Indian Strategic Studies

7 May 2025

Pakistan parliament passes resolution against India over Pahalgam attack fallout

Pakistan’s Parliament on Monday passed a unanimous resolution against India, terming New Delhi's countermeasures against Islamabad in the wake of the Pahalgam terror attack "a campaign" to malign the country's image.

On April 22, terrorists suspected to have links with Pakistan opened fire on tourists in Jammu and Kashmir's Pahalgam, resulting in the brutal killing of 26 people, mostly holidayers.

Calling the government of India's actions part of a “familiar pattern of exploiting terrorism for political gain,” the resolution said the attempt to malign Pakistan lacked evidence and credibility.

The resolution, which was tabled by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) lawmaker Tariq Fazal Chaudhry, rejected attempts to link Pakistan to the April 22 attack.

It rejected “all frivolous and baseless attempts to link Pakistan to the Pahalgam attack” and emphasised that the killing of innocent people was contrary to the values upheld by Pakistan, PTI news agency reported.

The resolution also aimed at India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty, calling it an “unlawful and unilateral” move that amounts to an act of war under international law.

India and Pakistan are in crisis again - here's how they de-escalated in the past

Soutik Biswas

Last week's deadly militant attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, which claimed 26 civilian lives, has reignited a grim sense of déjà vu for India's security forces and diplomats.

This is familiar ground. In 2016, after 19 Indian soldiers were killed in Uri, India launched "surgical strikes" across the Line of Control – the de facto border between India and Pakistan - targeting militant bases.

In 2019, the Pulwama bombing, which left 40 Indian paramilitary personnel dead, prompted airstrikes deep into Balakot - the first such action inside Pakistan since 1971 - sparking retaliatory raids and an aerial dogfight.

And before that, the horrific 2008 Mumbai attacks - a 60-hour siege on hotels, a railway station, and a Jewish centre - claimed 166 lives.

Each time, India has held Pakistan-based militant groups responsible for the attacks, accusing Islamabad of tacitly supporting them - a charge Pakistan has consistently denied.

Since 2016, and especially after the 2019 airstrikes, the threshold for escalation has shifted dramatically. Cross-border and aerial strikes by India have become the new norm, provoking retaliation from Pakistan. This has further intensified an already volatile situation.

China’s military surge signals urgency for India’s defence readiness

Air Marshal Anil Chopra

As China seeks to achieve “national rejuvenation” by its centenary in 2049, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders view a modern, capable, and “world-class” military as essential to achieving its revisionist aims (changing the current status quo) and overcoming what Beijing sees as an increasingly turbulent international environment.

This is the guiding principle charting China’s national, economic, and military strategy. It is thus important to understand the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategic thinking, current capabilities, and activities as well as its future modernisation goals.

China continues its efforts to transform the PLA into an increasingly capable instrument of national power. The PLA is adopting more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere while accelerating its development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen China’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “stronger enemy”, counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along China’s periphery, and project power globally.

Understanding China’s Strategy

China’s longstanding national strategy determinedly pursues political, social, economic, technological, and military development to increase China’s national power and revise the international order in support of China’s system of governance and national interests.

Lack of Will Prevents Wars from Being Won

Winning depends upon the combination of will and capability. In the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, U.S. capability was twice that of our enemies, and our will was three times less. Consequently, we lost all three wars.

Isaiah Berlin observed that understanding how a person thinks requires drilling down to the central idea he holds, usually hidden behind diversionary rationalizations. In the cases of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the hidden central idea of the policymakers was that America was too rich to lose. In each war, the policymakers believed the enemy—a fraction of our size in population, wealth and modernity—was outclassed. Our weapons and firepower seemed to assure our inevitable success. This Jupiter complex restrained the commitment of both adequate resources and resolute persistence. Since America could not lose and the wars were not existential, our presidents sought to win without inflicting too much harm upon the enemy or committing the required number of American forces, while not arousing the American people by demanding taxes to pay for the wars. Our presidents lacked the will to win. Our enemies had more determination than did a succession of seven American presidents.

Today, the situation is worse. We no longer have a superior capability, let alone the will to win. Under President Reagan four decades ago, America confronted the Soviet Union, and the Defense budget was 6% of GDP. In 2025, America confronted China, and the Defense budget had been slashed in half, to under 3%. Either we spent twice as much as necessary to deter the Soviet Union, or we are foolishly underfunded to deter China, a more formidable foe than was the Soviet Union. We’re like the owner of a fine house in a rough neighborhood who cuts in half his home insurance because he is tired of paying 6% in insurance. Then his house is burnt down.

Old Myths, New Country

Shehryar Fazli

“This was a destruction not of a house but of our history, of my history,” said a veteran of Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War, telling me about the destruction of the Dhaka home of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the country’s first leader, on February 5.

The address, 32 Dhanmondi, is well known in Bangladesh. It is where, in March 1971, Mujib was apprehended by Pakistani troops as they began the violent crackdown that culminated in a genocide, the third India-Pakistan war, and the birth of a new nation. And it is where, on August 15, 1975, Bangladeshi soldiers slaughtered President Mujib and several members of his family in the country’s first military coup.

That it now stands in ruins shows how much public anger had accumulated during the 15 years of repressive rule of Sheikh Hasina Wajed – Mujib’s daughter – which ended in August 2024 after weeks of student-led protests.

Hasina had turned the house into a memorial for her father. Now exiled in India, she is plotting a political comeback. Last February, she planned to give a speech that would condemn Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus’ interim government. Protest leaders warned that if she spoke, they would destroy her father’s house. She spoke anyway.

Taiwan Bolsters Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience

Kuang-Cheng Hsu and Calvin Chu

On April 1, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launched a large-scale military drill in the waters surrounding Taiwan. The drill, led by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command, also involved coordinated efforts from the army, navy, air force, and rocket force (Xinhua, April 1; China Brief, April 11). The stated objective was to deter what Beijing calls “‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces” (“台独”分裂势力) by increasing military pressure on Taiwan. The Global Times, which is published under the guidance of the Central Propaganda Department, further amplified this message on its social media platforms by posting an image of Taiwan encircled by PLA aircraft and warships, overlaid with the phrase “Closing In” (进逼)—an apparent attempt at psychological warfare aimed at instilling fear in Taiwanese society (X/Global Times, April 1).

In the face of this growing threat, Taiwan is bolstering its civil defense. On March 27, several days prior to the PLA activities, Taiwan conducted its first “Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee Field Drill” (全社會防衛韌性委員會實地演練). This large-scale civilian defense drill reinforced its commitment to Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience, following the five core pillars of Taiwan’s framework: civilian mobilization and training, strategic material stockpiling and distribution, energy resources and critical infrastructure maintenance, preparation of social welfare, medical, and shelter facilities, and cybersecurity for communication, transport, and financial networks (Office of the President, Taiwan, March 18, accessed April 28).

The U.S.-China Tariff War – and Some Lessons from History - OPINION

Martin Petersen

The United States and China are in what you might call a Cold Competition – if not a Cold War. One nation wants to preserve the world order established after WWII and its dominant place in Asia, while the other wants to alter significantly that post-war world order and replace the U.S. as the dominant power in Asia. The “tariff war” is just the latest round in that competition.

It is in the best interests of both parties to settle this dispute—something I believe both sides recognize—and three lessons from the history of U.S.-China relations suggest how this could happen. In both capitals we have strong leaders with outsize egos, and both are dealing with complex internal political situations. One leader’s style is more “in your face” and the other’s is all about saving face, a very important element of Chinese culture. Let me say that I have no issue with the Trump Administration’s efforts to achieve a redress of the U.S.-China trade imbalance—and other bilateral issues—and I wish them well. But I believe a change of tactics would give the U.S. a better chance of achieving its goals.

Lithuania knows how to have a backbone against China, the EU should take note

Anthony J. Constantini

It is not every day that a country stands up to the People’s Republic of China, particularly one as small as Lithuania. But Lithuania has, in the past five years, thumbed its nose at China on a variety of issues. In 2021, the small Baltic nation banned “unreliable” manufacturers from its 5G markets, a shot at China’s Huawei. That same year, it also allowed Taiwan to open a representative office (a step down from a formal embassy) which included reference to it being “Taiwanese” (oftentimes, such offices use “Taipei” to avoid angering China). This prompted China to downgrade relations with Lithuania, and to impose trade penalties. Chinese ships, along with Russian-flagged vessels, have also partaken in apparently cutting undersea cables around the Baltics.

But now, the country’s government has reversed course, with Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas seeking to restore relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Part of this is simply due to a change in government: Paluckas’s centre-left party won over the centre-right in last year’s elections, and new governments usually mean new policies. However, there is likely another reason Paluckas may want to reverse course: he has received virtually no help from Brussels against China.

China’s counter-UAV efforts reveal more than technological advancement

TYE GRAHAM and PETER W. SINGER

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are reshaping modern warfare—from the battlefields of Ukraine to the contested skies over the South China Sea—and spurring Beijing to upgrade its counter-drone capabilities aggressively. Recent demonstrations featuring high-power microwave systems and AI-assisted autonomous interceptors reveal an evolving PLA strategy designed to neutralize mass drone swarms and first-person-view (FPV) attack drones. China now appears to be adopting a multi-layered defense approach that integrates electronic warfare, directed-energy weapons, and AI-driven interception systems, combining both kinetic and non-kinetic solutions.

The successful and varied use of drones in locales ranging from Azerbaijan and Sudan to Ukraine and Israel has exposed clear gaps in traditional air defense systems. Conventional systems, built to target large, fast-moving aircraft have struggled with agile, low-flying, and often massed drones that operate in coordinated swarms. Traditional defenses are also extremely expensive compared to the cost of drones. One U.S. ally shot down a $200 drone with a Patriot missile that costs just over $3 million.

Watching these trends, the PLA has come to the same realization. During its training exercises last summer, countermeasures managed to neutralize only around 40 percent of incoming UAVs. These underwhelming results prompted Chinese military planners to rethink their approach.

China’s Rising Foreign Ministry

Sarwar Minar

The rise of China as a global superpower is marked by a debate on whether the rise has been peaceful or aggressive. Referred to as “assertiveness”, China’s recent offensive turn has fueled the debate and drawn further attention. While traditional narratives on the rise of China, particularly its assertiveness, focus on its rising military, top political leadership, and nationalism, Dylan Loh’s China’s Rising Foreign Ministry shows how China’s assertiveness can be explained by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The book shows some degree of independent influence of MOFA and considers political leadership as enabler of such role, not independent of the top leadership. The book contributes to a growing body of literature attempting to explain the sources of China’s rise, especially its assertive turn on global stage. Some recent works emphasize the role of diplomats, such as Peter Martin’s (2021) China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. Others downplay MOFA’s independent role, as in Dai and Liqiu’s (2024) Wolf Warrior Diplomacy and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: From Policy to Podium.

Wolf warrior diplomacy, assertive and often confrontational-style diplomacy adopted by the Chinese diplomats, begins to garner a lot of attention around 2019, though Loh points out that assertive diplomacy has been observable since 2009. The book focuses on the developments from 2009 to 2020, with reflections on the role of MOFA as the central driver and its “representationalrole” of assertive China (p.2). The author uses interviews, participant observation, textual materials, and artifacts analysis to investigate the internal dynamics of the Chinese government. He then applies practice theory, an analytical inquiry focusing on human/institutional “doings and sayings” (p.2) to study China, which adds to the tradition of applying conventional IR theories to study China. The book addresses timely but puzzling questions, including how China’s assertiveness is represented and manifested, how other actors construct and understand China’s behavior, and why its behavior is increasingly being evaluated as assertive by others (p.137).

China Wants to Silence My Organization. Why Is Trump Doing It? - Opinion

Bay Fang

In February 2020, weeks before Covid-19 paralyzed the world, the Radio Free Asia reporter Jane Tang received a panicked text from a source in Wuhan, China: “They are following me,” the message read. “I’m too scared to move.” Ms. Tang had been investigating China’s cover-up of a new disease that had spread through Wuhan when she learned that Li Zehua, a journalist who had quit his state media job to chase the story, was being trailed by the police. Shortly after Ms. Tang received the message, Mr. Li was arrested.

In contacting RFA, Mr. Li turned to one of the last reliable channels for on-the-ground, uncensored news in China. Since it was established in 1996 by the U.S. government in response to China’s massacre of pro-democracy student protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989, RFA has reported from regions in Asia hostile to independent journalism: China, North Korea and Myanmar, among others, filling an important gap where free press outlets cannot exist.

RFA’s impact has been crucial in China, where the Chinese Communist Party maintains a stranglehold on all media. The party, which leads the world in imprisoning journalists, relentlessly monitors and surveils social media and punishes people for online comments that run afoul of Beijing’s official narrative. Its advanced censorship and surveillance technologies are constantly upgraded to block unsanctioned news from reaching ordinary Chinese people.

These Thinkers Set the Stage for Trump the All-Powerful - Opinion

Damon Linker

With a blitz of moves in his 100 days in office, President Trump has sought to greatly enlarge executive power. The typical explanation is that he’s following and expanding a legal idea devised by conservatives during the Reagan administration, the unitary executive theory.

It’s not even close. Mr. Trump has gone beyond that or any other mainstream notion. Instead, members of his administration justify Mr. Trump’s instinctual attraction to power by reaching for a longer tradition of right-wing thought that favors explicitly monarchical and even dictatorial rule.

Those arguments — imported from Europe and translated to the American context — have risen to greater prominence now than at any time since the 1930s.

Mr. Trump’s first months back in office have provided a sort of experiment in applying these radical ideas. The alarming results show why no one in American history, up until now, has attempted to put them into practice — and why they present an urgent threat to the nation.

The tradition begins with legal theorist Carl Schmitt and can be followed in the work of the political philosopher Leo Strauss, thinkers affiliated with the Claremont Institute, a California-based think tank with close ties to the Trump movement, and the contemporary writings of the legal scholar Adrian Vermeule. Many on the right have bristled at presidential power’s being constrained over the past century by two waves of administrative reform. The first dates back to the early 20th century and the rise of the bureaucratic-regulatory state during the Progressive and New Deal eras. The second wave emerged in the 1970s, as Congress responded to the abuses of power by Richard Nixon.

The End of the Global Aid Industry

Zainab Usman

Every decade or so, the global aid industry finds that it must transform to survive. During these periods of change, donor countries restructure their aid agencies, shrink or expand their assistance budgets, and lobby for the creation or dissolution of a UN initiative or two. Typically, once the aid industry conforms to the whims of donor countries, the crisis is averted and business continues as usual. Since U.S. President Donald Trump began his second term, the aid industry has found itself at another inflection point. The Trump administration has gutted USAID, the world’s largest development agency, ending 86 percent of its programs, shuttering its headquarters, and terminating nearly all its 10,000 employees. At the same time, the Trump administration has slashed funding for various multilateral initiatives on climate, global health, and education.

Today’s crisis, however, is different from those that came before: this could truly be the end of foreign aid as we know it. For decades, global development—that is, the attempt to improve and save lives of the poor—has been driven mostly by foreign assistance provided by wealthy governments. Some scholars and analysts deride this process as the “aid-industrial complex.” But even advocates of foreign aid have come to see it as an industry, including in their efforts to reform it, which approach its defects as matters of business inefficiency. And now that governments in many rich countries have sharply lurched to the right and taken more skeptical stances on aid, this industry is collapsing. As a result, many charity workers, researchers, and academics will be out of jobs. More important, millions of poor people around the world will suffer.

Beyond the Hype: Why Drones Cannot Replace Artillery

Bill Murray

The relentless footage emerging from the Ukrainian battlefield, dominated by images of drones striking tanks, disrupting troop movements, and providing crucial reconnaissance, has fueled a narrative, often breathless and uncritical, that unmanned systems are poised to replace conventional artillery. This idea, however, represents a fundamental misreading of the realities of modern warfare.

While drones undeniably offer valuable and evolving capabilities, they are best understood as powerful additions to, rather than substitutes for, the sustained, massive, and versatile firepower required in large-scale combat. A current, somewhat uncritical embrace of drone technology within the U.S. Army, driven by a desire for innovation and a perceived cost-effectiveness, risks diverting attention and resources from the vital modernization of artillery, a critical need for facing potential conflicts with peer or near-peer adversaries. The allure of a “drone-centric” future must be tempered with a clear-eyed assessment of the enduring strengths of traditional fires and the inherent limitations of unmanned aerial systems.

The U.S. Army faces a real and present danger of drawing the wrong conclusions from the ongoing war in Ukraine, and from the broader proliferation of drone technology. The tactical successes achieved with inexpensive commercial drones and first-person view (FPV) systems are undeniably appealing, offering a seemingly low-cost means of achieving disproportionate effects.

Two Russian Su-30 Flankers Downed By AIM-9s Fired From Drone Boats: Ukrainian Intel Boss

Howard Altman

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) shot down two Su-30 Flanker multirole fighters with AIM-9 Sidewinder infrared-guided air-to-air missiles fired by Magura-7 drone boats, the head of the agency told The War Zone exclusively. This marks the first time fighter airecraft have been downed by drone boats and the first use of the AIM-9 from a drone boat for a kill.

“It’s a historical moment,” Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov told us. The War Zone cannot independently verify this claim.

The incident took place in the Black Sea on Friday, said Budanov, who offered new details about what happened. Previous reporting from GUR, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and Russian Telegram channels stated that one Flanker was shot down by an adapted infrared-guided R-73 (AA-11 Archer) short-range air-to-air missile.

Video emerged on social media showing the first Flanker downing. Budanov said there were no videos or images of the second engagement.

GUR used three Magura-7 drone boats in the attack, with two of them firing on the jets, according to Budanov. The Magura-7 is an air defense variant of the Magura-5, he explained, declining to elaborate on the difference between the two Budanov said that the crew of the first Su-30 survived and was picked up in the Black Sea by a civilian ship. Preliminary reports say the crew of the second jet was killed, he added.

Why the USS Gerald R. Ford Is Such a Badass Aircraft Carrier

Kyle Mizokami

In the summer of 2021, the United States Navy did the unthinkable: it attacked one of its own warships. It anchored the brand-new aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford off the East Coast and subjected it to a series of underwater explosions, culminating in a whopping 40,000 pounds of TNT hammering the ship’s hull. The tests were designed to ensure that Ford could protect its crew of 5,000 sailors—more than the total number of servicemen who died during the attack on Pearl Harbor.

For more than eighty years, the U.S. Navy has operated the world’s largest and most powerful fleet of aircraft carriers; its 11 ships carry more that 400 fighter jets and have a combined crew of more than 55,000 sailors. The bulk of the fleet consists of 10 Nimitz-class carriers built between the 1960s and 1990s. By the 2000s, it was clear Nimitz’s 50s-era design was holding back the adoption of modern technologies. Nimitz used steam catapults to launch aircraft, a system that involved routing steam through large, unwieldy pipes from the boilers to reservoirs just under the flight deck. And the ships used an older Westinghouse A4W nuclear reactor design that took up more room inside the ship than newer-generation reactors and could not support the growing power needs of carriers, especially as computers, sensors, and future directed energy weapons added additional energy demands.

Ukraine Is A Military Laboratory | Opinion

Ilan Berman

These are difficult days for Ukraine. More than three years into Russia's war of aggression, the country faces redoubled resolve from Moscow, as the Kremlin pushes to maximize its gains ahead of any possible settlement. It is also weathering flagging enthusiasm from Washington, where the Trump administration has adopted a decidedly skeptical stance toward Kyiv's continued fight. This has confronted the Ukrainian government with the prospect that—despite Europe's ongoing pledges of support—it will be forced to confront Russian aggression with less backing from the United States.

But in this grim calculus, Kyiv possesses a trump card. The past three years of war have seen Ukraine's brave defenders make massive military advancements, as battlefield necessity has become the mother of invention. In the process, Ukraine has singlehandedly managed to change the shape of modern warfare.

This can be seen most clearly in the context of drones. Since February 2023, a veritable revolution has taken place in drone warfare, as unmanned platforms have increased in versatility, affordability, and function. Ukraine has blazed the trail in this regard, pioneering a robust indigenous drone manufacturing capability, establishing cutting edge drone units, and erecting drone workshops on the war's frontlines, where they can rapidly resupply forward-deployed units. These capabilities are now proliferating at an astonishing rate; the state and private industry currently produce some 200,000 drones a month, and will manufacture a total of 2.5 million or more this year. This surge, in turn, has allowed Ukraine to offset at least some of Russia's advantages in conventional firepower.

Don’t Look at Stock Markets. Look at the Ports.

Juliette Kayyem

Stock markets plunged for days after President Donald Trump announced steep tariffs on imports from around the world. The sell-off ebbed only when he suspended most, but not all, of the new measures for 90 days. The ticker tape is just one indicator of an economy, and other signs are growing more and more ominous—including at the Port of Los Angeles, where high tariffs on China are crushing maritime traffic. “Essentially all shipments out of China for major retailers and manufacturers have ceased,” Eugene Seroka, the executive director of the port, said on April 24.

Trump views tariffs as essential to rebuilding the manufacturing economy that the United States once had. But his erratic tariff announcements have badly disrupted the economy that the country has today, and that pain is already being felt in the world of logistics.

“These are big, massive bullwhips that have not been seen since COVID,” Evan Smith, the CEO of the supply-chain-management company Altana Technologies, told me. “The tariffs themselves are a shock to the system, and the shock is echoed and amplified across the entire chain. Even if there is resolution, it will take nine to 12 months to work out these bumps.”

The U.S. Can’t Handle a War - Opinion

Mackenzie Eaglen and Brady Africk

The United States possesses the world’s most advanced military equipment, and quality matters immensely in combat. But quantity gets a say, too. And from ships to shells to soldiers, the U.S. military lacks the personnel and matériel it needs to fight a major war.

America’s armed forces, with a naval fleet roughly half the size it was in 1987 alongside an increasingly smaller and older fleet of combat aircraft, are equipped only for short, sharp, high-intensity conflicts. What happens when a war is longer and more violent? Ukraine’s fight against Russia, Israel’s battles in the Middle East and recent U.S. operations against the Houthis in Yemen offer a preview of the demands of modern war and demonstrate why America requires more than we have now to win a large conflict.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s mandate from President Trump to “refocus” the Pentagon should ensure America’s military has the resources to endure and win a large-scale war. Progressives and fiscal hawks have their knives out for military spending, but the secretary should refrain from cuts to resources that directly strengthen America’s combat power, including active service members, ammunition, new ships and new aircraft.

Disarray at Pentagon puts spotlight on civilian leadership’s crucial role

Anna Mulrine Grobe

The exodus of advisers from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s office is affecting U.S. troops far from the Pentagon – highlighting the importance of strong civilian leadership.

At U.S. bases across the Atlantic Ocean, queries for the secretary and his staff are going unanswered, documents unsigned, and decisions delayed for weeks, including surrounding a large review of the U.S. force presence in Europe, sources say.

“You get a sense of the turmoil in the Pentagon – there’s been no decisions because they’re dealing with staffing issues,” says a senior U.S. military official in Europe, who like some other service members interviewed for this story asked for anonymity to speak candidly.

Why We Wrote This

Many U.S. military officials welcome the idea of rethinking defense policies and posture. But they also say it’s vital in a democracy for direction to be set by the president and the secretary of defense. The worry now is about a leadership vacuum.

These reported backlogs, along with leaks using the platform Signal of “sensitive operational details that we would hold highly classified,” as the official put it, have diminished confidence in the defense secretary among many in uniform.

Britain Faces Rising Global Threats: Ex-UN Chief Sir Mark Lyall Grant on Cyber Wars, Russia and the Future of Security

Tabish Ali

During his time at the UN, Sir Mark was an active voice in Security Council debates on protecting civilians in conflict—particularly women and girls—and consistently underscored the importance of inclusive peacebuilding.

His support for gender equality and human rights initiatives has shaped his diplomatic legacy, reflecting principles of allyship that remain deeply relevant in today’s global leadership conversations.

In this exclusive interview, Sir Mark shares his perspectives on hybrid warfare, the evolving nature of diplomacy, and the future of the US–UK special relationship in a rapidly changing world.

Q: As hybrid threats continue to blur the lines between war and peace, how would you define ‘hybrid warfare’ in today’s security environment, and what implications does it carry for national defence strategies?

Sir Mark Lyall Grant: "Well, the big nations in the world—the main powers—are not actually at war with each other and haven’t been, obviously, for several years. But that does not mean that they’re at peace. We’re in a sort of stage at the moment of what some people call a hot peace or hybrid warfare. What that means is that, whereas we are not directly fighting against our enemies, we are doing so in different ways.

Operation Neptune Spear: What We Still Learn from the Mission that Killed bin Laden

Alex Dekker

In the early hours of May 2, 2011, U.S. special operations forces executed Operation Neptune Spear, the mission that killed Osama bin Laden. Conducted by U.S. Navy SEALs with support from other organizations, the operation marked the culmination of nearly a decade of relentless intelligence gathering, interagency cooperation, and global manhunting efforts following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The raid took place in Abbottabad, Pakistan, just a short distance from the country’s premier military academy. Two modified Black Hawk helicopters carried the assault force across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistani airspace undetected. Within 40 minutes of landing inside the compound, the SEALs had located and killed bin Laden, secured multiple hard drives and documents, and extracted without losing a single U.S. service member.

Despite the mission’s overwhelming success, not everything went according to plan. One of the helicopters crash landed inside the compound due to an unexpected aerodynamic effect caused by high walls, warmer-than-expected ambient air, and the confined landing zone. However, the team had trained for potential aircraft failures, allowing them to adapt quickly and continue the mission. On a broader level, the violation of Pakistani airspace, executed without prior notification to Pakistani authorities, caused significant diplomatic strain, especially since the target was found hiding in a high security area deep within the country.

Exploding Cargo. Hacked GPS Devices. Spoofed Coordinates. Inside New Security Threats in the Skies.

Jeff Wise

First, smoke curled out from the cube of packages stacked on a pallet at a DHL logistics hub near Birmingham, England, last July. Then a lick of flame emerged from the top of the stack. Racing to prevent the fire from spreading, a forklift operator snatched up the burning pallet and dashed away with it, setting it down at a safe remove before the stack turned into a roaring bonfire.

Not long after, 600 miles to the east, inside another DHL logistics hub in Leipzig, Germany, a similar scene played out. Then, according to Polish media, a third courier-related fire started near Warsaw. Polish officials say they intercepted yet another device before it went off and arrested at least four suspects. Another suspect was arrested in Lithuania, according to The Wall Street Journal, and charged with sending four of the devices from the capital city of Vilnius.

An incendiary device made of a magnesium-based substance had apparently sparked each fire. Investigators suspect that the sabotage was organized by Russia’s military intelligence agency as part of an ongoing campaign to sow chaos across Western Europe.

Report to Congress on Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon

What Is the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon?

The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also known as Dark Eagle (Figure 1), with a reported range of 1,725 miles, consists of a ground-launched missile equipped with a hypersonic glide body and associated transport, support, and fire control equipment. According to the Army,

This land-based, truck-launched system is armed with hypersonic missiles that can travel well over 3,800 miles per hour. They can reach the top of the Earth’s atmosphere and remain just beyond the range of air and missile defense systems until they are ready to strike, and by then it’s too late to react.

The Army further notes,

The LRHW system provides the Army a strategic attack weapon system to defeat Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, suppress adversary long-range fires, and engage other high payoff/time critical targets. The Army is working closely with the Navy in the development of the LRHW. LRHW is comprised of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB), and the Navy 34.5-inch booster.

On April 24, 2025, the Army formally designated the LRHW as the Dark Eagle.

New Battlegrounds in Information Warfare

Ronan Wordsworth

The concept of disinformation isn’t new; it’s been around as long as information has. The difference between then and now is that now there are more, and arguably more effective, avenues for controlling public opinion. And there are more people trying to control it. In addition to large media organizations, which can, to varying degrees, cooperate with the state, virtually anyone can try to control information. As a result, trust in institutions has been eroded, democratic processes have been undermined, perceptions have been altered, and societies have been conditioned to be disillusioned throughout the world. Governments have realized that information campaigns can be as big a threat to national sovereignty as military campaigns.

Adoption and Deployment

Foreign information manipulation and interference, or FIMI, has been recognized as a growing security threat. One small but significant component of FIMI is disinformation – that is, misleading content that is meant to deceive. This is not to be confused with misinformation: information that is merely inaccurate. Both, however, can affect public health, subvert attempts to address certain challenges, destabilize societies, shape narratives and undermine adversaries.

As the use of FIMI becomes more frequent, governments increasingly lack the tools to adequately counter it. It’s no easy task; education in, say, media literacy typically lags behind new forms of FIMI. But the bottom line is that as the threat matrix grows, so do the risks of inaction. Russia was perhaps the earliest and most high-profile proponent of mass-scale disinformation operations, and though they are especially useful to authoritarian regimes acting against democratic adversaries, countless

6 May 2025

India Makes Diplomatic Push for Military Action Against Pakistan - Analysis

Anisha Dutta

The terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir last week that killed 26 tourists has laid bare the persistence of militant threats in the region, exposing serious lapses in Indian security and intelligence.

Amid growing calls in India for military action against Pakistan, which New Delhi accuses of backing the militants involved, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is once again posturing toward cross-border retribution. Yet more than a week after the attack in Pahalgam, India has not made a major military move. It suspended its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty, and both countries have expelled each other’s diplomats and military attaches.

Pakistan’s Balochistan Crisis and India’s Defensive Offense

Arsalan Bilal

Pakistan’s Balochistan province is burning. A sharp surge in militant attacks in the province amid a decades-old insurgency has destabilized the entire country. The issue is related to not only internal security but also the deep-rooted Pakistan-India conflict.

Pakistan believes that India is aiding and abetting insurgents in the Balochistan province, which is resource-rich and strategically important. There are reasons to think India might be providing support to militants in Balochistan in a concerted effort to raise Pakistan’s cost for sponsoring cross-border terrorism.

I discern it as New Delhi’s defensive offense strategy, which India’s influential national security advisor Ajit Doval, once a spy inside Pakistan, advocated many years ago. I argue that the strategy has paid important dividends for India by taking the conflict deep inside Pakistan without triggering a full-scale conventional war—but this can become a perilous gamble if a possible escalation is not avoided.

India’s “Defensive Offense” Strategy

Before defining India’s defensive offense strategy, I want to highlight its origins. Interestingly, New Delhi conceived and operationalized the defensive offense strategy in response to what it saw as Pakistan’s efforts to destabilize India internally. Experts believed that Pakistan fanned insurgencies to “bleed India” through “a thousand cuts”. This defined Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare against India.

India-Pakistan Tensions Show Signs Of Easing – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

Time past is time present in India-Pakistan crisis. The ‘mediation’ by the United States from behind the scene on the diplomatic track appears to be once again working, which calls on both Delhi and Islamabad to show restraint and pull back from a military confrontation. The call for a responsible response by India — and for Pakistan to be cooperative — by the US Vice-President JD Vance serving under the leadership of a ‘peacemaker president’ epitomises the world opinion, for sure.

There are signs that life in India is moving on. The melancholy, long, withdrawing roar of a heavy heart is discernible. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is travelling out of Delhi. On Thursday, he was in Mumbai to inaugurate a 4-day summit, which is a landmark initiative to position India as a global hub for media, entertainment, and digital innovation.

On Friday, Modi will be in the southernmost state of Kerala to formally commission the Vizhinjam International Deepwater Multipurpose Seaport, touted as the country’s first dedicated container transhipment port, representing the transformative advancements being made by the Modi government in India’s maritime sector as part of the prime minister’s unified vision of Viksit Bharat, the initiative to achieve the goal and vision of transforming India into a developed entity by 2047, the centenary year of independence.

On the Brink of Another India-Pakistan War

Tim Willasey-Wilsey

The killing of 26 Indian tourists at Pahalgam in Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) is the first major terrorist incident in Kashmir since Pulwama in 2019. Following the Pulwama episode, India launched an aerial attack on an alleged training camp outside the Pakistani town of Balakot. Later an Indian MiG 21 jet was shot down and its pilot taken prisoner. The prompt Pakistani release of the pilot enabled both sides to climb down the escalatory ladder and for war to be avoided. It was a fortunate end to a perilous situation.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi set two precedents in the way he responded to the Pulwama episode. The first was that any terrorist attack in which a direct Pakistani hand was evident would be met with a kinetic response. The second was that the retaliation would happen in Pakistan and not in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) where low-level conflict is relatively commonplace. He also established a belief in India that there exists a space for conventional warfare against Pakistan without the danger of nuclear escalation.

So the strong likelihood now is that India will launch a retaliatory attack in the days to come. New Delhi seems already to have concluded that Pakistan was complicit in the attack and that the relatively new Resistance Front (TRF) is an offshoot of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) terrorist organization, which is based at Muridke, about 30 miles from Lahore.

China's Cyber Maze: Challenges and Prospects for the United States

Nistha Kumari Singh

The Cyber Maze is a strategic framework for managing modern cyberattack patterns by prioritising adaptability, layered risk mitigation, and context-specific responses over rigid measures. It acknowledges that cyberattacks, whether state-sponsored campaigns, proxy actors, or novel attack vectors, are not straightforward, symmetric, or static. The framework advocates for a flexible strategy combining deterrence, diplomacy, and defence to adapt responses based onattacks and context. This framework is useful for countering China’s ambition to become a cyber superpower (Wangluo Qiangguo, 网络强国), a policy fueling its state-aligned cyber ecosystem.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) cyber ecosystem is a “maze” of interconnected formal and shadow institutions, feeding into state-linked cyberattacks involving the People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the Ministry of Public Security. A US Homeland Security report from February 2025 shows 224 cyber espionage incidents targeted at the US from China, with over 60 directly linked to the Chinese Communist Party.

China’s state-linked cyber operations connect to its desire for technological dominance, aiming to lead innovation in critical sectors like artificial intelligence, 5G infrastructure, and quantum computing while reducing foreign technology dependence. This ambition, pronounced in platforms such as Made in China 2025 and the 14th Five-Year Plan, drives geopolitical rivalry to counter Western cyber hegemony and maintain domestic stability. Experiences during the “century of humiliation” (1840-1949) have shaped Beijing’s strategic vision, justifying narratives by emphasising technological self-reliance and cybersecurity.

Forget Tariffs—The Real US-China Tech War Is Over Internet Freedom

Jill Goldenziel

U.S.-China tech competition is about more than tariffs. The future of the Internet is at stake. China is not just exporting hardware—it is exporting laws, standards, and authoritarian control. China is promoting its vision of what cyberspace should look like, which clashes sharply with the U.S.’s vision for a free and open Internet. To do so, China is training other governments in its authoritarian ways. It is fiercely seeking to dominate the little-known international organizations that literally set the standards for global tech, ensuring that Chinese firms have a global edge. China is also exporting its Legal Great Wall, repressive laws related to China’s national security and cybersecurity. China is attempting to enforce those laws abroad—even in the U.S. The U.S. and the private sector must act to counter China’s legal warfare—and keep China from taking over the Internet.

China’s Competing Vision for Tech and Cyberspace

The U.S.’s conception of what the Internet should look like is vastly different than China’s. The latest U.S. National Security Strategy, released in 2022, endorses the UN Norms of Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace as the “rules of the road” for cyberspace and says the U.S. will promote them together with partner and ally nations. These “UN Cyber Norms,” were created by a UN Group of Governmental Experts and affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 2021. The 11 basic norms specify that states should not attack critical infrastructure, respond to requests for assistance by those attacked, and cooperate with other states to stop crime and terrorism, and other rules designed to keep civilians safe from cyber conflict. As the Strategy says, the Norms affirm that “human rights apply online just as they do offline.” Project 2025 goes even further than non-binding norms. Project 2025 advocates for the State Department to work with allies on a binding framework of enforceable norms that would “draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct” in cyberspace.

China’s ‘Great Firewall’ Spreads to Other Countries

Salman Rafi Sheikh

China has spent decades framing—and continues to frame—its partnership with BRI member states as purely economic. That China doesn’t interfere in the domestic politics of its member countries has been one of the key hallmarks of Beijing’s self-styled model of economic development, making it different from the sort of interventionism that characterizes the West in general, and the US in particular.

China, however, no longer appears to be different, with Beijing supporting the installation of “Great Firewalls”—systems of censorship and surveillance to control access to the internet and keep its citizens from hearing or experiencing anything the government doesn’t approve of. It operates by blocking access to websites and services, filtering content, and monitoring online activities.

The firewall, also known as the Golden Shield Project in China, allows member states such as Pakistan to monitor, restrict, and even block access to the internet and foreign websites. Beijing’s political entanglements in target states are already taking an obvious form with one clear purpose: to help extend the typically closed Chinese model of political system to other states. Other countries are thought to be using Chinese technologies for their own control measures, although the extent of this collaboration can’t be pinned down.

“Made in China 2025”: A Decade of Industrial Policy and Its Geopolitical Effects

Geopolitical Scenario

MIC2025 coincided with a broader shift in China’s global role. In 2024, China’s manufacturing value-added reached approximately 29% of the global total, nearly matching the combined output of the United States and the European Union.

In critical sectors like electric vehicles and high-speed rail, Beijing met or surpassed MIC2025 targets. By 2023, China produced over 60% of the world’s EVs, led by companies like BYD, NIO, and SAIC. In shipbuilding, Chinese firms controlled more than 50% of global orders by tonnage. These accomplishments reflect the effectiveness of policy tools used under MIC2025.

However, technological self-reliance, the program’s core ambition, remains incomplete. China continues to rely heavily on imported semiconductors, foreign aviation components, and high-end manufacturing tools. Despite years of targeted investment, the overall self-sufficiency rate for China’s semiconductor industry stood at approximately 13% in 2024, far from Beijing’s goal of 70% self-sufficiency., The C919 aircraft developed by COMAC to rival Boeing and Airbus, still incorporates engines and avionics systems sourced from US and European firms. Similarly, China’s automation systems frequently depend on German, Japanese, and Swiss technologies.

China-US AI Technology Competition: Who’s Winning in Key Inputs?

Sara Hsu

After China revealed its own homegrown large-language model, DeepSeek, in January 2025, the artificial intelligence (AI) competition intensified. Much of the conversation on this new technology has focused on semiconductors or model speeds, but the race is very much dependent on several upstream factors: energy, rare earth elements, and talent. These critical inputs into the AI industry face vastly different structures in the two countries and may determine the pace and scale of AI innovation.

Energy: Powering the AI Revolution

AI models use massive amounts of energy to power their computations. Ensuring a consistent and growing energy supply to power data centers and cool servers is now an essential part of national AI strategies. The United States and China have different energy ecosystems, with alternative methods of pricing, regulating, and sustaining energy for AI endeavors.

Due to increasing investment in electricity generation, the energy requirements of AI data centers have placed a great amount of pressure on local power grids. A notable incident occurred in July 2024, when 60 data centers in Northern Virginia were disconnected from the grid due to a surge protector failure. This incident forced operators to rapidly reduce power generation to prevent widespread outages, and demonstrated the challenges that utilities face in providing data centers with growing amounts of power.

Hegseth issues Army a lengthy to-do list

MEGHANN MYERS

The Army got a long list of marching orders from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on Thursday, with deadlines for fielding new weapons and technology, directives to unload old equipment, and orders to merge the service’s futures and doctrine organizations.

The memo includes a lot of items the service was already working on, or had considered but hadn’t been told to prioritize, a Defense official told Defense One.

“It is nothing but good news, nothing but excitement for us to build judicious plans and move as fast as we can,” the official said.

Weapons deadlines top the list. Long-range missiles that can hit moving land and sea targets, an apparent reference to the Precision Strike Missile now under testing, are to be fielded by 2027. Every division is to receive unnamed unmanned systems and “Ground/Air launched effects” by 2026. Counter-drone systems are to be sent to maneuver platoons by 2026 and maneuver companies by 2027.

Then there’s offloading outdated equipment and axing wasteful programs. The memo calls out the Humvee, which the service will begin to replace in brigade combat teams this year with its new infantry squad vehicle.

“We don’t want to take them to the next war,” the Defense official said of the Army’s roughly 100,000 older ground vehicles.

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