Joint Intel Chief Says US Must ‘Better’ Understand China Strategy

By COLIN CLARK

September 19, 2014

Source Link

WASHINGTON: We’ve got bus-sized satellites that can probably see any blemishes on Chairman Mao’s badly rebuilt face from space (didn’t know about that, did you?). We’ve got U-2s with their superb sensors watching the Chinese coast (for now). We’ve got P-8s scanning the seas for Chinese submarines and testing their radar. Our subs — hopefully — cruise within their harbors and along their coasts. Our diplomats and spies collect rumint, humint and huge quantities of documents about China. But that doesn’t mean we really understand what China is doing, plans to do, or why it’s doing what it’s doing.

The man responsible for indicators and strategic warnings at the Pentagon, the so-called J-2, told an audience of intelligence experts and industry types that the US suffers from a “data glut but an information deficit” about China. “We need to understand their strategy better,” Rear Adm. Paul Becker said this afternoon at the annual Intelligence and National Security Summit here. Our intelligence analysts need to come to closer grips with China’s grand strategy (if it has one), “interim objectives” and their “main campaigns” so they canbetter serve commanders and other senior leaders, he said.

You could almost hear his thoughts about the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the P-8 near-collision, oil rigs, and the Senkaku Islands as the admiral spoke.

And in a very interesting sidebar, Becker made clear that he worries the US lacks the sort of towering intelligence analysts we once possessed: “Where are those people for China? We need them?”

These are the names the admiral ticked off from World War II and the Cold War: Layton (probably a reference to the legendary naval intelligence analyst Edwin T. Layton); Vernon Walters, a military officer who rose to become UN ambassador and deputy director of CIA; Inman (certainly a reference to Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, who almost became Defense Secretary after serving as NSA director and deputy director at CIA); and Rochefort (which must be a nod to Joseph Rochefort, who worked with Layton, and played a crucial role in cracking the Japanese Navy’s most secure code).

The Struggle for the Levant: Geopolitical Battles and the Quest for Stability

By Aram Nerguizian

SEP 18, 2014

The United States and its allies compete with Iran in a steadily more unsettled and uncertain Levant. The political upheavals in the Middle East, economic and demographic pressures, sectarian struggles and extremism, ethnic and tribal conflicts and tensions all combine to produce complex patterns of competition. The civil war in Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza, and the internal upheavals in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon all interact and affect the competition between the US and Iran.

The Burke Chair is circulating a second review draft on US and Iranian strategic competition in the Levant. This study shows that the United States faced an increasing level of instability across the Levant, which in turn affected every key aspect of US competition with Iran in the broader Middle East and North Africa. It asks how do the US and Iran compete in the Levant, where do they compete, and what are the forces and constraints that shaped this contest in the past, present, and possibly in the future?

The study is entitled The Struggle for the Levant: Geopolitical Battles and the Quest for Stability and is available on the CSIS web site at:http://csis.org/files/publication/140918_Iran_VIII_Levant_report.pdf

The study examines how the US and Iran compete in the Levant, where they compete, and what forces and constraints that shape their competition:

The first chapter of this report introduces the analysis.

The second explores US and Iranian interests in the Levant.

The third chapter addresses how the US and Iran compete by considering the conventional military balance in the Levant.

The fourth chapter goes beyond conventional forces and considers an area where Iran has been especially effective over time, namely in shaping the regional asymmetric balance.

The fifth chapter looks at the history, evolution and current state of play in the Arab and regional state system.

A complementary sixth chapter looks at the evolution of socio-economic forces that shaped the Arab uprisings and their lingering regional effects.

The seventh to twelfth chapters examine how the US and Iran compete in each country in the Levant.

The thirteenth chapter evaluates persistent and emerging challenge or “wild cards” in the region.

The final chapter derives key implications that are likely to shape future US policy towards the Levant.

The analysis shows that deep socio-economic, political and sectarian cleavages, the pervasiveness of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a cycle of popular protests, all combine to make the Levant a growing challenge to the US in shaping its regional struggle with Iran.

The US Role in the Levant

The US must choose the best way to advance its interests in each area, as well as consider the enduring and emerging regional challenges and wild cards that may come to shape and influence US-Iranian interests and competition in the Levant in the years and decades ahead. 

At the same time, the study shows that it is impossible to predict the future outcome of the key trends in any given case. Even the short-term impact of changes in regimes are not predictable, nor is how these changes could affect the underlying drivers of regional tensions. It is particularly dangerous to ignore the risk of replacing one form of failed governance with another one, and the prospect of years of further political instability or upheavals.

The US faces major uncertainties in dealing with each major country in the Levant. The US has long supported the most powerful states in the area – Israel and Egypt – and it has been an ally of Jordan. It has helped them build up powerful conventional forces and anti-terrorism capabilities, and Israel has developed a major arsenal of long-range missile and nuclear weapons. The US has also strongly encouraged Arab-Israeli peace efforts and the peace settlements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan.

Leadership: American Boots On The Ground In Iraq

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20140916.aspx

September 16, 2014

The United States has declared that it will seek to destroy ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) without putting any troops on the ground in Iraq or Syria. That means no American regular troops will be sent in for offensive combat. Some will be there to help with security around the massive U.S. embassy compound, and perhaps other American facilities as well. There will also be a lot of security contractors. While these are civilians, many are veterans of the U.S. Army, Marines, Special Forces and so on. Given their civilian status, there may be a temptation to use the contractors if a lot of offensive muscle is needed. By the end of the year there will be at least 5,000 American military personnel in Iraq and even more contractors. That number is expected to grow in 2015 is needed.

Meanwhile there will be American troops in combat. These will primarily be special operations troops from the army (Special Forces, Rangers), marines, navy (SEALs) and air force (para-rescue)

There will be some similar special operations troops from American allies. Britain and Australia are already in and others are expected to join, including some Moslem special operations units that worked with NATO in Afghanistan.

The U.S. Air Force will also have air control teams on the ground, although these will often work with commando units. Many American special operations troops are trained to act as ground controllers and many have experience in combat doing this. The Western nations prefer to have a Western air controller on the ground confirming what is going to be hit. But this is not absolutely necessary. 

Nearly all armed UAVs fire their missiles using the vidcams (with zoom) they carry. Manned aircraft (including heavy bombers) have similar capability in the form of targeting pods. These are very popular with fighter pilots, mainly because they contain FLIR (video quality night vision infrared radar) and TV cameras that enable pilots flying at 6,200 meters (20,000 feet) to clearly make out what is going on down on the ground. The pods also contain laser designators for laser guided bombs and laser range finders that enable pilots to get coordinates for JDAM (GPS guided) bombs. 

Some have software that can identify many military vehicles and systems automatically. The 200 kg (440 pound) pods hangs off a hard point, like a missile, bomb, or fuel tank. Pilots and bomber crews are trained to use these pods to select and hit targets from the air if there is no one on the ground to help out.

The Iraqis and Kurds have some trained air controllers. The Iraqi ones were trained to call in strikes from Iraqi warplanes armed with Hellfire missiles. The Kurdish ones have been known to work with American Special Forces teams. It’s possible some might be allowed to operate on their own. Trusting the Iraqis, with all the bribery, divided loyalties and such is still discouraged.

The commando teams (usually three to a dozen troops) will definitely be on the ground in Iraq. Syria is another matter and they might or they might not. The problem in Syria is that ISIL is not just fighting the government (Assad) troops but also most other rebel factions. ISIL is estimated to have up to 30,000 armed men in Syria and Iraq but this includes many allies (some very recent and who previously were enemies of ISIL)

The core (most reliable) ISIL force is less than 10,000 armed men. Some of these guys are very effective in combat and American troops encountered some of them in Iraq earlier. The ISIL “allies” can switch sides very quickly if the Islamic terrorists gets hammered real bad. That will happen if Iraq and the Kurds use their elite (usually special operations) ground forces to go after ISIL. This tactic is no secret to many ISIL men, who are veterans of the 2004-8 terrorism campaign in Iraq and know about how such combinations quickly shattered the Taliban in late 2001 and has hurt the Taliban badly ever since

While ISIL knows a lot about avoiding smart bombs and missiles they also know that if they are to control their new “Islamic State” (eastern Syria and western Iraq) they have to use bases and concentrate gunmen to deal with ar

The 5 Most Powerful Russian Weapons of War in the Sky

Kyle Mizokami

September 18, 2014

The Russian bear has wings.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union established the largest air force in the world. Fed by a number of energetic state aviation design bureaus, particularly Mikoyan-Gurevich, Sukhoi and Tupolev, the Soviet Air Force was a powerhouse that enjoyed not only numbers and high technology but also that rare commodity in the Soviet bloc: innovation.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant the new countries that sprung up to replace it inherited thousands of fighters, attack planes, bombers and transports. Russia inherited the lion’s share of the old Soviet Air Force. Some of the old design bureaus survived—barely—the lean years of the 1990s and early 2000s.

After nearly a quarter century, Russia is clawing back as an air power. The air force is finally taking deliveries of new multirole aircraft, and Sukhoi is on the verge of fielding a brand new fighter. These planes, as well as upgraded older planes, will form the backbone of the Russian Air Force for decades to come.

PAK FA Fighter

Russia’s most ambitious aviation project since the end of the Cold War, the PAK FA, is the country’s first fifth-generation fighter design. PAK FA stands forPerspektivnyi Aviacionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviacii, or Advanced Frontline Aircraft System. A product of the Sukhoi bureau, responsible for such stalwarts as the Su-17 Fitter and Su-27 Flanker, PAK FA began development in April 2002 after Sukhoi won the development tender for a new fighter design.

Resembling a Su-27 Flanker with flattened and facet surfaces, PAK FA will be stealthy. Supercruise, the ability to cruise above mach one without the use of afterburners, will be achieved through engines currently under development. The aircraft will have both an active electronically scanned array radar and an electro-optical sensor to track and engage targets. An internal weapons bay capable of carrying up to six long-range missiles, air-to-ground weapons, or a mix thereof will help reduce PAK FA’s radar signature in a combat mission.

PAK FA’s first flight was on January 29, 2010, when it flew for forty-seven minutes from the Yuri Gagarin aircraft factory in Russia’s Far East. Currently five prototypes are flying, with more than 450 test flights as of late 2013. Production for the Russian Air Force is set to begin in 2016. A variant of the fighter, the T-50, is being jointly developed by Russia and India.

NSA Director Talks Islamic State, Cybersecurity

By Tom Risen

Sept. 16, 2014

Equating hacking with an act of war is a difficult task, Rogers says. 

NSA Director Michael Rogers, seen here speaking in Alexandria, Va. on Aug. 13, says the U.S. should be prepared to deal with cyberattacks from the Islamic State group. 

National Security Agency Director Michael Rogers said Tuesday the U.S. needs to be prepared for digital attacks from terrorist groups including the Islamic State and work with other countries on what qualifies as an "attack."

When asked about reports that the Islamic State has pledged to form a “digital caliphate,” the Navy admiral noted that the terrorist group has been “aggressive” in its use of media and the Internet, but would not specify the level of cybersecurity threat posed by the fighters. The Islamic State has gained international notoriety and shown some online competence by posting videos of beheadings on YouTube.

“We need to assume there is a cyber dimension in every area we deal with,” Rogers said during a speech at a cybersecurity conference at the Capital Hilton hotel in the District of Columbia. “Counterterrorism is no different.”

Many cyberattacks directed at the U.S. and other Western nations do not come from terrorist groups that lack the resources or support of a nation-state. Russia and China both employ or support hackers that steal trade secrets from American companies to benefit their own economies, which may represent the greatest cybersecurity threat to the U.S. since such hacks have allowed China to copy designs for military technology including submarines and drones. Iran’s hackers also are becoming more sophisticated.

Information Warfare: More Cyber Warriors Created

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20140914.aspx

September 14, 2014

The first American Army Cyber Protection Brigade recently became active. This unit was created to provide quick and competent personnel for setting up and maintaining network defenses, as well as experienced personnel to investigate and deal with intrusions. The core of the brigade are the twenty cyber protection teams. Each contains 39 military and civilian network security experts. To provide the military personnel the army has created a special MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) so qualified personnel can make a career of this work. This MOS (25D, Cyber Network Defender) is open to all qualified military personnel. Currently there are 700 troops with the 25D MOS and more are being sought. The 25Ds are in high demand, and they are supplemented by qualified civilians, who are more expensive. Since highly skilled 25Ds will always be tempted to leave the army and take better paying civilian jobs the army will, as it does with other specialists (like Special Forces troops) offer big cash reenlistment bonuses to 25Ds they want to keep.

The 25Ds are similar to Special Forces troops in other ways. The Special Forces brigades (called groups) are smaller (1,500 troops) than regular combat brigades (over 4,000 personnel). There are other specialized brigades that have fewer troops, like the 1,100 or so in the Cyber Protection Brigades. What does make the Cyber Protection Brigades unique is the integration of so many civilian contractors with military personnel in the key elements (the cyber protection teams).

These new brigades are part of the army and the new U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). There they will join the new offensive cyber-teams, which began forming in 2013. There will be at least 40 of them by 2015. By 2016 the army also expects to have at least three Cyber Protection Brigades.

The offensive and defensive teams benefit from Cyber Command intelligence and monitoring operations as well as a big budget for keeping the software library stocked with effective tools (including zero day exploits, which are not cheap at all). Cyber Command also has contacts throughout the American, and international, software engineer community. This can provide crucial expertise when needed. The effectiveness of these teams will vary a great deal because one highly skilled Internet software whiz on a team can make a huge difference.

Bringing the Great War to a New Generation

By Ashlee Godwin

18 Jul 2014

The Imperial War Museum is about to unveil its new First World War Galleries to the public. But what lessons can be drawn from these galleries about how to help a new generation connect with a 100-year-old conflict?

Men of the Border Regiment resting in shallow dugouts near Thiepval Wood, August 1916. Image courtesy of IWM.

How do we in Britain in 2014, both as a nation and as individuals, relate to the First World War?

Actually, perhaps a more precise question is how can we relate to the First World War, a conflict that was an all-consuming experience of a bygone age? 

Understanding the progress and impact of a war which was not only geographically vast, but which also touched lives – of both civilians and soldiers – on an unprecedented scale is difficult enough, without the additional challenge of trying to reconnect with an Edwardian Britain that seems a whole world away from today’s multicultural, multilingual and technology-driven society.

Then consider the fact that, with even the Second World War gradually slipping from living memory, most of us have no direct experience of war to serve as a guide to the range of possible emotions and horrors experienced by those on the front 100 years ago.

This is the fundamental question that the Imperial War Museum (IWM) has sought to answer over the past four years as it planned for the centenary of the outbreak of the Great War, and as it designed and created the new First World War Galleries to be opened to the public this Saturday, 19 July.

Contemporary, Individual Voices

ROLL OF HONOUR

As we mark the centenary of the start of the First World War, the Royal United Services Institute publishes its Roll of Honour listing those members who died during the conflict. With over 500 members’ names, the Roll of Honour represents the cream of Britain’s military intelligentsia, severely depleted during this period. 

As is expected, the high numbers of RUSI members who died in 1914 were mostly the ‘young blood’ of RUSI: Second Lieutenants, Lieutenants, and Captains. But contrary to common perceptions that those of higher ranks had little contact with the enemy, RUSI’s roll call reveals officers at Lieutenant Colonel level and above also being killed at this time.

Four members of RUSI were lost on the very first day of the BEF’s first encounter with German forces, on 23 August 1914 at the Battle of Mons. This was followed by really high losses among RUSI members in late October to mid-November 1914 during the First Battle of Ypres, the final death knell of the ‘Old Army’.

There were at least seven RUSI members who received the Victoria Cross during the war, none of them below the rank of Major. The August/September issue of the RUSI Journal features the first Victoria Cross recipient, Major C A L Yate, who was awarded the VC posthumously for his actions during the Battle of Le Cateau in August 1914.

The other Victoria Cross recipients were:

Brig Gen Charles FitzClarence (1914)

Brig Gen John Edmond Gough (1915)

Maj Garth Neville Walford (1915)

Capt Francis Octavius Grenfell (1915)

Lt Col Bertram Best-Dunkley (1917)

Lt Col John Dimmer (1918)

RUSI’s Roll of Honour also reveals that seven of its members died on the first day of the Battle of the Somme, on 1 July 1916.

RUSI members, then, as now, were the lifeblood of the Institute. They were often young officers eager to find a platform for debate about military policy and strategy. In turn they would contribute to the national debate and policy-making process for Britain’s defence and foreign policy. Their subscriptions and attendances, as well as their deaths, are charted in records that today can be found in the RUSI Archive.

They provide a fascinating insight not only into the history of the Institute, but also into the lives of those individuals who, through their membership and participation, allowed RUSI to thrive.

Over 500 of RUSI’s members died in the service of their country during the Great War. As part of its centenary commemorations, the Institute will remember these men with a Roll Call of Honour – published in the August/September issue of the Journal and online – and with a series of accounts that will draw out the unique stories that lie behind the names of those who made the ultimate sacrifice. Some of the information recorded in the archives is incomplete. The names of those members whose fate could not be verified are nevertheless included at the end of the roll call.

The forthcoming Great War special edition of the Journal explores the realities of the early months of conflict through the stories of Hon Archer Windsor-Clive, among the first of RUSI’s members to perish, and Major C A L Yate VC, the first of at least seven RUSI members to be awarded the Victoria Cross.

ReMastering the US Army’s Narrative

Soon to be(?) Lt Gen H.R. McMaster has a well-earned reputation as one of the best and brightest of the U.S. military’s ‘warrior scholars.’ His commentary on the contemporary defense climate is generally speaking both cogent and astute. However, some of his recent comments reflect a chasm that exists between what the US Army is trying to sell as its master narrative, and what it is actually doing.

At a recent event at the Brooking’s Institute McMaster outlined what he saw as the ‘four fallacies’ currently permeating in the discussions of future wars. They are (according to the linked article):

“The return of the revolution in military affairs,” a theory thought discredited in Iraq — “it’s like a vampire,” he said — with its promise that long-range sensors and precision strikes will let air and sea forces win wars cleanly and bloodlessly (for us) on their own. 

“The Zero Dark Thirty fallacy” that we can solve our problems almost bloodlessly with Special Operations raids, “something akin to a global swat team to go after enemy leaders.” 

What might be called the Mali Fallacy (my words, not his) that we can rely on allies and local surrogates to do the fighting on the ground while the US provides advisors and high-tech support. 

All three fallacies, he said, begin with a core of truth: Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, advisors, and allies are all impressive and essential capabilities, but we can’t count on them to prevail alone.

The fourth fallacy, by contrast, McMaster considers just plain “narcissistic.” The idea that the US can “opt out” of certain kinds of conflict — say, counterinsurgency, or ground warfare in general — without giving our adversaries credit for what they may be able to force us to do. Invading Afghanistan seemed ludicrous on September 10, 2001, after all, and inescapable on September 12th. 

While McMaster and others at the conference are right to point out that there are very significant political currents permeating these precepts in the ether of the Washington policy establishment, he’s not 100% correct in calling them fallacies either. Nor does the Army’s narrative fit squarely within a clear counter argument to combat these fallacies.

First off, he’s absolutely correct about the ‘Zero Dark Thirty fallacy’, an over-reliance and a correspondingly exaggerated expectation of what special operations are capable of, as well as the dangers of thinking that repetitive raiding can work in the long-term, is a serious issue. It is absolutely something that should be tempered against both by discerning scholars and experienced practitioners. But to differing degrees I’m not sure I agree with his other three points. My issue with the third and fourth points kind of run together and in essence are about how we understand choices and how we manage and manipulate situations. To really tackle my disagreement with his thinking on those points would require a much longer discussion, but simply put I’m not sure I agree with McMaster’s conception of the scope or range of political choices available to policy makers today.

What really concerns me here is his first point, which to my mind reflects the Army’s current problem with shaping its own message or narrative in an era where it may be the lowest hanging fruit in the defense budgeting process. Today the Army is building its narrative on the premise that the US will inevitably find itself in another drawn-out messy land war, and there is certainly evidence to support this logic. McMaster’s criticism of other services going back to the RMA-driven thinking that future war will be easy, as fallacy; and that down and dirty ugly wars cannot be avoided

Attrition: Better Is Not Perfect

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20140916.aspx

September 14, 2014

The U.S. Army released some of the results of an investigation into a June 9th incident where five U.S. Special Forces soldiers and an Afghan soldier died in Afghanistan when a GPS guided bomb was called in to the wrong location. It was concluded that the cause of the accident was misunderstandings and communications problems between the B-1B bomber that dropped the JDAMs bomb and the Special Forces soldier calling in the strike. Details of exactly what went wrong were classified as were specific suggestions for what needs to be changed to prevent more accidents like this. This secrecy was to be expected as the less the enemy knows how mishaps like this happen the less likely it is that someone will figure out how to make things like this happen on command. There is apparently some concern that the electronic devices used to call in smart bomb attacks could be hacked.

In the last decade it has become more common for electronic devices to be used to call in smart bomb attacks. For example this year U.S. Army Special Forces troops began receiving a new laser designator. The PEQ-1C SOFLAM is a 5.2 kg (11.3 pound) hand held device that looks like box like binoculars with two round lenses off to one side. It’s a 28.5 x 33.6 x 13.1 cm (11.2 x 13.2 x 5.2 inches) device that can determine range up to 20 kilometers away and designate targets over ten kilometers distant via a coded laser beam. It can be mounted on a tripod and operates off internal battery or vehicle power. Unlike earlier devices the PEQ-1C has fewer parts, is more reliable and draws less power. Devices like the PEQ-1C are used by Special Forces teams or forward air controllers to mark targets for laser guided bombs or missiles. This device is also exported.

Many armies prefer even smaller, if less capable, devices. For example, the French Army uses the JIM LR 2 which looks more like traditional binoculars. There are four, instead of two, round glass windows in the front, and the usual two eyepieces in the back. The controls are electronic, not mechanical. The zoom equipped stabilized binoculars also include infrared (night vision) electronics, as well as a laser rangefinder (max range of 5,000 meters) GPS, digital compass, a laser designator (max range of 10,000 meters), and communications systems to transmit coordinates of targets. The binoculars can also record video and still images. Weighing about 3 kg (6.7 pounds), one battery charge lasts four hours. Individuals can be detected at 5,000 meters and identified at about 900. Vehicles can be spotted at 8,600 meters and identified at 1,700.

The United States Air Force in 2014

By Samuel J. Brannen, Ryan Crotty

SEP 16, 2014 

http://csis.org/publication/united-states-air-force-2014

Top U.S. Air Force (USAF) leaders convene this week in the Washington, DC area for the Air Force Association Air and Space Conference. The annual conference gathers active duty and retired uniformed and civilian USAF officials, defense analysts, defense companies, the media, and foreign allies and partners. USAF leaders face tough questions with the threefold pressures of a shrinking budget, growing global operational requirements in a highly complex environment, and increasing threats to future U.S. air dominance.

Q1. What is the Air Force in 2014?

A1. The Air Force is far more than fighters and bombers, and it arguably has the most complex, varied, and numerous missions of any military service today. In its recently released 30-year strategy, the USAF identified its five key mission areas as: “air and space superiority; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; rapid global mobility; global strike; and command and control.” As part of the global strike mission, the Air Force is responsible for two legs of the nuclear triad—fighter and bomber gravity and cruise missile-delivered warheads, and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). 

Over the past several decades, the United States military has increasingly shifted to a globally connected and networked approach to warfare. The USAF is at the center of this approach to war, providing the enabling back-end architecture, from space-based communications, to remotely-piloted aircraft providing full-motion video, to the remarkable advances in treating wounded soldiers that move them rapidly from the battlefield to distant hospitals. 

The USAF now faces serious tradeoffs between what they view as the heart and soul of their service – a high-end combat scenario dependent upon air supremacy – and the backbone enablers that underpin the joint force. Top USAF officials have made clear over the past year that, in light of budget pressures, they plan to reduce current capacity across this diverse range of missions and joint enabling capabilities in order to prepare for future contingencies and reprioritize major combat operations. 

With an expanding use of U.S. airpower in operations from the Sahel to the Pakistan border—particularly in the Middle East—the question remains of how deep Air Force cuts to current capacity can and should go. Planned reductions in assets such as armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS) begin in FY15 with a reduction from 65 to 55 combat air patrols (CAPs). During this timeframe Congress has fought other budget-saving planned retirements such as the A-10 and U-2. Should sequester-level budget caps return in FY16, these capacity cuts would go deeper. The USAF would cut UAS to 45 CAPs, divest the KC-10 tanker and Global Hawk Block 40 fleets, and further reduce investment in enabling capabilities, including radars, sensors, and communications.

Q2. How can the Air Force prepare for the next war while winning today’s wars?

A2. In the words of the 2014 National Defense Panel, the USAF today “fields the smallest and oldest force of combat aircraft in its history.” Over the next decade, it has a daunting set of acquisition objectives to restore that force, including the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), the KC-46 tanker, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. USAF leaders have identified these programs as their highest priorities for the future of the force. To its credit, the USAF has been the most aggressive among the military departments in confronting the realities of the future funding environment, seeking to control its post-2019 “bow wave” and readiness challenges through clear prioritization. But this prioritization has clearly favored the air dominance capabilities that define the service’s image of the future force.

These three programs present significant challenges. The execution and affordability problems already demonstrated call into question the costs of the projects in development now. These cost problems have driven down investment in the other technologies and capability areas.

Walking into Dragon’s jaws!

The Statesman

20 Sep 2014

Contrary to popular perception, this writer considers President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi to have ended in disaster. China got everything it sought. India got nothing it needed. China toyed with the Indian PM as a tiger would with a rabbit. But Beijing’s strategy was so subtle that our so-called experts in the foreign ministry and security establishment do not know how they were taken for a ride. President Xi came after Mr Modi’s visit to Japan. The leverage earned by India through cooperation with America in the oceans and with Japan in business and security was squandered. During Mr Modi’s Japan visit the Chinese media and officials were announcing a $ 100 billion investment by President Xi to dwarf Japan’s $ 35 billion. With the capitulation displayed by Prime Minister Modi on all substantive issues President Xi offered only $20 billion. There was no need to buy India’s cooperation. It was already bought

Coinciding with President Xi’s visit was incursion by Chinese troops in Ladakh. President Xi is Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission and his wife is Major General in the People’s Liberation Army. It would be foolish to think the troops encroached without his blessing. This manoeuvre was adopted to test Indian will. At the extreme level India could have threatened cancellation of visit. Or at least India could have been blunt in the talks about Beijing’s policies threatening India’s national security. India was silent. The joint press conference of the two leaders at the end of talks was laughable.

Newspapers reported that the PM took a tough stand on the border. Really? How? He demanded that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) be clarified. For umpteen years meetings between both nations have continued to address the border dispute.

President Xi remarked that such incidents can always happen and should be settled peacefully. To end the controlled Chinese manoeuvre on the border the Chinese troops withdrew. Hurrah! We are moving towards peace. How does this change the status quo? The drama on the Ladakh border and indeed the entire issue on the LAC was a lollipop for the Indian public. The real concerns of this nation were ignored.

Did Mr Modi demand why Beijing continues to claim Arunachal Pradesh despite its written undertaking given in 2005 to not disturb any settled population while discussing the boundary dispute? No he did not. Did Mr Modi demand why Beijing arms Pakistan with nuclear weapons and missiles aimed against India? No he did not. Did Mr Modi demand why Beijing arms other SAARC neighbours to encircle India? No he did not. Did Mr Modi mention that Taiwan, Tibet and Xingjian are all disputed territories between Beijing and the inhabitants of these regions, and that unless Beijing stops meddling in Pakistan and other nations India will change its policy towards these territories? No he did not. Did Mr Modi ask why Beijing provides sanctuary and arms to anti-India insurgents and separatists? He did not.

STATES OF PROGRESS

Some successful chief ministers

Politics and play - Ramachandra Guha

In the summer of 2011, the anti-corruption campaigns cruelly exposed Manmohan Singh’s deficiencies as prime minister. It was known (or at any rate believed) that Sonia Gandhi would not be ruthless enough to replace him. Almost three years remained till the next general election. Yet, the debate had already begun as to who would — or rather, should — be India’s prime minister.

In 2012 and 2013, as I visited Mumbai, Calcutta, Ahmedabad, Kochi and other cities, I partook of dozens of conversations on politics. Almost all were centred on the ‘Narendra Modi versus Rahul Gandhi’ question. As Singh became weaker, and the economy slid further, middle-class Indians were waiting desperately for him to go. The hope was that with a younger, more active, prime minister, the economy would be turned around, and corruption would be stopped or at least stemmed.

The remarkable thing about these conversations was that they were all centred on national issues. I wasn’t asked or informed about Kerala- specific questions in Kochi, or Maharashtrian concerns in Mumbai.

India is a union of 29 states, many of which are as large — or as populous — as an important European country. Yet, wherever I went in 2012 and 2013, the popular discourse on politics was overwhelmingly Delhi-centric.

When asked who I preferred, Modi or Rahul, I declined to choose. Modi’s bullying side did not appeal to me — nor his sectarian past. But Rahul seemed lazy and unwilling to shoulder responsibility, and of course the dynastic culture of the Congress disgusted me. I also rationalized my refusal to ‘prefer’ a particular prime ministerial candidate on the grounds that what India needed was many better chief ministers, rather than a single charismatic, redemptive, figure at the helm in the national capital. Education, law-and-order, health, were all state subjects. With economic liberalization, the states now had more responsibility than the Centre in promoting investment and job creation. Therefore, good leadership mattered as much — arguably more — in state capitals than in New Delhi.

Pursuing this more federal approach to political analysis, I offer, in this column, a provisional listing of India’s finest chief ministers since Independence. This is based not on systematic research, but on soundings gathered in four decades of travelling through this country. These travels suggest that, when one looks at ‘development’ more broadly, incorporating social indicators as well as economic ones, perhaps the three most progressive states in India are Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Himachal Pradesh. How much of the progress in these states can be attributed to particular chief ministers?

At the beginning of the 20th century, Kerala was one of the most unequal parts of India. Land ownership was highly concentrated. Caste discrimination was extreme — some castes were not just ‘untouchable’, but ‘unseeable’, their very sight considered polluting. The move towards a more just society was hastened by popular social movements — such as the one led by the great reformer, Narayan Guru — and by organized Left politics. These struggles led to high expectations being placed on elected leaders, whose actions were rigorously scrutinized by an educated and alert citizenry.

Perhaps the best among Kerala’s chief ministers were E.M.S. Namboodiripad and C. Achutha Menon [picture]. E.M.S. gave up his ancestral wealth to embrace a principled asceticism that might have made Gandhi proud. And he actively promoted decentralization of governance, even though it ran antithetical to the Leninist dogma of ‘democratic centralism’.

Talking trade and peace with China

SRINATH RAGHAVAN

September 20, 2014 

From India’s standpoint, attracting Chinese investment is imperative for reviving growth. Besides, its deepening ties with Japan, Australia and Vietnam have opened up more room for manoeuvre in Asia

Xi Jinping’s visit was billed as the third by a Chinese President. This may be right in a technical sense; not so from a historical perspective. Mr. Xi is actually the fourth Chinese President to visit India. The first was Chiang Kai-Shek, President of the Republic of China.

Chiang visited India in early 1942 — soon after Japan entered the Second World War. As the Tokyo typhoon swept Southeast Asia, India became vital for China’s survival. Chiang travelled to India seeking to persuade the Indian National Congress to fully support the British war effort. His long meetings with Nehru and with Gandhi did not yield much. And Chiang returned with little more than the spinning wheel that Gandhi had gifted to his wife.

India’s strategic role

Yet the visits by Presidents Chiang and Mr. Xi have more in common than the Gandhian spinning wheel. For one thing, they underscore India’s importance in any Asian security architecture. In the 1940s, when the hegemon in Asia — Britain — was knocked off its perch by a rising power, India played a pivotal strategic role in stopping Japan in its tracks. Today the situation is very different. Yet, as China’s swaggering rise rattles its neighbours, India is seen as a key player in ensuring a balanced regional order.

Further, both the visits point to the strategic quadrangle of China, Japan, India and the United States. In 1942, China sought American assistance in enabling India to hold Japan at bay. Now it is India and Japan that are working together against any unilateral Chinese attempt to rewrite the rules of the game in Asia. And the Americans are keenly backing their moves.

These wider considerations clearly underpin Mr. Xi’s desire to woo India. At any rate, his visit may turn out to be rather more successful than the maiden foray by Chiang. From China’s standpoint, India now appears an attractive destination for investment. Prime Minister Modi has given unprecedented political salience to infrastructure and industry. So, the Chinese are well placed to play to their strengths. From India’s standpoint, attracting Chinese investment is imperative for reviving growth. Besides, its deepening ties with Japan, Australia and Vietnam have opened up more room for manoeuvre in Asia.

In commerce, testing the waters

Orbital Jumps, But How?

By Bharat Karnad

19th September 2014

In Beijing to prepare the ground for the Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping summit, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval talked of Sino-Indian relations as being primed for an “orbital jump”. Seeing these bilateral ties as a satellite in a low-earth orbit which, presumably powered by the success in the apex level talks, will be thrust into a high-earth or more strategic orbit is fine. The problematic part is to know what will push the ties into that more desirable state.

Low-earth orbit satellites have relatively short life because pulled by the gravitational force they eventually collapse back into the earth’s atmosphere and burn upon re-entry. But a low orbit policy, metaphorically and otherwise, hews more closely to ground reality which is that, with the border dispute, the India-China relationship is dictated by the line of actual control (LAC) and what transpires around it.

The ongoing incident in Chumar with Xi in India, suggests China is playing a different game to what New Delhi believes it is in. For Beijing its territorial claims on Arunachal Pradesh and in Aksai Chin are uncompromisable (hence, “stapled visas” for Arunachalis) because accepting the status quo as boundary solution with India would pressure Beijing into accommodating several Southeast Asian nations on its extensive “nine-dash line” claims in the South China Sea. So, a resolution of the dispute can be safely pushed out to the remote future, with Special Representative talks only offering cover for lack of progress. 

Modi’s plea for increased Chinese investments in infrastructure and manufacturing sectors and for shifting Chinese manufacturing plants to India as means of balancing Sino-Indian trade grossly favouring China was met partially with promises of foreign direct investment in industrial parks, etc. But there’s an irreconcilable clash of visions here.

Modi’s view of turning India into an international manufacturing hub generating massive employment runs smack into Xi’s vision for an “Asian century of prosperity” premised on coupling China’s “workshop” to India’s “backoffice”—the hackneyed Indian software wedded to Chinese hardware type of thinking. In other words, Xi is for freezing China-India economic ties on the basis of current national strengths, which surely is unacceptable.

Russian fighters intercepted by US near Alaska

Sep 20, 2014

WASHINGTON: Two Russian fighters entered a US "air defense identification zone" two days ago and were intercepted by American F-22 jets near Alaska, military officers said on Friday.

The incursion on Wednesday was followed by a second incident on Thursday involving two Russian long-range bombers, which flew into Canada's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), officers said.

Two Canadian F-18 fighter jets intercepted the bombers, which flew out of the area without incident, according to Major Jamie Humphries, a spokesman for the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

The Russian warplanes on Wednesday at no point entered US sovereign air space or Canadian air space, Humphries told AFP.

In Wednesday's encounter, the Russian fighters were accompanied by two refueling tankers and two long-range bombers, he said.

Although Russian aircraft have entered the zone previously it was "the first time in a long time" that fighter jets passed through the area, said a US defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

To safeguard a country's air space, air defense identification zones extend beyond territorial air space and are designed as a buffer to give a government more time to respond to potentially hostile aircraft. But the zones do not fall under international treaties and are not regulated under international law.

The Russian aircraft flights coincided with a visit by Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko to Washington, where he made an impassioned address Thursday before a joint session of the US Congress, denouncing Russia's military intervention in his country.

But Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby said there was no indication of a link between Poroshenko's visit to Washington and the air incidents.

"We've faced these kinds of incidents before. We take them very, very seriously. And we routinely intercept them," Kirby told CNN.

"We'll make our intentions known to Russia as we always do and we'll certainly discuss our concerns with them at the appropriate time and in the appropriate venue."

It was unclear if the Russian aircraft were in the area due to exercises announced by Moscow in far-eastern regions, including the off-shore naval training grounds of the Kamchatka region.

The Vostok-2014 exercise started on Friday and was scheduled to last through September 25 and included 100,000 troops and 120 aircraft, according to the Russian defense ministry.

Obama anti-IS coalition takes shape as France joins war

Sep 19, 2014

French jets carried out their first air strike against Islamic State militants in Iraq.

BAGHDAD: France carried out its first air strike against the Islamic State group in Iraq on Fridat, boosting US-led efforts to unite the world against the growing threat posed by the jihadists. 

More than a decade after Paris famously refused to back the invasion of Iraq, France became the first nation to join the US aerial campaign in the war-torn country. 

"This morning at 9:40, our Rafale planes carried out a first strike against a logistics depot of the terrorist organisation Daesh (IS)," President Francois Hollande said. 

The statement from his office said the target was in northeastern Iraq but did specify exactly where, only adding: "The objective was hit and completely destroyed." 

France, as well as Britain, had already sent aircraft into Iraq's skies for surveillance missions but today's strike was its first offensive operation against the jihadists. 

US aircraft have carried out more than 170 strikes since August 8 but President Barack Obama has been keen to build a broad international coalition. 

The bombing campaign was launched to protect Iraqi Kurdistan from advancing jihadists and attempt to help the autonomous region's troops retake the ground they lost. 

Jihadists who had already controlled large swathes of land in neighbouring Syria took the city of Mosul, Iraq's second largest, on June 10 and swept through much of the Sunni heartland virtually unopposed. 

In a second push in August, they dealt Iraq's Kurdish peshmerga forces a string of military defeats and attacked various minority groups, demolished heritage sites and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. 

Footage of the beheading of two US journalists and a British aid worker in Syria sparked international outrage and spurred calls for tougher action against what is widely regarded as the most violent and powerful organisation in modern jihad.

Talking trade and peace with China

SRINATH RAGHAVAN

From India’s standpoint, attracting Chinese investment is imperative for reviving growth. Besides, its deepening ties with Japan, Australia and Vietnam have opened up more room for manoeuvre in Asia

Xi Jinping’s visit was billed as the third by a Chinese President. This may be right in a technical sense; not so from a historical perspective. Mr. Xi is actually the fourth Chinese President to visit India. The first was Chiang Kai-Shek, President of the Republic of China.

Chiang visited India in early 1942 — soon after Japan entered the Second World War. As the Tokyo typhoon swept Southeast Asia, India became vital for China’s survival. Chiang travelled to India seeking to persuade the Indian National Congress to fully support the British war effort. His long meetings with Nehru and with Gandhi did not yield much. And Chiang returned with little more than the spinning wheel that Gandhi had gifted to his wife.

India’s strategic role

Yet the visits by Presidents Chiang and Mr. Xi have more in common than the Gandhian spinning wheel. For one thing, they underscore India’s importance in any Asian security architecture. In the 1940s, when the hegemon in Asia — Britain — was knocked off its perch by a rising power, India played a pivotal strategic role in stopping Japan in its tracks. Today the situation is very different. Yet, as China’s swaggering rise rattles its neighbours, India is seen as a key player in ensuring a balanced regional order.

Further, both the visits point to the strategic quadrangle of China, Japan, India and the United States. In 1942, China sought American assistance in enabling India to hold Japan at bay. Now it is India and Japan that are working together against any unilateral Chinese attempt to rewrite the rules of the game in Asia. And the Americans are keenly backing their moves.

These wider considerations clearly underpin Mr. Xi’s desire to woo India. At any rate, his visit may turn out to be rather more successful than the maiden foray by Chiang. From China’s standpoint, India now appears an attractive destination for investment. Prime Minister Modi has given unprecedented political salience to infrastructure and industry. So, the Chinese are well placed to play to their strengths. From India’s standpoint, attracting Chinese investment is imperative for reviving growth. Besides, its deepening ties with Japan, Australia and Vietnam have opened up more room for manoeuvre in Asia.

In commerce, testing the waters

Yet, for a range of reasons, it may be prudent to temper expectations. First, China is not rushing to open its coffers to India. Prior to the visit, Chinese officials had claimed that Mr. Xi would commit to invest at least $100 billion. But the five-year plan inked by the two sides envisages $20 billion of Chinese investment. Clearly, Beijing is waiting to see if New Delhi can walk the talk. This is not surprising. Outside of Gujarat, China’s experience with big ticket investments has not been encouraging. This is precisely why the Prime Minister received Mr. Xi in Ahmedabad. Moreover, China — unlike Japan — does not have long experience of working in India.

Nevertheless, China’s inclination to test the waters implies that India’s trade deficit may not be adequately offset by capital inflows. To be sure, the Chinese have also agreed to improve market access for Indian firms. But it remains to be seen whether they will deliver on this. The economic imbalance between India and China, then, may not be set right anytime soon.

Xi Jinping in India: A Breakthrough in Relations?

By Saurav Jha

September 18, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/xi-jinping-in-india-a-breakthrough-in-relations/ 

The Chinese president is in India hoping to manage a complex economic and security relationship. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping is visiting an India that for the first time in 25 years has given a clear mandate to a single party. He is meeting with a prime minister, Narendra Modi, who is known both for his hardline nationalist stance on foreign policy issues and a geo-economic sagacity. Moreover Modi’s government is also being actively courted by Shinzo Abe’s Japan at a time when the new normal for Sino-Japanese ties involves dangerous maneuvers in disputed East Asian waters.

As such, the Chinese side is clearly keen to position itself as an alternative capital and economic partner for an India looking to boost industrial growth and employment. Modi’s recent visit to Japan has created in China concern that an investment relationship between India and Japan might lead to a full-blown “democratic” alliance in the waters of the Indo-Pacific. India, though keen to develop its commercial partnerships in East Asia, will remain committed to freedom of navigation on the high seas and will adopt an increasingly reciprocal stance vis-à-vis China on economic and security issues. Indeed, while the visit will see much stress on economic complementarity and bonhomie with respect to institutions that promote a multi-polar world, the jostling for incremental advantage in the Asian panorama between India and China will continue.

India and China are expected to sign up to 20 agreements during this visit, many focused on cooperation in infrastructure, energy and water. The economic context was made somewhat explicit when Xi announced on the eve of the visit that China intended to invest $100 billion in India over the next five years. This was clearly aimed at upstaging Japanese investment plans of some $37 billion in India in the coming years. The Chinese are also stressing their ability to complete mega projects more cheaply and speedily than anybody else.

India’s Soft Power Advantage

By Kadira Pethiyagoda

September 17, 2014

Deeply entrenched factors make India a uniquely attractive great-power partner. 

During Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s recent visit to India, he was asked to justify Australia’s signing of a deal to sell uranium to the country. In response, theprime minister said, “India threatens no one” and “is the friend to many.” This was no mere diplomatic nicety, but a carefully chosen answer based on India’s international image. It is an image that is rare amongst great powers of India’s size and strength, and will give Delhi a unique soft power advantage in the future multipolar world.

Much of the globe sees India as a relatively non-violent, tolerant and pluralistic democracy with a benign international influence. Its values are seen as largely positive.

The U.S., with its Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, accorded India special treatment in nuclear cooperation. The deal provided benefits usually reserved for Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories. Washington justified cooperation with India by highlighting Delhi’s impeccable non-proliferation record. This stance was replicated by other states, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member states who allowed India’s participation in international nuclear commerce and supported the Indo-U.S. deal. The NSG decided to re-engage with India following an India-specific safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA’s Board of Governors endorsed a nuclear safeguards agreement with India by consensus that would permit Delhi to add more nuclear facilities to be placed under the IAEA safeguards framework. India did not have to have an Additional Protocol like the non-nuclear weapons states who are NPT signatories. India also received favorable treatment from Canada (which agreed to supply “dual-use items” that can be used for civilian and military applications), Japan and South Korea.

This cooperation was not merely driven by these states’ strategic relationships with the U.S. Russia has long cooperated with India on nuclear technology. Even China, as a member of the NSG, did not oppose the group’s decision on India. Today, India is the only known nuclear weapons state that is not part of the NPT but is still permitted to engage in nuclear commerce globally.