Lawrence Freedman
There were many questions on the Russo-Ukraine War and the prospects for an early conclusion. Carol Gramm asks how long Russia (and the Russians) can support the war. Martin Treacy notes that 2026 will be a crunch year for Putin, when economic constraints and only very slow Russian progress (at great cost) plus increasing impacts on the Russian people (drone hits on power production, petrol shortages etc). Will this finally create some real pushback against his regime? Or will he just be able to continue to grind forward for years to come? Ben noted that in a recent post I mentioned Ukraine taking back some land could have a disproportionate impact, buy how likely is that ‘given Ukraine’s manpower shortage?’
Most Russians, relying on what they are told by state media, accept Putin’s rationale for the war – that this is a consequence of hostile attitudes by NATO countries combined with a Russophobe and illegitimate government in Kyiv. They find it hard to accept that the war might end other than with a Russia victory. Yet they would still be relieved if it ended soon. Much of the pain of the war up to now – in terms of manpower for the army and consequential deaths - has been felt largely in outlying regions and not Moscow and St Petersburg. Even those distant regions have been compensated as the war has boosted local economies. Almost four years on there is no clear victory or end in sight, with hopes for a peace deal dashed, and the adverse economic and social effects are starting to be felt. (I discussed this recently here).
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