Aung San Suu Kyi and Kipling's Burma

31 October 2014 

One of the inevitable side effects of Burma's long struggle for democracy has been the demonisation, or canonisation, of its main political actors. This phenomenon has been reflected in countless articles in the media and on the web about figures like Ne Win (who effectively ruled Burma from 1962 to 1988), Than Shwe (who led the country's military council from 1992 to 2011), and of course opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

There are very few books published in English about the country's military leaders. The first full length biography of Than Shwe appeared in 2010, and a scholarly account of Ne Win's career is currently in preparation. Aung San Suu Kyi, by contrast, has been the subject of more than a dozen biographies, ranging from books for children to major studies. She has also published three semi-autobiographical works.

This is not counting director Luc Besson's rather imaginative account of her place in modern Burmese history, as seen in the feature film The Lady, starring Michelle Yeoh and released in 2011.

Given the close attention that has been paid to Aung San Suu Kyi's background and career since she first rose to prominence during Burma's 1988 pro-democracy uprising, it would be surprising to discover anything new about her. However, there remain a few areas of her private life that have still not been thoroughly explored.

These can sometimes be revealed in unlikely ways.

For example, a Griffith Asia Institute research project about the influence of Rudyard Kiplingand popular Western music on perceptions of colonial Burma, has unexpectedly thrown new light on Aung San Suu Kyi's affection for both the 'bard of empire' and classical music.

When Aung San Suu Kyi began to challenge Burma's new military government after 1988, a campaign that saw her awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Kipling's 1890 poem Mandalay was used in state propaganda against her. The generals likened her to the 'unpatriotic' Burma girl who had turned her back on her own race and, by implication, her own country. As David Steinberg has explained:

They cite the marriage of Aung San Suu Kyi to a British academic, Michael Aris, as disqualifying her from leading the country. This colonial issue, as exemplified in Rudyard Kipling's poem 'The Road to Mandalay' (and its paean to Burmese women who had relations with British soldiers) … thus continues today. 

There is no denying that Aung San Suu Kyi is an admirer of Kipling. In 1972, extracts from 'Mandalay', referring to 'a neater, sweeter maiden in a cleaner, greener land', were read out at her wedding. She and her husband named their second son Kim, after the lead character in Kipling's famous novel of the same name, published in 1901. Also, she ended her first Reith Lecture for the BBC in 2011 by quoting her favourite lines from Kipling. They were taken from his poem The Fairies Siege:

Chinese Basing Subs in New Underground Tunnels on Hainan Island

China’s secret submarine caves extend Xi Jinping’s naval reach

David Tweed

Sydney Morning Herald

November 1, 2014

Fishermen look at a Chinese nuclear submarine that sails past Yalong Bay in Sanya, south China’s Hainan Province. Photo: AP

Hong Kong: Beneath the surface of the South China Sea off the tropical Chinese resort island of Hainan, an underwater tunnel guides submarines into a lair reminiscent of a James Bond spy movie.

From this pen the subs can venture in and out of the contested South China Sea hidden from the prying eyes of reconnaissance planes deployed by the United States Navy, which for the past half century has enjoyed almost unfettered access to the waters, say military watchers who cite satellite images of the area.

The fleet of diesel and nuclear-powered submarines reflects President Xi Jinping’s efforts to ensure the security of sea lanes vital for feeding the economic growth on which the nation’s stability rests. It’s also provoked discomfort among neighbours bruised by China’s approach to territorial disputes.

As countries from India to Australia and Vietnam spend tens of billions upgrading their underwater fleets, cluttering the sea as well as the sky with the reconnaissance craft that follow, the risk is that a clash that previously might have been limited to coast guard and fishing boats spills into military conflict.

"Countries are saying: we need to put into place some kind of credible force that puts doubt into the mind of a Chinese admiral," said Bill Hayton, author of The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia. “They are clearly thinking about that because otherwise why are they buying submarines and anti-ship missiles?”

Defence spending in Asia and Oceania rose 3.6 per cent to $US407 billion ($462 billion) in 2013, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, making it the only region where spending increased every year since SIPRI began collecting the data in 1988. That was led by a 7.4 per cent rise in China’s spending, with a 5 per cent increase for Southeast Asia.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy has 56 attack submarines, of which 51 are conventional diesel-electric and five are nuclear powered, according to a US Defence Department report to Congress published in April.

China also has three nuclear-powered submarines that can launch ballistic missiles, and may add five more, according to the Pentagon report. The report said these subs will this year carry the JL-2 ballistic missile, which has an estimated range of 7400 kilometres and will “give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.”

New Article on Chinese SIGINT

November 1, 2014

There is an excellent article in the current issue of the Journal of Intelligence History by British author David Ian Chambers entitled A ‘Lantern in the Dark Night’: The Origins and Early Development of China’s SIGINT Service, which can be accessed here. Very interesting material on a subject that has not been well covered in the West.

The global proliferation of Chinese drones

31 October 2014 

David Schaefer

Source Link

In November of every other year, aviation experts descend on the Chinese city of Zhuhai for a rare look at the future of China's air power. Over the last ten years, the International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition has charted the progress of China's drone fleet from concept art to functioning models. Now, as the country's investment in drone technology helps it catch up to the competition, the technology on display at Zhuhai next week could pose another challenge for the global arms control effort.

The Wing Long UAV, Zhuhai International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, 2012.

Chinese companies have boasted about muscling into the international drone market, and they appear to be making headway. In May, it was revealed that Saudi Arabia purchased an unknown number of Chinese-made Wing Loong drones, a rough equivalent to the US-made Predator. This followed earlier reports of Chinese collaboration with the Algerian military, and suspicion that Uzbekistan, the UAE and Pakistan are operating Chinese drones. And in an August joint military exercise, China conducted a live-fire demonstration of drone strikes for its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

All this comes at a time when American experts are worried about their diminishing lead in unpiloted aerial vehicle (UAV) technology.

Several years after the Predator boom, the US military has scaled back its drone acquisition, to the point where it struggled to cobble together enough vehicles for surveillance of the Islamic State while the fighting season in Afghanistan was also getting underway. The only known future combat drone is being developed by the US Navy, and after being watered down to save on cost it is now the subject of review. In the meantime, with American export licenses for armed drones limited to the UK, there is a gap in the worldwide market which China hopes to plug.

Aiding China's export strategy are several underlying factors. In a country where central authority often needs to be imposed on wayward local officials, and where privacy restrictions don't really exist, technology which offers persistent surveillance is in high demand. Beijing has already used drones to keep an eye on polluting industries, corrupt officials and drug smugglers, assist the emergency response during earthquakes and support policing operations against Uighur-led violence in Xinjiang. All of these roles are likely to expand in the years ahead.

Drones also have commercial applications for China. Industries that are modernising in the developing world, like agricultural science and environmental mapping, rely on aviation. But the shortage of commercially available flight in China is making otherwise cheap drones a viable substitute.

As the Chinese military pushes ahead with research into next-generation fighters and bombers, improvements in engines and sensors will likely flow over into better equipment for future drones. As a result, China is forecast to become the global hub of drone production over the next decade, with the Chinese Government as the main buyer. But this raises some questions for a country with a patchy record on weapons proliferation. 

Could Iran and China Cut the US Out of Afghanistan?

Beijing and Tehran share similar interests in a stable Afghanistan that does not depend on U.S. support.

By Shannon Tiezzi

November 01, 2014

Source Link

Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met in Beijing on Friday, Xinhua reports. On one level, the meeting was simply the latest example of growing China-Iran ties. The timing of the meeting, however, suggests a more specific aim for bilateral relations – greater cooperation between Beijing and Tehran to achieve their joint goals in Afghanistan.

Zarif was in Beijing for the Istanbul Process meeting on Afghanistan. While the brief Xinhua report on his meeting with Yang did not mention Afghanistan (or any specific issues), the timing naturally raises speculation that the two countries might be seeking greater coordination in their efforts to secure Afghan stability and security.

The question of China-India cooperation on Afghanistan has received a great deal of attention, while the potential for China-Iran cooperation has been relatively overlooked. Like China (as well as most other interested parties, including India and the U.S.), it’s in Tehran’s best interests to have a stable Afghan government in Kabul, one that is free of influence from the Taliban. But Iran also seeks greater political and cultural sway over its neighbor, which puts it at odds with the U.S.

While China has been relatively accepting of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan as a means of achieving this end goal, Iran wants the U.S. gone as soon as possible. Unlike other major regional powers, Tehran opposed the recently-signed Bilateral Security Agreement that will allow a limited number of U.S. troops to remain in Afghanistan post-2014. Currently, Beijing is willing to accept the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan as a necessary evil. However, if Iran and China can cooperate to achieve their goals vis-à-vis Afghanistan while reducing or eliminating the need for U.S. involvement, it would suit both countries’ goals.

The possibility of closer China-Iran cooperation on Afghanistan comes amidst a general blooming of the larger bilateral relationship. The two countries have been growing closer together as Iran engages in talks with the P5+1 countries (Britain, France, China, Russia, U.S. and Germany) over its nuclear program. Ties are advancing diplomatically and economically as well as militarily — Iran’s naval chief, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, was in Beijing a week ago for talks with China’s defense minister and the PLA Navy commander.

On a strategic level, the China-Iran partnership is especially attractive for Tehran. As Maysam Behravesh argued in a piece for The Diplomat, the growing Russia-China alignment appeals to hardliners in Iran who are interested in joining an “anti-imperialist bloc.” Iran has been largely sidelined in international organizations favored by the West; new parallel international organizations being built by China provide an attractive alternative for Tehran. The September meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for instance, allowed for new members to join that grouping, seen by some as China and Russia’s answer to NATO. Along with Pakistan and India, Iran is likely to be first in line to join, allowing it to cooperate more closely with Central Asian states as well as China and Russia. Iran, which is not a part of the Asian Development Bank, might also seek to join China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

What Beijing Wants From APEC

The upcoming APEC forum in Beijing offers China the opportunity for a reset.

By Elizabeth C. Economy

November 01, 2014

Source Link

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is just around the corner, and Beijing is pulling out all the stops. Elegant Chinese limousines will ferry the region’s leaders to and fro. The Gods—or maybe just the Communist Party, in this case—have preordained clear skies (since all factories within polluting distance will be shut down and each day half of all cars will be banned from the road). And Beijing is working hard to patch up political rifts with neighbors such as Vietnam and Japan to ensure that a spirit of collaboration rather than confrontation prevails.

On substance, the APEC agenda is tailor-made for China. The forum reflects all of Beijing’s top domestic priorities, including an antigraft initiative that will be signed at the meeting. And the main themes for the forum read like Chinese President Xi Jinping’s China dream: “advancing regional economic integration,” “promoting innovative development,” and “strengthening comprehensive connectivity and infrastructure development.” China’s vision for the region—connected through railroads, ports, highways, and pipelines—will be well served by the forum’s focus on just these issues. It will also be an opportune time for Beijing to try to win over a few of the major economies of the region—namely Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, and perhaps Japan—and persuade them to join the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank. While some of these countries may have been pressured by the United States not to join, most have indicated that they have some serious concerns of their own about the bank and don’t need warnings from the United States to adopt a cautious approach. They are worried about the governance issues surrounding the bank and would prefer to have these settled before signing on rather than negotiated on the back end, when it may be too late.

Of course, there are some things that China won’t get. Likely on President Xi’s wish list for his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama is a serious discussion of Chinese participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). After a few years of decrying the TPP as a plot to contain China, Beijing has apparently decided that it wants in—now. In the words of one Chinese official, Washington is being “selfish” by not sharing details with Beijing about the trade negotiations. Never mind that China is likely at least a decade away from being able to meet the standards set by the other major economies already engaged in the TPP negotiations, Beijing has apparently decided that given the slow pace of the negotiations, it may well be ready by the time the deal is done. More realistic is a step or two forward on a bilateral investment treaty between China and the United States, whose timeline is one or two years until completion rather than a decade or more.

The APEC forum in Beijing offers China the opportunity for a reset—to reclaim the mantle of a positive force as a driver of growth in the Asia-Pacific and to recapture a time a decade ago when China’s rise really was perceived as peaceful. This may be too tall an order for a three-day meeting. Nonetheless, Beijing can at least breathe a sigh of relief—if not of clean air—that it moved the location from Hong Kong to Beijing. Better to risk polluted air than polluted ideas.

Elizabeth C. Economy is C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is an expert on Chinese domestic and foreign policy and U.S.-China relations and author of the award-winning book, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future. This post appears courtesy of CFR.org and Forbes Asia.

A New Ambition for Europe: A Memo to the European Union Foreign Policy Chief

Daniel Keohane, Stefan Lehne, Ulrich Speck, Jan Techau

OCTOBER 28, 2014

SUMMARY

Four experts assess the most pressing issues awaiting the incoming EU foreign policy chief and propose a new strategy for turning Europe into a more effective global actor.

Carnegie Europe spearheaded a review process to assess the European Union’s foreign policies. Drawing on consultations with experts from around the world, this memo proposes a new strategy for turning Europe into a more effective international actor.

EXPANDING GLOBAL ORDER

The European Union (EU) should become a powerhouse of global order. Europeans should not be satisfied with merely defending the global status quo, expecting to decline gracefully inside an imaginary EU fortress. Great changes threaten the current international system. To secure the future global order, Europe must change greatly too. The EU was built as a peace project among its members, but the peace of Europe now depends on events outside the EU. Foreign policy should therefore be at the heart of the EU’s peace project, not on its fringes. Europeans must be prepared to expand the liberal world order and to push for the widening and deepening of international and regional governance.

The main European foreign policy interests and goals are easy to agree on: To improve their prosperity, Europeans need an open global trading system and access to energy sources and other raw materials. To protect their security, Europeans want a more stable neighborhood and the ability to cope with crossborder threats such as terrorism and cybercrime. And Europeans would like all governments to comply with global rules, not only to safeguard Europe’s prosperity and security but also with the intention of spreading respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

The EU will need to do three things to expand global order:internally, it will need to become more unified, more attractive, and more powerful; it will need to build stronger alliances both regionally and globally; and it will need to invest in effective international institutions. To many non-Europeans, the EU is perceived more as a declining and fragmented grouping of governments than as an essential world power. But the Brussels-based institutions and the member states need to collectively show more determination to shape international developments beyond the EU’s borders.

Overcoming the economic crisis and strengthening solidarity among member states remains crucial. An economically strong and politically coherent EU would be a more credible international actor. EU foreign policy starts at home. Moreover, even with an economically stronger Europe, the power of attraction alone would not be enough to secure European interests. Military strength remains a key factor in international relations, and the current demilitarization of Europe has to stop. Given European countries’ enormous equipment shortages and falling overall defense spending, Europeans have to cooperate on military matters. In partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU foreign policy chief and the EU institutions must keep pressing member states to pool and share the almost €200 billion ($250 billion) they collectively spend each year on military resources.

The EU must try to keep its most important international partner, the United States, engaged in global politics. But the emergence of other powers means that the traditional model of the EU and the United States acting as Western stewards of global order is reaching its limits. The EU needs to develop stronger partnerships with countries across all continents—especially like-minded democracies—and prod them to confront global challenges and develop sustainable rules-based regimes. The EU should also support the efforts of countries in other regions to develop their own intergovernmental cooperation, particularly for mediating disputes and pacifying conflicts. Examples of such cooperation include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the African Union.

Exploring the Prospects for Russian-Turkish Cooperation in a Turbulent Neighborhood

Memduh Karakullukçu, Dmitri Trenin

SEPTEMBER 28, 2014

Source Link

SUMMARY

Even though tensions over Ukraine will inevitably cast a shadow over the bilateral relationship, Russia and Turkey—a NATO member—continue to share a range of important interests.

GRF–Carnegie Moscow Center Working Group

Memduh Karakullukçu and Dmitri Trenin, editors

WORKING GROUP ON RUSSIAN-TURKISH COOPERATION

In 2013, Global Relations Forum in Istanbul and the Carnegie Moscow Center established a Working Group dedicated to exploring the potential for regional cooperation between Turkey and Russia. The Working Group was tasked with generating new thinking on how cooperation between the two countries could be practically advanced. It aims to facilitate a better understanding of the mutual interests in bilateral relations and to help build a more practical working relationship. The Working Group includes former senior government officials, diplomats, military officers, and leading experts from both countries. From the outset, members of the group have been working as one team. This paper is a product of their cooperation.

List of Working Group Members

SUMMARY

Even though tensions over Ukraine will inevitably cast a shadow over the bilateral relationship, Russia and Turkey—a NATO member—continue to share a range of important interests. Indeed, there are a number of areas in which the two can work together in their common neighborhood, which stretches from the South Caucasus and the Levant to Central Asia and Afghanistan. A high-level working group on Russian-Turkish regional cooperation has sketched a forward-looking approach for Russia and Turkey in tackling regional challenges.

Key Issues

Russia and Turkey’s vast common neighborhood is a source of multiple threats, including terrorism, extremism, and drug trafficking, which can affect both countries.

Both countries have compelling reasons to work together to promote geopolitical and social stability and economic prosperity in their overlapping neighborhoods, particularly in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Moscow and Ankara have their differences on regional issues, rooted in their respective national interests, outlooks, and perceptions. Yet, they can manage those differences with a modicum of goodwill, shared respect for the tenets of international law and states’ territorial integrity, regular and open dialogue between their political leaderships, and support from both countries’ elites and societies. 

Next Steps for Russia and Turkey 

Russia and Turkey should work together to enhance stability in the South Caucasus, particularly on issues related to the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. 

Moscow and Ankara should strive to find a political solution to the conflict in Syria. Such a solution would help lay the foundation for future stability in the region.

Russia and Turkey need to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and to help bring about an acceptable final agreement on Iran’s nuclear program between Tehran and its international negotiating partners.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, both Turkish and Russian interests demand that the two cooperate to combat extremism and help to create political stability.

Central Asia would benefit from Russia and Turkey working together, rather than at cross-purposes, to enhance the economic well-being of countries in the region and prevent radicalism from undermining regional stability.

PROLOGUE

The crisis over Ukraine, which entered an acute phase in February 2014, has greatly affected Russia’s relations with the West. It effectively ended a quarter-century of generally cooperative relations and periodic attempts to integrate Russia into an expanded West. It also opened a new period of antagonistic rivalry and confrontation, particularly between Washington and Moscow. Although the future cannot be foreseen with any certainty, Russia is now likely to focus on itself; its relations with the former Soviet Republics; and its outreach to China and Asia. This has important implications for Russia’s neighbors, including Turkey. 

Committed to the principle of territorial integrity of states, Turkey has not recognized the Russian Federation’s recent incorporation of Crimea, which has altered the geopolitics of the entire Black Sea region. Turkey has been particularly interested in the situation of Crimean Tatars, a sizable minority in the peninsula. Turkey also believes that the security and stability of Ukraine is critical to the region. Turkey has taken due note of the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, to which Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are due to accede soon. Turkey is a U.S. ally, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a partner of the European Union (EU), negotiating full membership. The United States and these institutions are significantly hardening their positions vis-à-vis Russia. 

Prior to the Ukraine crisis, bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia had gained significant momentum. The two countries had reaffirmed their desire to expand their bilateral trade to $100 billion within a few years. Russian-Turkish energy cooperation had been proceeding, from the Blue Stream gas pipeline and the South Stream project to the nuclear power station. Economic cooperation in other areas, such as construction, has been moving forward, as is humanitarian, cultural, and intellectual contact. Political dialogue continues all the way up to the top level. Maintaining this momentum in the new environment is a challenge faced by authorities on both sides. 

Turkish-Russian relations had thrived in the broad context of cooperative relations between Russia and the West. Reversion to such a cooperative context remains the first-best and thus aspirational scenario for the bilateral relationship. In the absence of that benign trajectory, the two countries will need to reimagine and reshape their present positive relations within a new set of constraints. 

The Gathering Storm

ByVikram Sood

30 Oct , 2014

Source Link

ISIS Flags appeared in Kashmir during protests after Eid prayers

It is a troubled world that we live in today and there are many reasons for this. Draw a straight line from Pakistan to Turkey, swing down to the Gaza Strip and from there to Yemen, and we have an area embroiled in all sorts of conflicts, some recent and some that have lasted for decades. Another journey from Sinai to the Maghreb, thence to Nigeria and Central Africa and ending in Somalia, covers another arc of what is, at times, extremely brutal conflict.

What stands out most is the brutality of this group (ISIS) that has suddenly become a semi-state that no one seems to challenge, and the extent to which neighbours would go to allow the genocide of the Yazidis and Kurds to preserve their national interests.

Three recent maps would also explain the depth, scale and complex nature of the conflict. One, a map of Baghdad depicting, in small red dots, car bomb explosions in the city since its so called liberation in 2003. The entire map is full of these red dots and it is impossible to read the name of the streets or localities. The second map is of Syria with its conflict zones and the areas held by various factions ripping the country apart. It is more like a scrambled egg that has gone wrong and it is impossible to unscramble this.

The third map was published by Washington Post a few days ago, and shows the countries from where various jihadis have joined battle in Syria on behalf of ISIS. Many of the volunteers are from countries that are actually allies and friends of the US, but are fighting against US interests. This map may not be very accurate as it does not show anyone as having gone from India.

The sudden rise of the ISIS and its successes, its wealth and armament are a subject of some, if not complete mystery. Above all, what stands out most is the brutality of this group that has suddenly become a semi-state that no one seems to challenge, and the extent to which neighbours would go to allow the genocide of the Yazidis and Kurds to preserve their national interests. Local paranoia against Shia regimes that have strengthened since the Iraq War, local ethnic and sectarian conflicts, regional and big power interests (the Russian-American rivalry in the region is still active) are the source of trouble and confusion.

Then there is the American desire to fix the obdurate Bashar Assad, demonstrably be the Super Power and sell the American Dream but without wetting its feet. The trouble now is that we live in a world where military power alone no longer guarantees success. This is bad news at a time when defeat is unacceptable, as it is going to be perceived as a sign of decline. The worry is that rich and powerful nations are like Great Gatsbys.

Is There an Answer for Syria?

Jessica T. Mathews

NOVEMBER 6, 2014 ISSUE

Source Link

Jerome Sessini/Magnum Photos

The front line in the Bustan al-Basha neighborhood of Aleppo, October 2012

The glaring weakness in President Obama’s new Middle East strategy, unveiled on September 24 at the United Nations, is the lack of troops on the ground in Syria. In Iraq, the Kurdish peshmerga, a reformed and remotivated Iraqi army, and the Sunni tribes that played a major part in the success of President Bush’s surge can all be brought into the fight against ISIS. But in Syria—whose disintegration directly threatens the five nations on its borders and indirectly the entire region—there is no one. The Pentagon has made its timetable starkly clear: it has announced that it will take three to five months to identify and vet fighters from the Syrian opposition and another year to train them. What will happen, other than air strikes, in the interim?

No matter how seemingly intractable a problem, reexamining deeply buried core assumptions can sometimes point the way to a solution. The drastic shift in priorities for every country in the Middle East occasioned by the frighteningly rapid rise of ISISover the past several months may have made it possible to do just that in Syria. Two assumptions that have steered policy from the beginning of the crisis—that the eventual outcome must hinge on whether Bashar al-Assad stays in power or goes, and that the framework of a political agreement must precede any cease-fire—ought now to be rethought.

Notwithstanding the appalling human cost of this war—now standing at 200,000 dead, three million refugees, and six million forced out of their homes—President Obama has clung (and may well have been wise to do so) to what he sees as the lesson of prior American military interventions abroad. He has insisted from the outset that the US not take the relatively easy step of deploying its immense power until there is at least the outline of a political agreement among the warring factions. He couldn’t find one, and neither could anyone else.

In August 2012, not long after former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stepped down as the international community’s special envoy on Syria, he and I shared a coffee break between airplane flights. Speaking with deep sadness, this consummate international negotiator said he’d never worked harder on a problem with less to show for it. Since then, the widely respected former Algerian foreign minister and international civil servant Lakhdar Brahimi has done the same, with the same result.

U.S.-Arab Counterterrorism Cooperation in a Region Ripe for Extremism

Michele Dunne, Frederic Wehrey

OCTOBER 23, 2014

Source Link

SUMMARY

Many Arab governments are fueling the very extremism they purport to fight and looking for U.S. cover. Washington should play the long game.

U.S. cooperation with Arab allies against terrorist groups is essential—and also problematic. Many Arab governments are fueling the very extremism they purport to fight and looking for cover from the United States for increasingly repressive policies. Washington needs a holistic counterterrorism strategy that ensures its Arab allies do not use U.S. assistance to perpetuate terrorism and that supports those in Arab societies best able to combat radicalization.

Recommendations for the U.S. Government

Initiate broad discussions with partners at every level, across agencies, about extremism’s roots. Every organ of the U.S. government that interacts with Arab partners—particularly defense and intelligence agencies—should engage in sustained discussions about a holistic approach to national security that includes human development, economic opportunity, and individual freedoms as critical tools against radicalization.

Push for a repeal or revision of antiterrorism laws that target peaceful dissidents and civil society. U.S. agencies that interact with Arab security forces and judiciaries should be wary about how new terrorism laws in Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states can and are being used against political dissidents. U.S. diplomats should push for laws that target the unlawful use of violence rather than nonviolent opposition to the state.

Use security cooperation and assistance as tools to promote political and economic reform. The United States should press for institutional reforms to tackle terrorism’s real roots. This requires thinking creatively about ways to leverage defense relationships to promote reform, through key leader engagement, bilateral exchanges, and, where appropriate, conditionality on arms transfers.

Reinvigorate civil society assistance. Washington should rethink and reinvigorate its support for youth, women, and civic groups that can spread the values of tolerance and pluralism to combat radicals’ appeal.

Avoid an excessive focus on religion-based programs. The United States should be mindful of the limits of religion-based counterradicalization programs advanced by state-sponsored clerics in Egypt and the Gulf who lack credibility among at-risk youth.

TURNING A BLIND EYE TO BAD POLICIES

U.S. officials are focused at present on military action to eliminate the threat from the militant Islamic State, an effort in which the cooperation of regional allies is essential. But it is equally critical that the United States avoid certain pitfalls when cooperating with Arab allies.

The failure of the 2011 uprisings to put affected Arab countries on a sound path toward more dynamic economies, polities, and societies—with the exception of the still-hopeful transition in Tunisia—has left the region open to militant groups ready to exploit unresolved grievances, including sectarian discrimination, unemployment, corruption, and human rights abuses. Governments have lost control of much of their territory in some countries (Iraq, Libya, and Syria), while in others, such as Egypt and the Gulf states, they have become increasingly repressive in an attempt to hold onto power through coercion rather than consent.

A problem that has already received well-deserved attention is that regional powers, including some Arab states, Iran, and Turkey, have at times supported terrorist groups in their attempts to steer outcomes in Syria and elsewhere, as well as in their power struggles with each other.

Just as important is that the United States and some of its main Arab allies differ significantly in their definitions of terrorism and how to combat it. Nowhere is this more evident than in the attempt by Egypt and Gulf Arab states to portray mainstream Islamist political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists, a definition that the United States does not accept. These countries have adopted, or are now considering, harsh new laws that not only criminalize free expression, free association, and peaceful protest but in some cases actually define such activities as terrorism. Such measures are aimed not only at Islamists but also at many other critics including secularists and members of religious sects.

The resulting political repression and human rights abuses on a massive scale in Egypt, and on a smaller scale in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are antithetical to American values and threaten to push more recruits into the jihadists’ ranks while alienating wide swaths of the population. Such an approach is likely to increase the problem of terrorism in Arab countries rather than reduce it, and perceived U.S. support for repression will increase public antipathy to the United States.

Meanwhile, Washington has focused on bolstering the technical and bureaucratic capabilities of Arab counterterrorism forces. But too close a reliance on local partners could not only further destabilize the region but also threaten U.S. interests. This approach leaves the United States with little oversight and control over how and against whom these capabilities are employed. And increasingly, this loss of leverage is not just confined to the domestic conduct of these Arab regimes. Some Arab partners are using U.S.-supplied capabilities to conduct an aggressive foreign policy under the guise of counterterrorism with scant regard for U.S. input.

Iraqi Kurd Peshmerga Enter Kobani to Aid in Fight Against Islamic State Militants

October 30, 2014 

Voice of America

Syrian activists said the first of 150 Iraqi Kurdish fighters have arrived in Kobani to help Syrian Kurds in their fight against Islamic State militants.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which relies on a network of activists on the ground, said Thursday about 10 of the peshmerga forces from Iraq's Kurdistan region crossed into Kobani from Turkey.

Around 150 fighters spent Wednesday traveling across Turkey toward the Syrian border under an agreement with the Turkish government to let them pass through.

​​The monitoring group said the remaining peshmerga fighters were expected to enter the town - known as Ayn al-Arab in Arabic – “within hours.”

“That initial group, I was told, is here to carry out the planning for our strategy going forward,” Meryem Kobane, a commander with the YPG, the main Syrian Kurdish armed group defending the town, told Reuters.

Strategic planning

Hemin Hawrami, a senior official in the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq, wrote on Twitter that the peshmerga already in Kobani were assessing where the heavy weapons would be deployed.

In a compound protected by Turkish security forces near the border town of Suruc, the fighters were donning combat fatigues and preparing their weapons, a Reuters correspondent said.

The peshmerga fighters are joining the battle in Kobani, where Kurds have been fighting to hold off an advance by the Islamic State group since mid-September.

On Thursday, Masoud Barzani, the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, said the region is prepared to deploy more forces to Kobani if asked.

On Wednesday, a group of about 50 rebels from the Free Syrian Army arrived in Kobani to help the Kurds.

Turkey has said it will not send its own troops because it says the Syrian Kurds in Kobani are linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has fought with Turkey for three decades for cultural and political rights.

​​U.S. military jets have carried out weeks of airstrikes in the Kobani area targeting the Islamic State group.

The U.S. said in the last day it launched 10 more airstrikes on Islamic State positions near Kobani, two others elsewhere in Syria and two in Iraq.

Neither side has gained a decisive advantage in the fighting, which has forced almost 200,000 Syrian Kurds to flee into Turkey.

The town's fate has become a test of the U.S.-led coalition's ability to combat the Islamic State insurgents.

Mass graves, executions

Indonesian Military Chief: 'ISIS Is the Worst Idea in History'

In a speech this week, Gen Moeldoko said “ISIS is the worst idea in history. ISIS is not Islamic. I am a Muslim.”

By Zachary Keck

November 01, 2014

Source Link

Indonesia’s military chief said this week that the Islamic State is the “worst idea in history” and called for a more assertive regional response to combat the threat.

Calling IS a “cancer,” Indonesia’s armed forces (TNI) chief General Moeldoko said in a speech on Wednesday that: “ISIS is the worst idea in history. ISIS is not Islamic. I am a Muslim, but I can say that ISIS does not represent the Islam that I know. To me, there is no room for ISIS to develop in Indonesia.”

At the same time, he warned that: “There have been several people from countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia who have gone to Syria and Iraq to join IS. We need to find a common understanding among the ASEAN Chief of Defence Forces, to anticipate the future risk, when these fighters return to their home countries. We need to think of concrete steps to deal with this threat.”

To that end, Moeldoko said that at the ASEAN Chief of Defense Forces informal meeting in Malaysia next year, he would propose a meeting between regional defense chiefs to discuss how to best coordinate a regional strategy for combating the Islamic State in Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia has a number of Muslim-majority nations including Indonesia itself, the world’s largest Muslim country. There are also large Muslim populations in other states throughout the region, who are potentially vulnerable to IS’s message.

The Indonesian government says that 60 Indonesians have traveled to the Middle East to fight alongside the Islamic State, at least five of whom have died. Earlier this month an Indonesian national reportedly carried out a suicide attack in Iraq. At least one Malaysian citizen has also carried out a suicide attack on behalf of ISIS. Filipino militants have also said they support IS.

Back in August, Indonesia’s government officially banned the Islamic State’s teachings in the country.

The U.S. has sought stronger backing from Indonesia and other regional states in its ongoing fight against IS. Earlier this month, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry briefly visited Indonesia to attend Joko Widodo’s presidential inauguration and hold talks with various regional leaders attending the inauguration, including the new Indonesian president himself. State Department officials said that combating IS was the top priority for Kerry during these talks.

Moeldoko was speaking in Singapore at an event hosted by the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) on the strategic challenges that Southeast Asia will face over the next two decades.

What Are the Jordanian Military and Intelligence Services Doing to Counter ISIS?

Jordan responds to the Islamic State threat

IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review

October 29, 2014

US president Barack Obama, right, meets Jordanian King Abdullah II at the NATO summit at Celtic Manor in Newport, Wales, on 4 September 2014. Jordanian security forces have told IHS Jane’s they are optimistic about the future success of the multinational alliance against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Photo: PA

Key Points 

Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID), with its extensive cumulative experience, spearheads the kingdom’s security efforts against the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra threat, inside and outside the country. 

The multi-front approach being used to counter the threat comprises the promotion of moderate Islam, increased border security, and participation in the international military alliance in Iraq and Syria, in addition to GID intelligence operations. 

Arab intelligence sources interviewed by IHS Jane’s believe the jihadist threat within Jordan is minimal compared with its regional neighbours, due to Jordan’s lack of sectarianism. 

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, bordering Iraq, Israel, Syria, and the West Bank, and across the narrow Gulf of Aqaba from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, has faced a dramatic increase in security threats in the past several years. “The situation is very dangerous in the Middle East, and since 2011, the Arab Spring has left a huge impact on Jordan,” said a senior Jordanian security official, who spoke to IHS Jane’s on condition of anonymity in Amman on 14 September, adding, “No stability took place, and no democracy realised, but on [the] contrary, the threats increased significantly.”

Conflict areas bordering Jordan. (IHS)

Jordanian security officials told IHS Jane’s that Islamic Salafist jihadist groups, including the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which operates in the Sinai Peninsula and claimed the improvised explosive device (IED) attack on the Egypt-Jordan gas pipeline in January 2014, form the main threats to Jordanian security. The internal stability threat of the Muslim Brotherhood within Syria and the unresolved Palestinian-Israeli conflict form other strategic defence challenges.

Jordan’s security services and armed forces were put on the highest state of alert in September in response to the Islamic State’s growing capability and the belief that the group is a direct security threat to the country, senior Jordanian security officials told IHS Jane’s . Jordan has had a long history of being targeted by Islamist terrorists, including the ‘Millennium Plot’ allegedly orchestrated by Al-Qaeda operatives aimed at bombing and poison gassing the Radisson Hotel in Amman on 1 January 2000, according to US FBI agents. The plotters were also accused by Jordanian authorities of planning to attack two Jordan-Israel border crossings and Christian sites.

Additionally, the late Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi oversaw a number of terrorist operations in Jordan during 2001-05, including November 2005 suicide IED attacks on three hotels in Amman. Therefore, Jordan is wary of the rising threats in its neighbours Iraq and Syria, where the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra are active, as well as from Islamists in the Sinai Peninsula, and the enhanced ability of jihadist groups to cross borders ideologically through social media.

COUNTERING TERRORISM

Many security experts, including those based at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, have argued that Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) is the most professional and capable security service in the region. “GID has [the] highest level of professionalism in handling internal and external security crises,” a senior Palestinian Authority security officer told IHS Jane’s on 22 September. Another Arab intelligence official agreed, before adding, “But Jordan could not stand and counter the ISIS [Islamic State] threat without external support from the Gulf, the US, and EU countries. We are [in a] dangerous threat circle, and we do not know when ISIS will decide to target Jordan or Jordanian interests directly.”

With the Islamic State’s increased funds, its ability to pay salaries and recruit new fighters has also increased. As the senior security official stated, “The most dangerous threat in the Middle East is the wide spread of terrorism and extremism, and the flow of big numbers of foreign fighterian o Syria and Iraq.” Jordan’s security forces, acc rding to IHS Jane’s Jordanian security sources, make substantial efforts to protect the kingdom’s borders and prevent its use as a passage for would-be militants to join the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

The Jordanian security official told IHS Jane’s , “Al-Nusra Front [Jabhat al-Nusra] is less ferocious than ISIS, but it’s the second terrorist organisation after ISIS.” In September 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra reached as far as the northern border of Jordan, to the Deraa-Al-Ramtha post, but it has not gained traction in the Jordanian community so far, which has limited its spread in the northern part of the kingdom. However, on 6 March, Jordanian Salafist leader Mohammed Shalabi claimed that most of the approximately 1,800 Jordanian Salafists believed to be fighting in Syria had joined Jabhat al-Nusra. He subsequently told the Al Jazeera news network that Salafist supporters in Jordan were split between the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.

Israeli nuclear weapons, 2014

Hans M. Kristensen

Source Link

Abstract

Although the Israeli government neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons, it is generally accepted by friend and foe alike that Israel is a nuclear-armed state—and has been so for nearly half a century. The basis for this conclusion has been strengthened significantly since our previous estimate in 2002, particularly thanks to new documents obtained by scholars under the US Freedom of Information Act and other openly available sources.1 We conclude that many of the public claims about the size of the Israeli nuclear arsenal are exaggerated. We estimate that Israel has a stockpile of approximately 80 nuclear warheads for delivery by two dozen missiles, a couple of squadrons of aircraft, and perhaps a small number of sea-launched cruise missiles.

Nuclear policy issues

Since the late 1960s, every Israeli government has practiced a policy of nuclear opacity that, while acknowledging that Israel maintains the option of building nuclear weapons, leaves it factually uncertain as to whether Israel actually possesses nuclear weapons and if so at what operational status. Since the mid-1960s, this policy has been publicly expressed—and recently reaffirmed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—as the phrase “We won’t be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East” (Netanyahu, 2011).

This statement is widely seen as a deception, because it is a long-held conclusion among governments and experts that Israel has produced a sizable stockpile of nuclear warheads (probably unassembled) designed for delivery by ballistic missiles and aircraft. Common sense dictates that a country that has developed and produced nuclear warheads for delivery by designated delivery vehicles has, regardless of their operational status, introduced the weapons to the region. But Israeli governments have attached so many interpretations to “introduce” that common sense doesn’t appear to apply.

Declassified documents from US–Israeli negotiations in 1968–1969 about the sale and delivery of F-4 Phantom aircraft show that the White House understood full well that “they [Israel] interpreted that [“introduction”] to mean they could possess nuclear weapons as long as they did not test, deploy, or make them public” (White House, 1969a: 1). In a memo prepared for President Nixon on the Israeli nuclear program, national security advisor Henry Kissinger stated: “This is one program on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us—and may even have stolen from us” (White House, 1969a: 7 of attachment).

Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations tried to get a clearer understanding of the Israeli interpretation of “introduction.” During a meeting at the Pentagon in November 1968, Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, who later succeeded Prime Minister Golda Meir as Israeli prime minister, said that “he would not consider a weapon that had not been tested to be a weapon.” Rabin noted that this was his personal understanding as a former military leader. Moreover, he said, “There must be a public acknowledgement. The fact that you have got it must be known.” Seeking clarity, US Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke asked: “Then in your view, an unadvertised, untested nuclear device is not a nuclear weapon?” Rabin responded: “Yes, that is correct.” So, Warnke continued, an advertised but untested device or weapon would constitute introduction? “Yes, that would be introduction,” Rabin confirmed (Department of Defense, 1968: 2, 3, 4).

In a follow-up exchange in July 1969, the Nixon administration plainly summarized its own understanding of the term “introduction”: “When Israel says it will not introduce nuclear weapons it means it will not possess such weapons.” The Nixon administration wanted Israel to accept the US definition, but the Meir government didn’t take the bait and instead claimed: “Introduction means the transformation from a non-nuclear weapon country into a nuclear weapon country” (Department of State, 1969a). In other words, Israel construed its pledge not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to mean that that introduction was not about physical possession but about public acknowledgement of that possession.

Kissinger saw a way out of the disagreement: He informed President Nixon that what the Israelis had done was to “define the word ‘introduction’ by relating it to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].” Kissinger’s argument was that the “distinction between ‘nuclear-weapon’ and ‘non-nuclear-weapon’ states is the one which the NPT uses in defining the respective obligations of the signatories.” By arguing that the NPT negotiations “implicitly left … it up to the conscience of the governments involved” by being “deliberately vague on what precise step would transform a state into a nuclear weapon state after the January 1, 1967, cut-off date used in the treaty to define the nuclear states,” and by arguing that the NPT does not define what it means to “manufacture” or “acquire” nuclear weapons, Kissinger concluded that the new Israeli formulation “should put us in a position for the record of being able to say we assume we have Israel’s assurance that it will remain a non-nuclear state as defined in the NPT” (White House, 1969b: 1).

Kissinger’s disingenuous interpretation provided the United States with a way out of a diplomatic dilemma via a tacit understanding between Nixon and Meir that the United States would no longer pressure Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as long as the Israelis kept their program restrained and invisible—meaning that Israel would not test nuclear weapons and would not acknowledge in public its possession of such weapons.

The Nixon administration also tried to extract a pledge from Israel on the use of US-supplied aircraft. In the Israeli letter that requested the sale of 50 F-4 Phantoms, Rabin formally promised the United States that Israel “agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrier” (Embassy of Israel, 1968: 1). A similar promise was made in 1966 in connection with the sale of A-4 Skyhawk aircraft. It is not known if Israel made similar pledges when it acquired F-15 and F-16 aircraft in the 1980s and 1990s, or when it purchased F-35s—which will start to be delivered in 2017.