What the US Navy Can Learn from Iran

National Interest  |  Christopher A. Preble, Marie-Louise Westermann

The ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iranian anti-access/area denial capabilities demonstrates how asymmetric forces can disrupt global trade despite suffering major fleet losses from US-Israeli strikes. Even with its conventional navy largely destroyed, Tehran has weaponized speed boats, drones, anti-ship missiles, and naval mines to obstruct shipping through a critical maritime chokepoint for five months.

This operational friction exposes limitations in traditional Alfred Thayer Mahan-derived sea power doctrines, which prioritize fleet size and battle-fleet deterrence over anti-access trade interdiction. Similar disruptions by Ukraine in the Black Sea and Houthi forces in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait highlight a broader global shift toward low-cost maritime disruption. US Navy doctrine's focus on high-end peer competitors leaves critical vulnerabilities when confronting regional actors leveraging geographic advantages and low-cost strike options. Reinterpreting sea power to include economic interdiction capacity is essential for realistic operational timelines and military assessments in asymmetric littoral warfare.

Comment

Naval theory anchored in Alfred Thayer Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* equates maritime dominance primarily with fleet battles and decisive capital-ship presence. Iranian sea-denial tactics in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate that cheap anti-ship cruise missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles can decouple economic interdiction from surface fleet control. This divergence reveals a structural flaw in blue-water force design when applied to narrow chokepoint defence. The persistence of littoral denial capabilities despite the destruction of conventional surface assets shifts the balance of maritime leverage toward asymmetric coastal defenders.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If littoral interdiction in the Strait of Hormuz can invalidate classical Mahanian assumptions about sea control, which capability matrix — heavy battle fleets or distributed anti-access fires — will ultimately dictate carrier strike group deployment in restricted waterways?

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