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At present, the defense policy landscape is replete with arguments, many of which are ultimately based in the lack of a common vision among both elites and within the broader citizens about the role of the political leaders in the future. Cyber operations are one element of these debates, though much of the discussion has centered on how best to defend against a growing cyber threat, the role of the Ministry of Defense in that debate, and tensions between privacy, human rights, freedom of speech, and security interests. Occasionally, greater attention is paid to questions about the use of cyber offensively, which brings with it questions of precedent, deterrence, international norms, and a host of other challenges. But it is also apparent that political leaders have already approved the use of offensive cyber capabilities, though under tight restrictions. While not ignoring this larger context, the specific question this project sought to examine in greater depth is whether the Ministry of Defense should make a more deliberate effort to explore the potential of offensive cyber tools at levels below that of a combatant command.
With respect to operational and tactical cyber use, the Indian defense establishment finds itself at a logical but difficult decision point. As is historically the case with new technologies, from gunpowder to airpower to space, there is a natural evolution as the capability is introduced, begins to be used, becomes more integrated, and sparks creative thought about further applications. Cyber, and offensive cyber in particular, is moving along this path, which (as has been the case for other technology areas) is fraught with domestic and international legal and policy concerns. The Ministry of Defense enterprise has to focus its attention on addressing these issues at the level where the capabilities can have the most profound effects—the strategic level. But as progress is being made there, the military services are giving more serious consideration to the role that offensive cyber could play in also supporting the priorities of tactical and operational commanders.
To date, the services’ efforts have progressed at different rates of speed, due in part to differing service cultures and to the priority placed on the development of these tools by senior leaders within each service. The question for the broader policy community at this point, and for the Office of the Defense Secretary in particular, is whether current efforts are sufficient, or whether a more systematic approach to exploring the potential is warranted. A broader consensus on the wisdom of delegating the authority to use offensive cyber tools may be far in the future, and resolving the many practical concerns explored here is both critical and nontrivial. At present, neither the procedures nor the tools are sufficiently robust to merit a delegation of offensive cyber authorities beyond the very limited ways in which they have been utilized thus far. But a reasonable determination of whether the potential operational benefits outweigh the real and legitimate potential costs outlined above necessitates further capability development, albeit in a very controlled context.
