Israeli Defense Ministry Covering Up Facts Surrounding Second Failed Test of ARROW Anti-Ballistic Missile

Yossi Melman

December 17, 2014

Israel’s defense establishment lies about failed missile test - again

For the second time in three months, Israel has failed in tests of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system.

For the second time in three months, Israel has failed in tests of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system.

And for the second consecutive time, the Defense Ministry has published statements which did not tell the entire truth in order to conceal the embarrassing failure.

To put it mildly, the statement misled Israeli defense reporters and commentators and the public at large.

More blatantly, one can say that the ministry tried to lie and was caught red handed.

Representatives of the Israel Air Force, Israeli Aerospace Industries, the maker of the system, and the US Pentagon (a partner in the project) gathered at the seaside Palmahim Base, Israel’s missile site 15 km. south of Tel Aviv, to watch and evaluate the test.

It was aimed to comprehensively check all the components of the Arrow 3 system: the target missile, the intercepting missile, the radar, and the ground station.

As is customary in tests of this kind, an IAF fighter plane fired a target missile from over the Mediterranean hundreds of kilometers away to simulate an incoming Iranian Shihab-3 ground-to-ground missile. The radar and other systems identified the target and were supposed to lock onto it.

A two-speed IT architecture for the digital enterprise

by Oliver Bossert, Chris Ip, and Jürgen Laartz

December 2014

Source Link 

Delivering an enriched customer experience requires a new digital architecture running alongside legacy systems.

Digital business models have become essential for companies across a range of industries. With social networks and e-commerce websites setting new benchmarks for speed, agility, and user-friendliness, consumers expect similar online performance from banks, retailers, and telecommunications companies. Attackers born in the digital age give consumers what they want, but many older companies struggle to meet customer expectations. For them, going digital is now a prerequisite for surviving and thriving. Success requires strong capabilities in four areas.

First, because the digital business model allows the creation—and shorter time to market—of digital products and services, companies need to become skilled at digital-product innovation that meets changing customer expectations. One such new offering for consumers is car-insurance policies enabled by geolocation-tracking technology, where the price of the policy depends on how much and how aggressively a person actually drives.

Second, companies need to provide a seamless multichannel (digital and physical) experience so consumers can move effortlessly from one channel to another. For example, many shoppers use smartphones to reserve a product online and pick it up in a store.

Third, companies should use big data and advanced analytics to better understand customer behavior. For example, gaining insight into customers’ buying habits—with their consent, of course—can lead to an improved customer experience and increased sales through more effective cross-selling.

Fourth, companies need to improve their capabilities in automating operations and digitizing business processes. This is important because it enables quicker response times to customers while cutting operating waste and costs.

A two-speed IT architecture will help companies develop their customer-facing capabilities at high speed while decoupling legacy systems for which release cycles of new functionality stay at a slower pace.

Implications for enterprise architecture

Each of the four levers poses a substantial challenge for IT. For example, many banking-product lines—among them credit cards, investments, and checking and savings accounts—are managed in silos. This makes it difficult to get a comprehensive view of customers quickly, for example, to assess their loan applications. What’s more, channels are often managed and tracked independently, complicating matters for customers who wish to use multiple channels as they pursue a transaction. For instance, customers starting a loan application on their smartphones may find that they have to reenter data when they switch to desktop computers to fill in the more detailed information required. Weak systems integration and slow database-access times can prevent customers from enjoying a real-time shopping and purchasing experience. Analytics capa­bilities are especially difficult to integrate with operational process flows. Manual steps in these processes, such as rekeying and trans­ferring information, present major obstacles to both analytics and automation of processes.

While a few players have overcome some of these hurdles, it is a big challenge for many IT executives to implement all four levers so customers can, for instance, purchase individually tailored products across multiple channels. One important reason is that the legacy IT architecture and organization, for example, which runs the supply-chain and operations systems responsible for executing online product orders, lacks the speed and flexibility needed in the digital marketplace.

Marines take cyber warfare to the front lines

By Kevin McCaney

Dec 16, 2014 

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It’s been over three years since the Pentagon formally declared cyberspace a domain of warfare, but the typical image of a cyber warrior usually involves an operator sitting in front of a monitor in a network command center. The Marines, however, recently demonstrated cyber war on the battlefield, with a mix of technologies that includes Google Glass-like augmented reality glasses and other systems to conduct cyber and electronic warfare in parallel with physical military operations.

During the amphibious Bold Alligator exercise last month off the coast of Virginia, Marines working in signals intelligence, or SIGINT, could monitor, intercept and interpret radio and radar signals while on maneuvers in an urban combat environment, and do it without information overload.

The package of technologies, sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, is called the Tactical Cyber Range and it combines networking, communications, sensors, unmanned systems and augmented reality technology in an on-the-go arrangement.

“Our goal for the Tactical Cyber Range is to extend cyberspace training to the radio frequency physical environment to better integrate information related capabilities with traditional fires to support mission objectives at the tactical edge,” Maj. Christian Fitzpatrick, ONR tactical cyber special projects officer, said in an ONR release.

During Bold Alligator, a joint, bi-annual exercise intended to test new technologies, Marines used the Tactical Cyber Range to both emulate enemy communications in a crowded electromagnetic spectrum and work to disrupt them.

“The Tactical Cyber Range really helped me coordinate realistic SIGINT and cyber training for my analysts and operators,” Staff Sgt. Johnathon Krahnke, a SIGINT team lead, said in the release. “The environment was realistic and noisy, and my Marines had to work together to solve the tactical problem. This would be a valuable capability for the Marine Corps to define cyberspace tactics, techniques and procedures.”

The Objective: Dominating the Enemy's Frequency Spectrum

Ami Rojkes Dombe 

6/3/2014

The warfighters of the electronic warfare layout of the IDF C4I Corps operate alongside the combat elements at the front line and are responsible for the warfare effort against the enemy

According to the IDF doctrine, the EW (Electronic Warfare) elements are a part of the fire delivery plan, and the elements of this layout operate close to the combat units," explains Col. Avi, head of the EW layout administration who also serves as the IDF EW officer attached to the General Staff during wartime. Unlike kinetic weapon systems, EW attacks are carried out in the electromagnetic spectrum and their objective is to disrupt/jam the communication and data networks of the enemy during combat operations. 

The EW unit was established in 1964, under a cloak of secrecy and was regarded as a special unit. Only after the Yom-Kippur War of 1973, when the IDF supreme command realized that the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces also possess EW capabilities, the unit evolved into a layout with a structured administration in the IDF C4I Division, and an OrBat that includes an EW officer, with suitable equipment, attached to every IDF division. 

According to Col. Avi, EW operations are complex deception and subterfuge activities that require a high degree of creativity and severely undermine the other side's ability to operate. One Example of EW attacks is neutralizing the communication network of a hostile infantry battalion. 

Unlike the western doctrine, as used by the IDF, Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria rely on Russian equipment and on the Russian doctrine. "While we differentiate between EW and SIGINT, according to the Russian doctrine, these disciplines are combined. It is because their SIGINT and EW capabilities are intended for offensive purposes. In Israel, the SIGINT world is not used solely for offensive wartime purposes, and our monitoring units are a national asset that serve more than just the IDF. This is the reason for the differentiation." 

It is important to note that the EW layout of the IDF C4I Division is not responsible for the EW suits of such IDF weapon systems/platforms as aircraft or naval vessels. The manufacturers (either local or foreign industries) providing the weapon systems to the IDF are responsible for these suits. 

Unlike other western armed forces, the IDF have a unique operating concept for the EW layout, with the activity divided into three primary axes: attack, defense and electromagnetic compatibility management. In other armed forces, each one of these axes is the responsibility of a separate arm. In the IDF, the entire activity is carried out by the Lotem unit of the C4I Division. 

"Regarding the attack axis, I do not care what the IDF have, but rather what the enemy has. We have communications officers who know how the enemy implements and uses his communication networks and that makes the attack more effective. This applies primarily to offensive electronic warfare against enemy ground forces," says Col. Avi. 

"The second axis of our activity is what we call 'counter-EW'. It is our responsibility to ensure that the IDF develop effective solutions for the enemy's EW attacks. These solutions provide protection for the communication networks of the IDF. In this case, too, owing to the familiarity of our communications officers with the enemy's systems as well as with the systems of the IDF, we know how to provide the manufacturer with a reference threat. 

Israel’s New National Cyber Operations Center

Amir Rapaport 

13/11/2014

A first glimpse at the new operations center known as CERT 1.0. Nir Peleg, senior division head at the National Cyber Bureau explains how the new center operates

In the cyber world, boundaries are blurred and the issue of prompt cooperation is critical,” says Nir Peleg, while presenting the national cyber operations center, established in a trial version during the month of August 2014, for the first time. 

At this stage, the cyber operations center is physically located in a standard-size room at the National Cyber Bureau which resides in a standard high-tech office building in northern Tel-Aviv. There are no signs outside the building to indicate the activities taking place inside. In about a year, the operations center will reside at Cyberpark (the cyber environment combining technological incubators, start-up companies, established IT companies, the Ben-Gurion University and in the future – units of the IDF Intelligence and C4I Directorates that had relocated to the south). The cyber operations center will employ dozens of computer specialists, operating around the clock. 

The threats are very real: Nir Peleg told us that during Operation Protective Edge, for example, the State of Israel was under a constant cybernetic attack. That attack caught the new cyber operations center just as it was setting up the trial version, known as CERT 1.0. 

“We have seen the trend of increase in the number of attacks against Israel as a state and against Israeli websites,” says Peleg. “We have also seen the diversity of the attacks. During Operation Protective Edge, which was a fairly long campaign, many offensive efforts were made, and I think the major challenges are still ahead of us, as it is an evolving, asymmetrical combat zone with no boundaries. Cooperation must be international as well as local, between corporations and organizations. That is the only way in which we will be able to cope with the extensive range and diversity of cybernetic threats that keep growing all the time. 

“This particular space presents a low level of risk to the attackers. The ability to catch and damage them – just like in the physical world – is limited. This encourages the attackers to keep on attacking. At the same time, despite the large number of attacks during Operation Protective Edge, eventually there were no highly irregular incidents, or incidents that had an effect on the functional continuity at the state level. This says something about our situation, as in some areas we provides effective solutions, however we are not looking at the threats of today, but at those we can expect in two to three years from now.” 

Israel’s National Cyber Bureau 

The National Cyber Bureau, established in early 2012 by the Prime Minister, operates along the "seam" between the covert and overt worlds, although the bulk of its activity takes place in the civilian sector. Heading the Bureau is Dr. Evyatar Matanya, formerly the commander of the "Talpiot" program of the IAF and a former senior executive of the Weapon System & Future Infrastructure R&D Administration at IMOD. 

"Operation Protective Edge brought the Future into the Present Reality"

Ami Rojkes Dombe 

16/11/2014

Colonel A., who commanded the IDF electronic warfare center during the Operation Protective Edge, in a rare interview about the center's activity and the implementation of "Network IDF"

The Second Lebanon War was a constitutive event for the IDF C4I Directorate. As far as the technology aspect was concerned, IDF authorities had realized that they must be able to share visual and aural information in real time, all the way down to the tactical echelon. Eight years later, that insight was implemented in the context of Operation Protective Edge – which has also evolved into a constitutive event. This time, the IDF realized that it was necessary to provide the command echelons with a decision support system that would enable flesh-and-blood officers to cope with the flood of information coming in from the field. The fragrance of a technological revolution is evident in the corridors of the IDF C4I Directorate. The name of this revolution is "Network IDF". 

"You cannot look at Operation Protective Edge without referring to Operation Pillar of Defense," says Colonel A., who commanded the IDF electronic warfare center during Operation Protective Edge and today commands the C3 center of IDF Central Command. "Looking through a more farsighted prism, you can say that between the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead we had closed the gaps in the field of EW and recovered. 

"As far as we were concerned, Operation Pillar of Defense was a model (practice run) and Operation Protective Edge was the actual operation. A technological organization that has the opportunity of running a 'wet' model before actually entering the combat zone enjoys a definitive advantage. During Operation Pillar of Defense, that model was not executed. Eighteen months later, during Operation Protective Edge, it was executed, and we entered it better trained and prepared. As a fire element, you can say that during Operation Protective Edge the Network IDF concept was implemented, and we saw it in the fire employment process. It was the largest network-centric operation we have staged to this day. It brought the future into the present reality." 

Asymmetrical Warfare 

From Weapon Systems to Managed Information Security Services

Ami Rojkes Dombe 

24/7/2014

The technological developments in the field of cyber have compelled the defense industries to change – and fast. "We are competing in an arms race where the bad guys are winning", says Esti Peshin, Director of Cyber Programs at the ELTA division of IAI

"We are competing in an arms race where the bad guys are winning,” explains Esti Peshin, Director of Cyber Programs at the ELTA division of IAI. “You are always one step behind the hackers’ technology. Organizations are beginning to realize that.” 

Peshin explains that one of the main problems faced by the information security world today is the long time constant required for the assimilation of new solutions. In effect, says Peshin, it is a time-consuming process that can take between 18 months and three years. “Information security is like a balloon – a pin is all you need in order to burst it, but in order to protect it you must see to it that the pin cannot be driven into any point in its surface area. The same with cyber. The bad guys have the advantage because all they need is a pin. This is why they are ahead. Organizations are vulnerable and are normally positioned three years behind the hackers.” 

The Transition to Managed Services 

In order to cope with the challenge, organizations implement working methods that would enable them to shorten the assimilation of protective products. One of the solutions is to change from boxes to managed services (MSSP, Managed Security Service Providers). In this way, assimilating a new technology or a new capability can be accomplished quickly. In this configuration, the organization does not install products. Instead, it is remotely monitored by the systems of the service provider. It should be noted, however, managed services are not suitable for every scenario. 

When do you choose managed services and when do you opt for boxes? Well, the main difference stems from the extent of integration of the system you want to protect. Some systems, like CRM, ERP or the billing system are installed at the very core of the organization. These systems are linked to all of the organizational systems and protecting them through managed services will compel the client to expose to the service provider the most sensitive information of the business, a fact that normally does not take place in real life. In such cases, the client will prefer to purchase products, install them on the premises and manage the task of information security on his own. 

Conversely, in the case of such “peripheral” services as IPS, FW or IDS, managed services can provide an adequate solution. In most cases, these services monitor the organization’s incoming or outgoing communication channel, so in the context of this scenario a service provider will be able to protect the organization without the organization having to expose sensitive information to that service provider. 

The working model of the service provider consists of a main operations center that provides services to various subscribers. The service provider ensures the survivability of the services (normally by dispersing the service to several server farms around the world), he ensures that his infrastructure is protected, and most importantly – he keeps the service current with all of the updates and patches, so that the subscriber always benefits from the most current protective service. 

The Objective is National Cyber Warfare Defense

Ami Rojked Dombe 

17/12/2014

http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=3265

Exclusive interview with Brig. Gen. (res.) Yair Cohen, who established the Cyber Division at Elbit Systems

We had met Brig. Gen. (res.) Yair Cohen, VP Intelligence & Cyber at Elbit Systems, about 5 years ago, when Elbit Systems entered the cyberspace field and decided to regard it as a growth engine. This move had been brought about, to a considerable extent, by the encouragement of MAFAT (IMOD's Weapon System & Future Technological Infrastructure Research & Development Administration) and the vision of the group's leadership. A lot has happened since then, and the vision has evolved into a reality. Cohen will be one of the primary speakers at the Israel HLS conference to be held in November 2014 at the initiative of the Israel Export & International Cooperation Institute with support and sponsorship provided by numerous national organizations. 

"Three things have happened," explains Cohen, formerly the commander of the IDF Intelligence Directorate's main SigInt element, Unit 8200. "First and foremost, many people have realized that the existing defensive measures are unsatisfactory. They are improving – but still unsatisfactory. The second element is the gap between the offensive measures and the defensive measures. This gap is growing constantly. You can see it through the incidents reported by the media, and especially through the incidents that are not publicized. A senior US official told me once: 'we built our future on the basis of capabilities that we do not know how to handle'. The third element is the interface between the defense/security sector and the public sector. The Prime Minister's decision to establish a national cyber authority is an example of the attempt to deal with it. It is an interesting decision. 

"There is a difference between the information security world and the cyber warfare world, which is sometimes hard to see. It lies in the different worldview. While information security is intended to provide pinpoint solutions to specific problems, cyber solutions are comprehensive. The cyber world we aim at deals with an integrated solution for a state or a military organization. In today's world they still rely on pinpoint defensive measures – and that is not enough." 

What is the difference between the situation today and the situation that has existed with regard to nuclear weapons? Back then they had also developed a technology that until this day they do not know how to handle 

"It is, without a doubt, an interesting analogy that keeps many people around the world preoccupied. A few years ago there was talk about the USA and Russia intending to set up a 'red phone' link for any eventuality of a cyber warfare attack, like the one set up to deal with a situation of the use of nuclear weapons," says Cohen. "At the same time, cyber warfare is more problematic, as the destructive potential of a cyber warfare attack is equal to or greater than that of an atom bomb. It involves damage to critical systems that control such basic resources as water, gas, electricity and so forth. The most substantial damage is inflicted mainly on civilian infrastructures – more than on military infrastructures. 

Sony Hack Attacks Presage New Warfare: The Weaponization of Code

Source Link

12/16/2014 

North Korea is a miserable, backward, hellhole of a place. It has a per capita GDP ofless than $2,000 -- trailing Yemen, Tajikistan and Chad -- and about one-sixteenth the size of the GDP of South Korea. The Hermit Kingdom derives its power through the twin pillars of state repression and an all-encompassing propaganda apparatus.

This poor, delusional country managed to wallop Sony after it objected to the content of some movie which I can't remember the name of at the present moment but which looks boring and stupid. Most of the press reporting is about the compromise of celebrity emails and some Hollywood chitter-chatter. Nobody will remember or care about these emails or chitter-chatter in a week.

What is important is that these hacks presage what is going to happen for years to come and at far greater cost than what is being imposed on Sony. We have had a good 20-year run since the advent of the commercial Internet, during which the worst that comes from our connectivity is (for the most part) spam, occasional identity theft and lots of time wasted on click-bait.

The weaponization of code is the most significant development in warfare since the weaponization of fissile material.

Sadly, there are few barriers to entry in the domain of cyber war. Any country that puts a little bit of time and effort into it can develop some pretty nasty offensive capabilities. It is not like the development of nuclear arms, which requires years of work, billions of dollars and access to the scarcest of scarce scientific talent and transuranium elements. Don't want to invest the time or effort? That's okay -- today'sLégion étrangère is the black hat hacker -- available on a fee-for-service basis. Just wire the money and they'll start shooting in the direction you point toward.

The very nature of cyber conflict shifts norms in transnational conflict. It is no longer just sovereign nation state versus sovereign nation state. The guys wearing blue uniforms versus the guys wearing red uniforms. No, increasingly cyber conflict will be directed from a country toward a company and from a company toward a country.

DOES THE ARMY PROMOTE COMPETENCE IN ITS OFFICERS?

By Maj. Melanie S. Kirchhoff

Does your heart swell with pride when you hear the words profession of arms, or do you find yourself scoffing at its inherent idealism? Presentations on the subject may make us feel proud of our profession, but we might not be meeting the levels of professionalism and esprit de corps that our profession demands. We must have faith in ourselves as professionals to manage our own field of expertise as well as give the community reasons to have that same faith in us.

The profession of arms calls for three Cs: character, competence and commitment. We are professing our expertise and professionalism without adequately measuring our current status in these areas. If true character, competence and commitment do not measure up to the profession of arms’ message, we stand to lose the faith and trust of the community as well as the interest and enthusiasm of our soldiers and leaders.

A quick search on the profession of arms will bring up a great deal of fascinating investigations and writings on Army ethics relating to character. These studies point to the importance of good moral character in Army officers for a multitude of reasons. There is not as much written in current literature, how-ever, about competence and very little about our current levels of competence (competence being defined as an underlying characteristic related to effective or superior performance).

Why talk about competence? As the Army continues to pursue higher levels of professionalism and performance, it is critical to ensure that officer competence is understood in the context of Army culture and that it is effectively identified, recruited, trained, retained, rewarded and promoted. That is a vast and complex task, but the Army does it well on many fronts.

We need to ask ourselves two fundamental questions: 1) Does the Army, as an institution, value competence in its officers? 2) Does the Army, as an institution, promote competence in its officers? Only from there can we begin to assess the Army’s success at fostering and developing the competence necessary to call itself a profession.

We can narrow down the aforementioned questions even further: 1) Do established leadership development processes provide accurate tools for identifying competence and incompetence? 2) Are these tools being used to promote competence? 3) Does the Army reward competence in individual officers? 4) Is officer incompetence tolerated in the Army? If so, why? Is Army culture a factor?

Interviews and surveys with a number of field-grade and senior officers indicate that the Army does, in fact, promote competence in its officers. Not only do senior officers and Command and General Staff College students agree that overall, the Army promotes competence, but the list of Army practices virtually mirrors the Fortune 500 companies’ best practices for developing leaders. The evidence identifies certain areas for improvement, however, as well as some outright failures in the system.

Survey Results

Potential Conflict Powderkegs in 2015

Gregory Viscusi and Nicole Gaouette

The World Hot Spots You’ve Never Heard of That Could Ruin 2015

These places risk becoming household names in 2015. Can’t locate them on a map? Well, a lot of people couldn’t have found Donetsk in Ukraine or Raqqa in Syria as 2014 got under way.

As experts debate potential nasty surprises in 2015, certain scenarios keep coming up: a naval incident between China and one of its neighbors over a series of sparsely inhabited islands. A renewed push by Islamic rebels in Libya’s lawless south into West Africa. An implosion in North Korea.

Other possibilities include a Russian push into the Baltic countries, a third Palestinian intifada, an Israeli strike against Iran and a continued fall in oil prices that destabilizes countries from Russia to Venezuela.

“You can never predict the next crisis, but you can see some regions that are spring loaded,” said Michael Clarke, director general of the Royal United Services Institute, a research group, in London. “You don’t know where the mouse will pop up, but you know where the traps are set.”

Few analysts predicted that a disavowed trade pact between the Ukraine and the European Union would turn into the tensest standoff with Russia since the end of the Cold War. And the strength of Islamic State was underestimated in many corners of the world before its successful onslaught into Iraq.

“Geopolitical risk is going to be very prevalent next year: None of the conflicts from this year, whether it’s the Ukraine, Middle East or disputes between China and Japan, have been reconciled,” said Russ Koesterich, chief investment strategist at New York-based BlackRock Inc. “These frozen conflicts will be with us for some time and they’ll keep cropping up the way they did in 2014.”

CRASHING CURRENCIES

Unrest could also arise via planned elections from Israel to Greece to the U.K., where extremist parties threaten to disrupt the established groupings. Falling oil prices already pushed Russia’s ruble down 52 percent this year and Venezuela’s bolivar has fallen about 65 percent on the black market. Swaps traders are overwhelmingly betting that Venezuela will default.

COUNCIL ON FORIEGN RELATIONS

The northern reaches of the planet are melting at a pace few nations can afford to ignore, yielding potentially lucrative returns in energy, minerals, and shipping. But debate is mounting over whether the Arctic can be developed sustainably and peaceably. 

The remote latitudes of the Arctic have long been a province of natural beauty, high adventure, and untold riches. For centuries, mariners risked their lives plying the frigid waters and frozen expanses in search of new territory, trade routes, and treasure for king and country. Where a few, like Norwegian polar explorer Roald Amundsen, triumphed over uncommon challenges, many others, like British rear admiral Sir John Franklin, suffered tragedy and defeat. With rare exception, much of the promise of the Arctic remained out of reach, encrusted in the polar ice.

In the twenty-first century, many experts believe that climate change, technological advances, and rising global demand for resources may at last unlock the considerable economic potential of the Circumpolar North. The melting of Arctic sea ice to record lows in recent years has prompted many nations, principally those with Arctic Ocean coastlines—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland)—to reassess their commitments and interests in the icy reaches atop the globe.

Many forecast Arctic summers will be free of ice in a matter of decades, potentially opening the region up to hundreds of billions of dollars in investment, including energy production, shipping, and fishing. The thaw will also pose new security demands as greater human activity induces states to increase their military and constabulary presence. While most experts dismiss the prospects for armed aggression in the Arctic, some defense analysts and academics assert that territorial disputes and a competition for resources have primed the Arctic for a new Cold War.

Meanwhile, environmentalists are concerned that a new era of Arctic exploration and development could spoil one of the planet’s last great frontiers, a pristine habitat home to iconic wildlife and native communities that have subsisted there for thousands of years. Climatologists warn that the extraction of Arctic fossil fuels will contribute to global warming at a time when they believe nations should be paring back greenhouse-gas emissions and pursuing alternative energy sources.

But for many, the debate is less over whether the region should be developed, but rather if it can be done sustainably and peaceably. The Arctic is emerging on the world stage, and it is not yet settled whether businesses, governments, and other operators can fully manage the unique risks it poses.

I want to stress the importance of the Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery that will rival traditional trade lanes.

A Thawing Arctic

Caught in the act

S.K. Sinha

Dec 16, 2014

The demand for scrapping AFSPA is ill conceived. What is required is to ensure that human rights violations are not allowed to occur and, if they happen, they are dealt with in an exemplary manner.

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) has become a very controversial issue. It gives special powers to the armed forces to deal with insurgency and low-intensity conflicts generated from across our national borders. Separatists and their co-travellers have been carrying out a relentless campaign against it and so have human rights activists. Politicians, with an eye on their vote banks, also toe the same line. It is unfortunate that a speeding car going past an Army checkpost had to be fired upon, resulting in the deaths of three young boys at Badgam, Jammu and Kashmir. This incident has to be viewed in the correct context. 

There had been a red alert in the state against terrorist activities during the ongoing state Assembly elections. Intelligence had been circulated that terrorists travelling in cars may carry out suicide attacks. Army checkposts had been alerted about this. The corps commander acted rightly in visiting the family of the young boys to condole. At this stage to state that action against soldiers will be taken will have an adverse effect on soldiers facing an unseen enemy round the clock, in very difficult circumstances. Such accidents take place both in war and peace.

There was a provision for martial law in the British era when the civil administration could be superseded and taken over by the military. This happened in 1857, and during the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. The last time the British imposed martial law in India was during the Hur rebellion of 1942 in Sindh. In Pakistan this provision has continued and there have been several instances of martial law. AFSPA is a substitute for martial law without undermining the authority of the civil administration. 

The chief minister of the state heads the joint command group conducting operations in areas where AFSPA operates. It has an enabling provision for the military to function in an effective manner for national security. The Army does not have the powers of search and arrest. This act gives it the authority to do so. There is no requirement for a magistrate to hand out approval for arrest and search. Without this authorisation it is well nigh impossible for the Army to conduct counter-insurgency operations. After the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, the British introduced the four principles of necessity, minimum force, impartiality and good faith to guide the actions of troops acting in aid to civil authority.

 Minimum force is related to the type of opposition being faced by the troops in this role. It is interesting that whereas Pakistan in Baluchistan and Waziristan and the US in Vietnam used artillery and air power, we in India have never used air power or artillery in dealing with insurgency, whether in the Northeast or in Kashmir. We have also been using psychological initiatives to win the hearts and minds of the people. In this we were particularly successful in bringing back the alienated insurgents of Assam to the mainstream. In the monogram for study prepared at the National War College in the US, the counter-insurgency operations conducted in Assam have been described as a success story of the century.

Such a long nightmare

Written by Praveen Swami 

December 19, 2014 

The warlord’s story goes to the heart of who the Pakistani Taliban’s leadership are.

For the most part, the language we have used to describe the massacre of 132 school children in Peshawar has consisted of cliché: the perpetrators were evil, cowardly, animals. This language of righteous rage tells us next to nothing about the perpetrators and why they acted as they did. The Taliban’s justification of the carnage may be self-serving, but it also tells us that their acts had context. It is important to understand this context, because the ideals that drove the perpetrators are inexorably shaping Pakistan’s destiny, no matter what the outcome of the war between the state and the Taliban might be.

The story dates back to the late-1970s, to when military despot Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, flush with Saudi cash and United States arms, launched his great jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The jihad saw the recruitment of thousands of young men from Pakistan’s northwest. The recruits were mainly young men with some elementary secular or seminary education, and ambitions far greater than the roles traditional tribal society had assigned them.

Following 9/11, the Islamic utopia these men had sought to build in Afghanistan imploded, and they returned home. In 2004, the US pushed military ruler General Pervez Musharraf into action against Arab, Chechen and Uzbek jihadists operating from Pakistan’s South Waziristan Agency, with the help of local warlords who had fled Afghanistan after 9/11. The offensive proved disastrous. Facing rebellion from within his force, Musharraf sold the US the idea that he could co-opt the jihadist leadership using his intelligence services.

In April 2004, key warlord Nek Muhammad Wazir agreed to stop support to foreign jihadists. In a video recorded in the spring of 2004, Nek Muhammad garlanded Lieutenant General Safdar Husain, head of Pakistan’s XI corps. “The most important thing”, he said, “is that we are Pakistani soldiers, too. The tribal people are Pakistan’s atomic bomb. When India attacks Pakistan, you will see the tribals defending 14,000 kilometres of the border.” Days later, though, the Shakai agreement unravelled. Nek Muhammad refused to hand over foreign jihadists. He began assassinating traditional tribal leaders who competed with him for power.

Despite billions in aid, US unable to get Pakistan to confront militants

Dec 19, 2014

Pakistani men walk past a shoe and blood inside the school, attacked by Taliban gunmen in Peshawar, Pakistan

Since 2001 the United States has tried virtually every strategy available to persuade Pakistan's army to take the threat of militancy more seriously, but 12 years and $28 billion in aid later, all the American approaches are widely viewed as having failed.

First, the Bush administration heaped praise on former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, agreed to reimburse the Pakistani army for anti-Taliban military operations and launched drone strikes that killed al Qaeda leaders and militants wanted by the Pakistani government.

Adopting a more confrontational stance, the Obama administration unilaterally carried out the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, vastly increased aid to Pakistan’s weak civilian institutions and, at times, cut off aid to the Pakistani military.

Yet the militants continue to operate, ever more brazenly, as illustrated by Tuesday's harrowing attack on a school in Peshawar, in which 132 students were killed by a faction of the Pakistan Taliban. And with the United States increasingly focused on other crises, Washington's options for bringing about change in an increasingly unstable Pakistan are dwindling fast.

"There is great ‘Pakistan fatigue’ in Washington," said Cameron Munter, who served as the American ambassador to Pakistan from 2010 to 2012. “Not only have the last dozen years been very difficult, but other challenges - from Syria to Ukraine to Iran, to name a few - demand our attention."

Although Tuesday’s attack sparked widespread condemnation, current and former US officials expressed cynicism that the bloodshed would cause Pakistan's military to change its view of militants.

Munter and other officials said the United States has been unable to break a powerful, army-backed narrative in Pakistan that militant attacks are the result of America’s war on terror. Foreign powers, not Pakistan, are responsible for growing militancy in Pakistan, according to the narrative. And Pakistan is not responsible for the problem and unable to stop it.

That narrative played out immediately when Pakistan’s army chief, General Raheel Sharif, flew to Afghanistan within 24 hours of the attack to meet Afghan leaders. They said they had information that the school attack was directed by militants hiding inside Afghanistan.

"We are hoping that we will see strong action from the Afghan side in the coming days," said Pakistani army spokesman Major General Asim Saleem Bajwa.

Strategic assets no longer maintainable

Written by Ayesha Siddiqa

December 19, 2014

There is a possibility that in the days to come, it could all turn into a farce in which military apologists blame politicians, politicians blame each other.

Some might have wanted to become engineers, doctors or sportspersons. Yet others would have dreamt of travelling around the globe in 80 days. But all the dreams and desires of 132 children were brutally interrupted on Tuesday in Peshawar, Pakistan when a group of seven Taliban attacked an army-run school. A nation is in mourning, but its leaders still have to answer if they are ready to fight both terrorism and the radicalism that gives birth to such violence.

For many, this is indeed Pakistan’s 9/11. Notwithstanding the Taliban’s attack on schools and both hard and soft targets in the past, the terrorists seem to have crossed a line with this attack. The prime minister called an all-party conference and the army chief took a flight to Kabul to demand the extradition of the chief of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Mullah Fazlullah. Interestingly, the responsibility for the attack was claimed by the wing of the TTP that has joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the recent past.

But a more important question is whether those who want to draw attention away from the Taliban will succeed in distracting the government and society at large. In a television programme after the incident, former military dictator Pervez Musharraf pointed at India as the main culprit behind the attack. Indeed, he talked about launching a counter-offensive. One of his main supporters in the media, a television anchor reputed for his close association with military intelligence agencies, suggested banning India’s overhead flights. Not surprisingly, the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s Hafiz Saeed made a similar claim. It could possibly be days before others, like the retired general Hamid Gul, also come out of the woods and begin to sermonise about the main threat being external. There may be an internal division within the armed forces regarding what is considered a bigger threat — the internal or external — but there is almost a consensus on India being the key enemy.

CHINA’S DAM DREAMS, INDIA’S WATER WORRIES

Claude Arpi

18 December 2014

As a lower riparian country, Delhi has often taken up the issue of launching the first unit of the run-of-river hydropower plant with Beijing, which has repeatedly assured India that no such project is on the cards

It took some 16 days of talk in Lima, Peru, for the international delegates to approve a framework for setting national pledges to be submitted to the conference in Paris next year. Environmental groups say that the deal was a bad compromise, as divisions between rich and poor countries over how to fulfil carbon-emission pledges persist. This is very ominous for the planet in 2015.

As the new year approaches, let us take a look at some other issues related to climate change and water in the subcontinent and beyond, particularly on the Tibetan plateau.

A few days agoXinhua spoke of the ‘domino effect on water supply’, after a comprehensive study into China’s glacial ice shows an average a 244 sq km of glaciers disappearing every year; the news agency added: “China’s glaciers have retreated by 18 per cent over the past half century”. The Chinese glaciologists “warn of ‘chain effects’ that could have an impact on water supplies in the country’s western regions” …and India, one should add.

The figures come from the survey of China’s glaciers conducted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which found that, “China had 48,571 glaciers in its western provinces, including Xinjiang, the Tibetan region as well as Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu provinces (also part of the Tibetan plateau).” This is not encouraging news. Despite a shortage of water in the long-term, China nevertheless continues to dam rivers originating from the third pole (as Tibet is known in environmental parlance).

In November, the Indian Press reverberated with anxiety on the launching of the first unit of the run-of-river hydropower plant at Zangmu on the Yarlung Tsangpo, (which becomes the Siang and later the Brahmaputra). Xinhua announced: “Tibet’s largest hydropower station became partly operational, harnessing the rich water resources of the Yarlung Zangbo (Tsangpo) River to develop the electricity-strapped region.”

WHEN CHANGE DOES NOT COME, IT MUST BE FORCED

G Parthasarathy

19 December 2014

Major interlocutors like the US, the EU, Russia and China have to be candidly told that India will not countenance continuing Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and will respond strongly, as it recently did

In our public discourse on terrorism from territory under Pakistan’s control, there has predictably been a tendency to hold the military establishment as being solely responsible for the rise of terrorist outfits in Pakistan, as though the country’s political establishment and parties are devoid of any responsibility for the burgeoning of radical Islamic militant groups in the country. It is no secret that the Deobandi-oriented Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman has backed the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in Jammu & Kashmir and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, responsible for the hijacking of IC 814 and the December 2001 attack on our Parliament.

It was when the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam was an ally of Benazir Bhutto in 1994 that her Government’s assistance to the Taliban, organised by her Interior Minister General Naseerullah Babar, gathered momentum. The Jamaat-e-Islami, a perennial Inter-Services Intelligence favourite since the days of General Zia, backs the Hizbul Mujahideen in Jammu & Kashmir.

It is in this context that one has to objectively analyse the role of Mr Nawaz Sharif in the promotion of terrorism across Pakistan’s borders with India and Afghanistan. Moreover, one should never forget that while the Sharif family may have lived in Punjab (initially in Amritsar and thereafter in Lahore and Raiwind) their roots are really in Kashmir, as Mian Mohammad Sharif (Mr Nawaz’s father) hailed from Anantnag and his mother from Pulwama. Mr Sharif has a far more hard line position on Jammu & Kashmir than many other politicians. Despite the obvious futility of seeking international mediation and a UN role in Jammu & Kashmir, Mr Sharif is obsessed with creating conditions to keep international attention focused on Jammu & Kashmir, even if this involves promoting terrorist violence throughout India.

Search for an Ataturk

Ashraf Jehangir Kazi

19 Dec 2014

FORTUNATE is the country that has professionally ‘thinking’ generals but unfortunate is the country that has politically ‘thinking’ generals. In Pakistan, battles have largely been planned and fought by ‘unthinking’ generals, and our politics and policies have been largely shaped by politically thinking generals. The result is where we are.

Some observers might, with a bit of irony, suggest this is the ‘genius’ of Punjab at work which ‘outsiders’, including Pakistanis, cannot fathom. Non-Punjabis, without a trace of irony, might assert that however large a proportion of Pakistan the Punjab may be, it can never ever equal Pakistan; and if politics and policymaking proceed on the assumption that Pakistan is effectively Greater Punjab, that would be a blow to the possibility of developing a genuine Pakistani nationhood that no adversary of Pakistan could strike.

This is how we lost East Pakistan — which was the majority, more Pakistani, more educated and more progressive than West Pakistan, including Punjab. This is how much of Balochistan has become almost irretrievably alienated. To this wound salt is added by the portrayal of the situation in Balochistan as a case of Indian interference, and not an issue of the denial of entitlements, rights and justice to the Baloch people. This is how Fata, much of KP, interior Sindh, huge swathes of Karachi and even southern Punjab are also excluded today from the practice and working of Jinnah’s concept of Pakistan. If he had foreseen today’s Pakistan would he have sacrificed himself for a cause destined to be betrayed?

The statement that the military is the ‘only binding force’ in Pakistan has resonance domestically only in Punjab, and externally in the US. Despite all its pretended disapproval of Gen Sisi of Egypt, the US supports him and the Egyptian military as ‘the only force’ that can bind Egypt to US strategies in the region. Pakistani generals have not been an exception. US regional strategies require strategic compliance and conformity from regional military ‘binding forces’. The same, unfortunately, may be in store for Afghanistan. Those regional regimes that do not conform are targeted by US strategic planners for regime change.

In none of the minority provinces and areas of Pakistan does the idea of the military being the sole national binding force have any resonance. Moreover, as stated, in no circumstance can political sentiment in Punjab substitute for the political sentiment of Pakistan. Unless, of course, one is indifferent to the progressive erosion of the foundations of the country!

This irresponsibility defined the attitudes of mainstream politicians, bureaucrats, business elites, religious custodians, the media, and not least, the military of West Pakistan towards Jinnah’s united Pakistan. Did the tragic consequences teach us anything? The answer is provided by the fate of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report. It is also provided by the similar fate of the Abbottabad Commission report 40 years later. Amidst all the howling of political jackals not a single sustained demand for the release of the report! This is the measure of our leaders’ sincerity.

Make in India makes sense, Dr Rajan; countries cannot be run by economic theory alone

By Sanjeev Nayyar

Source Link

RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan. Image courtesy PIB

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Raghuram Rajan recently said the following: “There is a danger when we discuss ‘Make in India’ of assuming it means a focus on manufacturing, an attempt to follow the export-led growth path that China followed. I am...cautioning against picking a particular sector such as manufacturing for encouragement, simply because it has worked well for China. India is different, and developing at a different time, and we should be agnostic about what will work.”

Excerpts from a Business Standard (BS) editorial of 15 December have this to say: “Make in India sounds too close to import substitution and old-style industrial policy for comfort. Further, it has been reported that the prime minister himself has asked secretaries to the government to appraise imports on a quarterly basis and work out how to reduce them.”

These words have raised doubts on the Prime Minister’s Make in India (MII) campaign. Using examples, this article throws light on what MII actually means.

One, according to this Mint report, India imported $31 billion worth of electronic items in 2013-14, including $10.9 billion of mobile phones. This could rise to $296 billion by 2020 – which could surpass even our oil import bill. This is simply unsustainable, unless a part of the import demand is met by domestic production.

MII means that this equipment should also be made in India. After all why, should India’s telecom backbone be made in China? “Now, it has been reported that the National Security Council (NSC) has specifically warned that imports from China, which are over half of imports in the relevant category of telecom equipment, pose significant national security hazards.”

As and when a domestic manufacturer achieves scale, it can begin to export. If Bharti Airtel had built a plant to manufacture telecom products and equipment to cater to its domestic needs, it could have sourced some of it for their Africa operations from India. Here MII combines catering to domestic and export markets.

Two, the programme of blending ethanol with fuel has failed to take off. MII means allowing oil marketing companies (OMCs) to set up 100 percent ethanol plants (these plants can make ethanol directly from cane). This way farmers can sell cane directly to the OMCs, and would be paid promptly, saving the country dollars.

India’s tech opportunity: Transforming work, empowering people

byNoshir Kaka, Anu Madgavkar, James Manyika, Jacques Bughin, and Pradeep Parameswaran

December 2014 

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Executive SummaryPDF–688KB 

Full ReportPDF–4MB 

Millions of Indians hope for a better future, with well-paying jobs and a decent standard of living. To meet these aspirations, the country needs broad-based economic growth and more effective public services. Technology can play an important role in enabling the growth India needs. The spread of digital technologies, as well as advances in energy and genomics, can raise the productivity of business and agriculture, redefine how services such as healthcare and education are delivered, and contribute to higher living standards for millions of Indians by raising education levels and improving healthcare outcomes.

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Empowering technologies in India

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McKinsey’s Noshir Kaka and Anu Madgavkar discuss how India could transform its economy by employing 12 technologies.

A dozen empowering technologies

A new McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) report identifies a dozen technologies, ranging from the mobile Internet to cloud computing to advanced genomics, which could have a combined economic impact of $550 billion to $1 trillion a year in 2025. The selection of the 12 technologies for India was based on a similar process established by MGI’s earlier work on disruptive technologies.1 For India, we used additional criteria to identify the technologies that would have a direct impact on the country’s economic and social challenges in the coming decade. As a result, we include technologies such as electronic payments, which are well established in other parts of the world but not well developed in India. By 2025, however, electronic payments could help 300 million Indians join the country’s financial system.

We group the 12 technologies into three areas: digitizing life and work, smart physical systems, and energy technologies: 

digitizing life and work—the mobile Internet, the cloud, the automation of knowledge work, digital payments, and verifiable digital identity 

smart physical systems—the Internet of Things, intelligent transportation and distribution systems, advanced geographic information systems (GIS), and next-generation genomics 

energy—unconventional oil and gas (horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing), renewable energy, and advanced energy storage 

Each of these technologies has the potential for rapid adoption in India between now and 2025 (exhibit).

Exhibit

Potential adoption of 12 empowering technologies in India 

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