of territory in both Iraq and Syria—could mobilize a combined total of between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters. It was double or triple the CIA’s previous estimate of 10,000 fighters.

“This new total reflects an increase in members because of stronger recruitment since June following battlefield successes and the declaration of a caliphate,” a CIA official explained.

FOREIGNERS ARE A MINORITY

The Islamic State is well known to field large numbers of foreign fighters, such as the Chechen forces under Omar al-Shishani, a Georgia-born jihadi commander. But the number of foreigners should not be overstated. According to the CIA, the total number of jihadis that have traveled to Iraq and Syria in the past few years is thought to be around 15,000—but that doesn’t mean that the Islamic State has enrolled 15,000 foreigners.

Of these, some thousands have gone into al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front or independent jihadi groups like the Ansar al-Deen Front and Jund al-Aqsa. Several thousands have also been arrested, wounded, or killed in the past few years, or simply returned home. Whatever number this leaves the Islamic State with, it is certainly a minority of its total manpower. Although the Islamic State’s elite frontline forces and certain leadership bodies seem to be disproportionately foreign, most fighters on the ground are without a doubt local Syrians and Iraqis.

EXPLOITING SUNNI ARAB GRIEVANCES

When I visited northern Iraq in late August, a Kurdish militia leader told me that his unit had not seen, heard, captured, or killed a single foreign fighter near its positions north of Mosul. The fighters on the other side of the hill may have included a few Syrians, but almost all seemed to be Iraqis. Some may have come from further afield, like the Anbar Province in western Iraq, but most, he reckoned, were young men from nearby cities like Mosul and Tal Afar or from the handful of Sunni Arab villages near the frontline.

“There are not a lot of real Islamic State fighters here,” he said. “It’s an exaggeration. All Sunnis are now called ‘Islamic State’ but they’re not.” The political marginalization and military devastation of local Sunni Arab communities had, along with Arab-Kurdish tension and abuses, made many inhabitants welcome the Islamic State as a liberator from Shia and Kurdish oppression.

“You’ll have two members of the Islamic State who go into an Arab village,” said the commander, “and then they suddenly get 40, 50, or 100 men to follow them.”

These new recruits would have included members of other rebel groups, former Baathists, and of course the cannon fodder of every war: unemployed young men with no particular political affiliation and no prospects for a decent future. For them, it was hardly a question of ideology, but of opportunity and of a desire to get back at common enemies—and most of all, to get out of a miserable situation.

COOPTING RIVAL GROUPS AND DEFECTORS

One of the most important manpower sources for the Islamic State seems to be other rebel groups. Both Syria and Iraq are home to a vast mass of young Sunni Arab men who have joined local rebel groups for a wide variety of reasons: primarily to overthrow the Damascus and Baghdad regimes, but also to chase thrills and glory, to follow the example of friends and family, to protect their home areas, or simply to earn money. Some are even forced into service.

Many of these fighters are conservative and religious, even sectarian and drawn to fundamentalist politics, but the vast majority are certainly not ideological Salafi-jihadis. Still, in today’s desperate times, thousands appear to be willing to join a jihadi group if it offers them what they need—or if they have no other alternative.

In Iraq, U.S. sees hints of Islamic State’s defense plan

By Missy Ryan 

October 23, 2014 

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MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, Fla. — The Islamic State has laid improvised explosives along a major highway north of Baghdad, revealing for the first time how the militant group is seeking to defend territory it controls from counterattack, U.S. defense officials said on Thursday. 

U.S. officials described Iraqi forces’ struggle to clear the explosives and advance into contested areas around the strategic Baiji oil refinery as the start of what they expect will be a years-long endeavor to break the Islamic State’s hold on a vast area across Iraq and Syria. 

“We’re seeing now . . . how they defend,” a U.S. military official said. “We got a good lesson on how they attack, but how they defend — we’re getting a good lesson in now.” 

Officials at the U.S. military’s Central Command said Islamic State fighters were increasingly turning to roadside and car bombs as tools to try to slow the advance of Iraqi troops, as they were along the country’s main roadway connecting the capital Baghdad to militant-held areas to the north. 

Poor weather in recent days has forced Iraqi troops to stick close to the highway, increasing the danger from bombs militants had buried underground. 

The Islamic State’s use of such homemade explosives harks back to the worst of the violence unleashed by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. During those years, roadside bombs were a signature weapon of insurgents, killing and maiming thousands of soldiers and civilians. 

U.S. officials, speaking to reporters on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly discuss details of U.S. operations, said U.S. and allied airstrikes have been critical in providing Iraqi troops and Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq an opening to hit back at the Islamic State. The total of U.S. and allied sorties over Iraq and Syria reached 6,600 this week. 

“We’re going to start to get a good lesson in how they lose, because how they morph when they lose is important,” the official said. 

On Thursday, U.S. war planes conducted another strike south of Baiji, an example of how the Obama administration hopes to help Iraqi forces reverse the Islamic State’s advance without inserting American soldiers into another ground war in Iraq. 

The strikes have been necessary in part to compensate for weaknesses in Iraq’s military, which were exposed when Iraqi troops abandoned their posts in droves this summer in the face of an Islamic State assault. 

But U.S. officials said that Iraqi troops’ attempts to recapture strategic points north of Baghdad, like their struggles to reclaim other militant-held parts of the country, amount to little more than localized attacks, not the kind of major offensive required to defeat the Islamic State. 

Why the Battle for Kobane Matters (and Doesn't Matter)

Rodger Shanahan

October 23, 2014 

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If you relied only on the media, you could be forgiven for thinking that the focus of the fight against ISIS has been on the Syrian city of Kobane.

This is thanks to the easy access for international media to the Turkish side of the border near Kobane and the resulting images, as well as the work of the Kurds and their associated lobby groups who want the world to focus on their issues. At one point the Australian Broadcasting Cooperation (ABC) even claimed that a hill near the town was “strategic.” Tactically important perhaps, but strategic? I don't think so.

As US Secretary of State John Kerry noted, the US does not consider Kobane a defining element of the coalition strategy. Rather, it quite rightly sees that Iraq is ISIS’ main effort and hence the bulk of Washington's force is directed there.

Kobane's value though, lies in what it represents more than what it is. One of the principles of war that applies to insurgent groups as much as it does to conventional armies is the maintenance of momentum. If you have momentum, then you force your opposition to make reactive decisions under pressure that often turn out to be sub-optimal. You can also create fear and panic in the opposition, as ISIS showed in its attack on Mosul and subsequent drive south, which resulted in the collapse of several Iraqi army divisions. ISIS has also relied on battlefield victories to replenish its ammunition stocks and gain military equipment and recruits.

The capture of Mosul, though, may well represent a high point in ISIS's campaign.

While the group is still pressing its advantage in al-Anbar province in Iraq, it has lost Mosul dam and has been investing in Kobane for over a month without success. If it is unable to capture Kobane, it will have lost significant personnel and resources against some Kurdish irregulars (with coalition air support) for little to no gain. One of ISIS's lines of operation will have stalled, and very publicly so.

ISIS is a media savvy organization and it realizes that being beaten back in Kobane would be a very public loss. And in the social media world ISIS inhabits, a public loss can also be a strategic one. Images of coalition airstrikes and Kurdish fighters tearing down ISIS flags don't do much for ISIS's reputation as a near-invincible jihadist war machine, an image on which it has relied for much of its success to date.

Kobane also offers the coalition opportunities greater than the limited value of the town itself. In the past week the coalition has increased its support for the Kurdish fighters, indicating a willingness to fight for the town's defense. This limited action offers some significant practical benefits for the coalition. It will be learning much about integrating airstrikes with indigenous forces and can use the Kobane battle as a live run for future actions against ISIS in Iraq. At the same time, the coalition is able to degrade ISIS forces in the region, which appear to be reinforcing failure in their assault on Kobane.

This piece was first posted on The Interpreter, which is published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy.

General Dempsey to the Rescue How America’s top military leader dragged Obama back into Iraq. Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/general-dempsey-to-the-rescue-112154.html#ixzz3HEEMlA5H

By MARK PERRY

October 23, 2014

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Apart from an occasional Thursday afternoon meeting between Barack Obama and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel at the White House, Gen. Martin Dempsey—the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—rarely has opportunities to get face time with the president. So when he does, he presses his advantage. One of the few times this happened was during the early evening hours of Aug. 6, when Dempsey joined Obama in his limousine at the State Department, where the president had been attending a session of the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. The ride to the White House allowed Dempsey his first one-on-one with Obama in several weeks. As the two sat across from each other in the presidential limousine, Dempsey turned to his commander-in-chief.

“We have a crisis in Iraq, Mr. President,” Dempsey said, according to a senior Pentagon official who spoke with the chairman about his discussion with Obama that same day. “ISIS is a real threat,” he added, using an alternative acronym for the military group the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL. The senior Pentagon official with whom I spoke, and who paraphrased the Obama-Dempsey exchange, added that “Dempsey really leaned into him” on the crisis, saying it demanded “immediate attention.”

By that point, ISIL had overrun Mosul, a city of one million people in northern Iraq, seized stockpiles of heavy weapons from the hapless Iraqi military and was attacking thousands of ethnic Yazidis who had fled the conflict. According to the senior Pentagon official, the president listened carefully as Dempsey outlined the militants’ rapid military gains in western Iraq and warned that ISIL fighters were threatening Baghdad. “It’s that bad?” Obama asked, according to this person’s account. Dempsey was blunt. “Yes, sir,” he said, “it is.” (The White House, asked to characterize the president's reaction, declined to comment.)

Obama surely wasn’t surprised by what Dempsey said, though it was a stark message to hear from his normally phlegmatic Joint Chiefs chairman. After Dempsey’s intervention, Obama convened a meeting of his top foreign-policy team that evening that included Dempsey, national security adviser Susan Rice, Chief of Staff Denis McDonough and others, then conducted two lengthy discussions on the crisis the next day, Aug. 7. That same night, a Thursday, he appeared on national television to announce that he had authorized U.S. airstrikes on ISIL positions.

While Obama’s actions reflected the quick and decisive action of a president faced with an immediate threat, reports of ISIL’s gains had been circulating in administration circles for weeks. And while the president told the American people on Aug. 7 that he would “not allow the United States to be dragged into another war in Iraq,” he now found himself drawn back into a conflict that he desperately wanted to avoid.

As far back as late June, in fact, the danger of the burgeoning crisis had been made clear in a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry from three Sunni leaders in Anbar province that outlined the ISIL threat and asked for help, according to an Iraqi official who provided me with a copy of the correspondence.

Kerry received the letter after his June 24 visit to Irbil, where he met with Massoud Barzani, the president of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Barzani sketched a vivid portrait of what his peshmerga forces, fighting ISIL just miles from where he and Kerry were meeting, were facing. Irbil was in danger of being overrun, Barzani told Kerry, unless his militia received modern American weapons. At one point, according to an Iraqi official who spoke to Barzani about the meeting, the Kurdish leader grew angry, telling Kerry that the United States had “failed to meet its commitments” to arm the Kurds—with the result that the weapons ISIL were using, including American weapons captured from Iraqi stores, were much more lethal than what his troops employed. The vaunted peshmerga, he told Kerry, were in danger of being overwhelmed

The letter that Kerry subsequently received from Iraq’s Sunni leaders began by thanking the secretary for his visit to Irbil and his “tireless efforts to help resolve” the Iraq crisis. It went on to request U.S. help in rolling back the ISIL threat: “We ask your help [and] American counsel to advise us on the best course of action to prevent ISIL from extending their evil dominion from Syria into Iraq.” The letter concluded by requesting that the United States appoint a military adviser to oversee the efforts. “We believe that the best person to advice [sic] Iraq on the security side of the crisis is General John Allen, who has the best reputation among the people of Anbar and beyond. As you know he worked hand-in-hand with us during his service in Anbar to defeat the extremists and defended our people from their crimes.”

The letter was dated June 30 and signed by Sabah Abdul Khroat (chairman of the board of Anbar province), Ahmed Abu Risha (a powerful Sunni sheikh in Anbar province) and Ahmed Khalaf al-Dulaimi (the governor of Anbar Province). The three are the most important leaders of Iraq’s Sunni community, known in Washington for their role in the 2006 and 2007 Anbar Awakening—and as adamant opponents of Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

According to an Anbar leader who oversaw the drafting of the request, the letter was “the result of a lot of debate and consultation.” The three men, along with a wider group of supporters opposed to Maliki, had also developed an extensive proposal that included a list of grievances against Maliki and a political program for addressing them. The five-page paper, which was forwarded to me by this same Anbar leader, accused Maliki of launching an “authoritarian/sectarian revenge campaign” against Iraq’s Sunni community. At the heart of the proposal was a demand that the United States abandon its support for Maliki and support the establishment of a Sunni “National Guard” with “an enduring command structure” that could not be undermined from Baghdad. But the appointment of a U.S. adviser to oversee the effort was key.

ISIS Training Camps Proliferating Rapidly In Iraq and Syria

Jihadist training camps proliferate in Iraq and Syria

Bill Roggio & Caleb Weiss

The Long War Journal

October 24, 2014

Since the Syrian civil war began in the spring of 2011, the Islamic State, al Qaeda, and other allied jihadist groups have operated more than 30 training camps inside Iraq and Syria. While global jihadist groups have primarily used camps to indoctrinate and train fighters for local insurgencies as part of the effort to establish a global caliphate, in the past al Qaeda has used its camps to support attacks against the West.

The Long War Journal has compiled information on the camps from jihadist videos, news accounts, and US military press releases that note airstrikes against the training facilities. It is unclear if all of the training camps are currently in operation. In addition, this analysis is compiled using publicly-available evidence. It is likely that some training camps are not advertised.

Since the beginning of 2012, a total of 37 camps have been identified as being operational. Of those camps, 28 are in Syria, and nine are in Iraq.

The Islamic State, the al Qaeda splinter group that was disowned by al Qaeda’s general command in February 2014, operates the largest number of training facilities, with eight camps in Iraq and 12 more in Syria.

In Iraq, the Islamic State has operated three camps in Anbar province, two in Salahaddin, two in Ninewa, and one more in Kirkuk.

In Syria, the Islamic State has run six facilities in Aleppo province, two in Deir al Zour, and one each in Hasakah, Raqqah, Latakia, and Damascus.

The Al Nusrah Front, which is al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, has run seven camps in the country; two each in Deir al Zour and Aleppo, and one each in Idlib, Homs, and Daraa. The camps in Deir al Zour and Raqqah are thought to be no longer operational after the Islamic State took control of the areas. The Al Nusrah Front camps are also likely the same camps used by the so-called Khorasan group, which is led by senior al Qaeda leaders and is embedded within Al Nusrah. Al Qaeda’s Khorasan group seeks to conduct attacks against the West.

Ten more camps are run by jihadist groups allied with the Al Nusrah Front. Nine training facilities are in Syria, and one, run by Ansar al Islam, is in Iraq. Two of the camps in Syria are operated by Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar and Junud al Sham. In September 2014, Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar was listed by the US as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group, and Murad Margoshvilli, the leader of the Junud al Sham, was named a global terrorist.

Training for insurgencies and for terrorist attacks

In the past, al Qaeda has used its network of camps not only to train fighters to battle in local insurgencies, but also to identify potential recruits as well as support a host of allied jihadist groups.

The 9/11 Commission Report detailed how al Qaeda used its sanctuary in Afghanistan prior to the attacks on the US to operate camps and expand its ties to jihadist groups throughout the world:

The alliance with the Taliban provided al Qaeda a sanctuary in which to train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other jihad groups and leaders, and plot and staff terrorist schemes. While Bin Ladin maintained his own al Qaeda guesthouses and camps for vetting and training recruits, he also provided support to and benefited from the broad infrastructure of such facilities in Afghanistan made available to the global network of Islamist movements. U.S. intelligence estimates put the total number of fighters who underwent instruction in Bin Ladin-supported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000.

In addition to training fighters and special operators, this larger network of guesthouses and camps provided a mechanism by which al Qaeda could screen and vet candidates for induction into its own organization. Thousands flowed through the camps, but no more than a few hundred seem to have become al Qaeda members. From the time of its founding, al Qaeda had employed training and indoctrination to identify “worthy” candidates.

Here’s Everything Wrong with the White House’s War on the Islamic State

BY PETER CERTO, 
OCTOBER 2, 2014
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The Obama administration’s war plans in Iraq and Syria are illegal, ill-conceived, and destined to fail. Here's what the U.S.—and you—can do instead. 

If Barack Obama owes his presidency to one thing, it was the good sense he had back in 2002 to call George W. Bush’s plans to go to war in Iraq what they were: “dumb.” (The war was many other things too—illegal, cynical, not to mention disastrous—but “dumb” was pretty good for a guy running for Senate back when both parties had largely lined up behind the war.)

Since then, Obama’s had his ups and downs with the antiwar voters who delivered his 2008 nomination and subsequent election. But throughout the arguments over drones, Afghanistan, Libya, and NSA spying—among other issues—Obama could always come back to these voters and say: Hey, at least I ended the war in Iraq. What do you think the Republicans would have done?

But now, with scarcely a whisper of serious debate, Obama has become the fourth consecutive U.S. president to launch a war in Iraq—and in fact has outdone his predecessors by spreading the war to Syria as well, launching strikes not only on fighters linked to the Islamic State (IS, or ISIS) but also on the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front and al-Khorasan.

This was no minor escalation. According to the Washington Post, the United States and its Arab allies dropped more explosives on Syria in their first engagement there than U.S. forces had dropped over all of Iraq in the preceding month. It was the largest single U.S. military operation since NATO’s intervention in Libya was launched back in 2011.

War planners are predicting that the latest conflict could rage for three years or longer, meaning Obama will bequeath to his successor a quagmire much like the one he inherited—the one he’d so distinguished himself by opposing and subsequently ending. That’ll make five U.S. presidents at war in Iraq and beyond in a row.

Polls show some significant public support for air strikes against IS, albeit alongside ample wariness about getting dragged in too far. Support for action against IS is easy enough to understand: Many fair-minded people otherwise weary of war in the Middle East are appalled by the brutality of IS and feel compelled to “do something” to stop them.

And we should do something. But not this.

We’ll come to regret this war, potentially long before it’s had three years to run its course. Here’s why.

This war is illegal.

So, first thing’s first: This war is unmistakably illegal.

Under international law—at least as defined by the UN Charter, to which the United States is a founding signatory—one country can only legally launch attacks inside another under one of three conditions: if the intervention is authorized by the UN Security Council; if it’s a cut-and-dry case of self-defense; or if assistance is requested by the other country’s government.

It’s true that in Iraq at least, the government requested U.S. assistance in stemming the spread of IS—an intervention promoted in Washington as part of an effort to prevent the genocide of Iraqi religious minorities like the Yazidis (remember them?). Yet the United States has continued launching strikes on IS positions in Iraq long after the crisis on Mt. Sinjar was putatively resolved.

The Ghosts of Gaza: Israel’s Soldier Suicides

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Were Israeli soldiers so haunted by what they saw and did in the last Gaza war that they took their own lives? What role did their zealous commander play?

HAIFA, Israel—More than two months after the end of Israel’s latest offensive in Gaza, Operation Protective Edge, its consequences are still being felt in Israeli society. While the Palestinian territory where the war was waged lies in ruins, for some of the Israelis who fought there the devastation that lingers is in the mind. 

In the weeks after Israel and Hamas agreed to an open-ended ceasefire, three Israeli soldiers decided to end their lives with their own weapons. And what was especially striking about their suicides was that all served in the same unit, the Givati Brigade, which had a reputation for its ruthless ferocity, considerable bravery, and the use of Old Testament religiosity to justify the merciless operations of its commander, Colonel Ofer Winter. 

The unit spent most of its time in Gaza close to the border with Israel in an area the Israel Defense Forces set out to make a wide buffer zone consuming more than 40 percent of Gaza’s territory. Fighters from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other groups did not fall back. Instead they operated out of a vast network of tunnels, and the combat was as ferocious as any the IDF has seen for many years. But the Givati Brigade drew particular attention because of its alleged responsibility for widespread civilian casualties. 

On July 21, the Givati was the main infantry force in the assault on Khuzaa, a town in south-central Gaza right on the border with Israel. Human Rights Watchreported afterward, without specifying the unit, that IDF troops there were responsible for “repeated shelling that struck apparent civilian structures, lack of access to necessary medical care, and the threat of attack from Israeli forces as [civilians] tried to leave the area.” 

Humanitarian organizations were denied entry to Khuzaa, leaving medics unable to tend the wounded or collect corpses. Residents fortunate enough to have escaped began returning to the destroyed village at the beginning of August. 

On Aug. 1, The Daily Beast reported what appeared to have been a summary execution of six men inside an abandoned home full of IDF bullet casings. 

In a follow-up report, an Islamic Jihad member under the alias Abu Muhammad, who claimed to have fought in the battle of Khuzaa, alleged that the Palestinians killed were members of his organization, that they had come out of a tunnel to try to ambush IDF soldiers but had been ambushed themselves, were cornered in a nearby house, ran out of ammunition, and then were executed. 

He claims that during an early morning operation in Khuzaa, God sent “clouds of glory” to protect his troops. 

When asked about the event, and about the possibility that the three soldiers who committed suicide might have been involved, an IDF spokesperson declined to comment and said the matter was still under investigation. 

By the time villagers returned to the ruins of Khuzaa in early August, the Givatis had moved south. Second Lieutenant Hadar Goldin of the Givati Brigade was believed to have been captured by Hamas fighters during a battle in Rafah on Aug. 1. 

In response, the IDF appears to have initiated what is known as the Hannibal Directive or Protocol, a procedure that aims to free a captured soldier—or risk ending his life along with that of his abductors, if that’s what it takes—in order to avoid protracted negotiations with militants that may free hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. The directive dates back to 1986, was kept secret and reportedly was abolished. But on Aug. 3, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the Hannibal Directive was still very much in effect: 

“On Friday morning, when the IDF still believed that Lt. Hadar Goldin may have been taken alive by Hamas into an attack tunnel beneath Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, the Hannibal Directive was activated to its most devastating extent yet—including massive artillery bombardments and airstrikes on possible escape routes. At least 40 Palestinians were killed in Rafah.” 

The Right Kind of German Leadership for Europe

by: JAN TECHAU

OCTOBER 28, 2014

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German leadership has become the Holy Grail of European politics. There is not a single policy debate on EU affairs—be it about the euro, political union, a possible British exit from the EU, trade, or foreign policy—that does not end up being a discussion of what Berlin wants, should want, can do, and can’t do. All solutions (and all problems, for that matter) seem to stem from German leadership—or a lack thereof.

But what is the right kind of German leadership in and for Europe?

Successful German leadership in Europe has traditionally rested on three pillars. Let’s call them the Kohlian trinity, after former chancellor Helmut Kohl.

The first pillar was a rock-solid idea of what the European Union should be. Almost all members of the German political elite subscribed to the same vision of Europe: if in doubt, favor integration. This did not necessarily mean embracing the EU’s founding principle of “ever closer union,” but it was essentially a feeling that more Europe was a good idea.

This notion was not a lofty, postmodern, federalist pipe dream. It was very sensible politics that served German interests and the country’s domestic zeitgeist well. It was also about a clear Ordnungsmodell: a rules-based system of conflict resolution that would make all EU members more affluent and more secure in return for partly surrendering national sovereignty.

The second pillar of German leadership was the willingness of all postwar German governments to give in just a little bit earlier and pay just a little bit more than other countries to forge compromise. Germany became a modern-day honest broker and reserve power of European affairs.

Being willing to give more than others to hold the EU together and to deepen integration was strongly in Germany’s national interest. The country had most to gain from a functioning Europe. Not only did a well-oiled EU make the Germans immensely rich and turn former enemies into friends; it also enabled Germans to live at peace with themselves, a motivation that was (and still is) hugely underestimated by others when they assess German foreign policy.

The third pillar of the Kohlian trinity was a painstaking effort to attend to the fears, worries, and concerns of Germany’s neighbors. Kohl’s mastery came from the fact that he wasn’t only interested in the big players like France, Britain, or Italy. That went without saying.

He was also particularly concerned about the smaller countries. He put an enormous effort into cultivating trusted relationships with the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, and also, crucially, with Spain. Kohl knew that these states all had barely concealed nightmares about German size and dominance, and about their dependence on Germany’s economy. So he made a point of visiting them disproportionately often and being their advocate, whenever possible, inside the EU.

Germany’s extraordinary investment in these smaller players (a feat that consecutive French governments were unable to pull off) served a dual purpose. The move created the trust that Germany’s neighbors needed and that the Germans themselves required to come to terms with their place in Europe. And the effort was eminently smart power politics in terms of organizing majorities in the EU institutions.

Today, Germany’s dilemma is twofold. First, the three Kohlian pillars of leadership are still required, but they are only partly intact at best. Second, even if they were fully functioning, they would no longer be sufficient.

#Germany needs to redevelop a clear idea of where it wants Europe to go.

The World’s Future: Bipolar Geoeconomics?

by: DMITRI TRENIN

OCTOBER 28, 2014

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At an event in Beijing last week, a leading Chinese academic said that the vision of a multipolar world so central to Beijing's foreign policy doctrine was in fact unrealistic—for the lack, now and in the foreseeable future, of multiple poles. In fact, he said, there were only two poles available: the United States and China. All other countries would need to decide with which they want or have to align. Many in the audience nodded and some even suggested that the Chinese leadership's thinking was much closer to that of the professor than to its own formal doctrine.

Political developments of the past nine months seem to have produced a lot of fresh evidence in support of the growing global bipolarity. The Ukraine crisis has put an end to Russia's hopes of building a Greater Europe or of a strategic partnership with Japan. The European Union has had to reduce and restrict its economic ties with Russia, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan has had to abandon his idea of forging a strategic connection to Moscow. In their opposition to Russia's policies, both Europe and Japan are now more closely tied to the United States than ever before since the end of the Cold War. Faced with the Western sanctions, Russia, for its part, has had to intensify and expand its relations with China. As the Beijing academic put it, it simply has no other choice.

Several fundamental geoeconomic trends point in the same direction. As Konstantin Simonov put it in his October 21column in Vedomosti newspaper, the re-industrialization of the United States powered by cheap energy and helped by raising labor costs in Asia leads to the emergence of a pan-American economic space, from Canada to Chile, with the United States at its center. Europe, Japan and Australia are already aligning themselves with the U.S. through Transatlantic and Transpacific partnerships. In response, China is already working on expanding its own domestic consumption and consolidating its ties with neighboring countries in Asia.

President Xi Jingpin's initiatives, announced in 2013, about the Silk Road Economic Belt in continental Asia and the Maritime Silk Road point to the two main axes of China's geoeconomic expansion. Beijing eyes Central and South-East Asia as prime areas for boosting trade and investment. South Asia and Eurasia are next. If these plans are implemented, the future economic Sinosphere, which might be more politely called Greater Asia, may extend all the way to the Gulf, the Black Sea and the Baltics, and embrace countries such as India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia.

Regionalization may indeed be the future or at least the new stage of globalization. Competition among the super-regions, in this scenario, will become the essence of global geoeconomics and geopolitics. Unlike in the early stages of globalization, the main players' norms and principles, the values and ideas will be actively contested. It is not a given that this contest will always be peaceful. Geoeconomics, by itself, will not just build a new and stable world order. Again, as the developments of the past nine months have shown, geopolitics is not far behind, and can throw a wrench into the process, particularly when it is ignored. A world of roughly equal multiple poles is not in the offing. But do not bank on a Sino-American bi-hegemony, either. It is going to be messier, but also more diverse and more interesting than that.

SOCOM Wants To Start Data Mining the Open Web

By PAUL McLEARY 

Oct. 25, 2014

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Eyes on the Threat: A US Air Force tactical air control party member (left) observes the compass and the area while an Air Force combat controller talks on the radio during Emerald Warrior 2014 on Hurlburt Field, Florida, May 1. A new US Special Operations Command program would use online information to give operators on the ground a better view of nearby threats. (Senior Airman Colville McFee/ / 3rd Combat Camera)

WASHINGTON — US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is building an open-source data-mining program that will run automatic keyword searches across a variety of websites and databases, allowing its operators to build a better picture of their operating environment in as close to real time as possible.

The command held a series of meetings with a group of defense industry representatives in late June to discover what commercial tech might be available in the near future, according to a SOCOM official.

Dubbed AVATAR — “Automated Visualization for Tailored Analytical Reporting” — the program would be run by existing SOCOM staffers at the “tactical, strategic and operational levels” of action, according to command spokesman US Navy Capt. Kevin Aandahl.

The objective, Aandahl said, is to “filter and display open-source information in a way that is specific and timely to the needs and requirements of the SOF [special operations forces].”

A request for information released in May stated that the program would comprise functional areas: “data acquisition, data mining and analysis, visualization and reporting, and alerts and monitoring.”

SOCOM is also looking for contractors to provide the ability to “perform high-volume queries quickly and conduct searches on pre-determined websites.”

The data-mining software, the May solicitation said, would “automatically extract information of interest from all types of structured, unstructured, and multimedia data,” then perform link analysis and correlate that information with intelligence that has already been provided by the big US intelligence agencies.

The national security strategy outlined by the White House in 2012 places a premium on the use of special operations forces to operate — quietly — with allies on train and assist missions while continuing their counterterror mission wherever Washington deems fit.

But that doesn’t always mean that specific missions will be given a high priority by the big intelligence agencies.

When operators go to perform a small mission, they have to tailor their intelligence packages for the geographic area, and “that’s something that’s hard to get from one of the big intel agencies on short notice, because those agencies are worried about those top-level national priorities,” said Jim Penrose, a former National Security Agency intelligence officer.