Indian Strategic Studies

9 November 2024

Understanding India’s Approach to Nuclear Strategy

Alex Alfirraz Scheers

At the recent BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, India and China held formal talks for the first time in five years. While Beijing and New Delhi are major trading partners, that partnership is characterized by a lopsidedness that weighs in China’s favor. In recent years, their relationship has also been tense. Unsettled border disputes led to skirmishes in 2020, 2021, and 2022, with the former arguably the worst confrontation between the regional powers in decades.

The countries are natural rivals, with the two largest populations in the world – together comprising approximately 36 percent of the global population — and with starkly contrasting political systems and social cultures. China has been a one-party state since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, while India is the world’s biggest democracy, and has been since its independence in 1947. With China’s meteoric rise, India has been orienting its strategic position with the aim of elevating its own global standing.

Indeed, China’s ascendancy comes about as India is concurrently planning its own. Hence, it would be unwise to be wholly convinced by the BRICS Summit’s optics. These fractious neighbors are also nuclear powers and are actively seeking to expand and modernize their nuclear forces. China’s nuclear journey plays a considerable role in India’s own strategic outlook. While Pakistan has always been India’s greatest security concern, China’s threat has imbued military and political strategists in New Delhi with a renewed focus. To compound New Delhi’s concerns, Islamabad and Beijing have a longstanding strategic partnership. The perceived threat from China has initiated developments approximating a regional security dilemma. These realities should not be ignored, regardless of the BRICS Summit.

Many Ways to Fail: The Costs to China of an Unsuccessful Taiwan Invasion

Lonnie Henley

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be an extremely difficult military, complex operation. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been thinking seriously since the early 2000s about what such a landing would require. For over two decades, its force development efforts have been focused on the weapons, equipment, doctrine and operational concepts required to conquer the island in the face of full U.S. military intervention. The PLA has made considerable progress toward that goal and may deem itself fully capable by the 2027 force development target set by Xi Jinping.

Even after the PLA has reached its development targets, however, an invasion of Taiwan would remain an extremely difficult undertaking with a high risk of failure. The PLA may not perform up to its own standards, or the uncertainties in such a complex operation may turn out more challenging than anticipated, or sheer bad luck and the fog of war may thwart the best of plans. A failed attempt to take Taiwan by force could have dire consequences for China’s global standing and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) hold on power.

There are many ways a Chinese invasion could go wrong, so many that it is difficult to offer more than a long list and brief description of topics that deserve much fuller treatment. What follows is far from exhaustive but it attempts to group these into coherent bins and focus on the most salient vulnerabilities in the invasion effort.

How Do Media Organizations Define Taiwan?

Ben Alperstein

Taiwan’s political status has served as a point of contention among governments, organizations, and people alike. Companies and celebrities referring to Taiwan as a country have landed in hot water with China, and many have quickly offered apologies and retractions. Government officials largely stick closely to official talking points, similarly walking back any comments that stray too far in either direction. Alternatively, everyday people are welcome to refer to Taiwan however they like, and – to the growing extent that awareness exists in the first place – so too does considerable confusion over its status.

Media organizations thus occupy a difficult position. On one hand, journalists have a responsibility to provide accurate depictions, without bowing to the same concerns that others face. On the other hand, the decision to define Taiwan in any form may feel like a subjective choice, given the ongoing debate over its status. This issue has only become more prominent in recent years amid increased global interest in Taiwan.

This raises an important question: How do different countries’ media organizations define Taiwan?

To pursue this, I compiled roughly 1,500 articles between 2019-2023 from 16 media organizations around the globe, analyzing six nouns (country, nation, democracy, island, territory, and province) and the resulting multi-word terminology, or phrases that include these nouns. In short, my research finds that media references to Taiwan serve as a reflection of countries’ own relations. For countries strongly aligned with either Taiwan or China, for example, outlets define Taiwan through straightforward nouns like simply “country” or “island.”

Inside China’s cognitive warfare strategy

Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu

Amid rising geopolitical tensions, much attention is being paid to the need to rebuild and revitalize Western defense industries, particularly in the United States and Europe. The growing threat of conflict with China, especially over Taiwan, has sharpened this focus. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made clear that China is preparing for “worst-case and extreme scenarios,” ready to face “high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms.” Its military is fast modernizing, with a shipbuilding capacity that outstrips that of the U.S. by a factor of 200, and a nuclear arsenal expanding faster than that of any other nation. Meanwhile, the U.S. lacks the shipyards needed to build and maintain its fleets, and Europe’s military capacity is weak, at best.

In this context, the Western preoccupation with bolstering its military hardware is understandable. Yet what such a focus overlooks is that, for Beijing, the true battlefield is not one of missiles or ships, but in the domains of information and cognitive warfare. People’s Liberation Army manuals describe cognitive warfare as its “fundamental function” and “the basis for the ability to accomplish military tasks.”

Soon after he took control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), President Xi urged China’s military to expand an “ideological concept of information warfare,” to spread Beijing’s preferred narratives and silence global dissent, as well as one of cognitive warfare, to shape the perceptions and behaviors of its adversaries.

If Trump Wins, What Will His China Policies Be?

Bonnie Girard

For many critics of the Chinese Communist Party around the world, the Trump administration of 2016 to 2021 provided a welcome package of strong new policies in its reset of the China-U.S. relationship along the lines of an “America First” agenda.

Although Donald Trump has recently been making fleeting remarks that suggest he is open to finding a deal with China if he becomes president of the United States again, those statements should be taken as an opening gambit only. From the beginning of Trump’s administration in January 2017 to the very last day of it in January 2021, Trump pulled no punches in dealing blows to China on a comprehensive list of agenda items.

Trump tackled China on the toughest of issues, not just the tariffs which are the best-known policies of his China package. Trump went after China on genocide in Xinjiang and the National Security Law in Hong Kong effectively censoring free speech in the former British colony, enacted after massive protests against Beijing. His administration also blocked certain Chinese telecommunications companies from doing business in the United States.

European politicians learn Trump’s victory is a glimpse of Europe’s future

Henry Olsen

Europeans awakening to the reality of Donald Trump’s victory will be asking themselves what it means for them. The obvious answer is that US policy and attitudes towards European countries and the European Union dramatically change.

The less obvious but more poignant answer is that his win is a glimpse of Europe’s future.

Trump won because he painstakingly built a multiracial conservative populist coalition. That coalition is rooted in America’s working class — the people who never graduated from university and perform the hard labour on their feet and with their hands that undergirds the modern economy.

This is the demographic that fuels Europe’s populist Right. Look at any poll in a recent election and you will see the same thing: voters with less education and moderate incomes who are classified as workers are the foundation of parties like Austria’s FPÖ, France’s National Rally and Sweden’s Sweden Democrats.

What Tehran May Do Next | Opinion

Ilan Berman

What a difference a few weeks can make. As recently as this summer, the world seemed to be going Iran's way.

The campaign of terror carried out by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023, succeeded in denting Israel's aura of military invincibility, while the resulting conflict in Gaza helped isolate Jerusalem on the world stage. Israel's normalization with the Gulf States, which had started to profoundly marginalize the Islamic Republic, also seemed to be a casualty of the new war. Meanwhile, timid American regional policy, and the Biden administration's overriding fear of a wider Mideast war, led to a persistent failure on Washington's part to hold Tehran accountable for its regional troublemaking.

Unsurprisingly, Iran's leaders had begun to make big plans. Their regime was advancing in Latin America, where weak regimes and leftist politics provided ample opportunities for Tehran to expand its influence and stoke anti-Americanism. Iran was insinuating itself into Africa, building ties to substate actors like the Polisario Front, and working to expand military contacts with war-torn Sudan. Officials in Tehran even announced plans to stake a claim to the South Pole.

How Ukraine Became a World War

Michael Kimmage and Hanna Notte

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was an event of global magnitude. The scale of the invasion, commensurate with its goal of eliminating Ukrainian statehood, was massive. Millions of refugees fled Ukraine into the rest of Europe. Fuel and fertilizer prices shot up, stimulating inflation worldwide. The war disrupted the production and distribution of grain, generating concerns about supply far afield from Russia and Ukraine. And as the conflict stretched into its second and third years, its international repercussions have expanded in scope.

In the war’s early stages, countries outside Europe tried mostly just to manage its effects. For those that chose not to directly back Ukraine—not to provide Kyiv with weapons or to sanction Russia—two priorities predominated. Seeing that there were deals to be made, some countries sought to benefit from Russia’s loss of European and U.S. markets for gas, oil, and other commodities. Others offered themselves as mediators in the sincere (or insincere) hope of minimizing the war’s direct and ancillary costs or even of ending it altogether. Their diplomacy was motivated in part by the prestige that comes from adjudicating a large-scale conflict.

As Donald Trump Returns, Israel Reshapes Its War Cabinet: What’s Next?

Seth J. Frantzman

Hours before polls closed in the United States on November 5, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu informed Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant that he was fired from the cabinet. Gallant had become a well-known face throughout the war on Hamas. Gaunt and black-clad in the wake of the Hamas 10/7 massacre, he often visited soldiers in the field and kept his hand firmly on the helm of military operations.

Netanyahu said that he dismissed Gallant because trust had eroded between them. They had different priorities for the war effort and different visions for Israeli strategy. Gallant preferred a hostage deal and pushed for a day-after plan for Gaza. He also wanted to draft ultra-Orthodox Jews, who historically have an exemption from the army in Israel. This put him at odds with other members of Netanyahu’s coalition government. “...During the past several months, this trust between myself and the Defense Minister has begun to crack,” Netanyahu said.

With Gallant gone, there will be a shakeup in Israel’s political landscape. This is because Gallant brought with him many decades of experience as a soldier and officer to the position. He will likely be replaced by a politician rather than a former general, putting the war effort more firmly in Netanyahu’s hands. During the first months of the war in Gaza, Israel had a war cabinet that included two former generals (Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot). They left the war cabinet in June.

How Trump Won

Eric Cortellessa

It was the moment he had fantasized about for four years. At 2:24 a.m. on Nov. 6, Donald Trump strutted on stage in a Florida ballroom, surrounded by advisers, party leaders, family and friends. The Associated Press had yet to call the race, but it was clear by then that the voters had swept him back into power. Staring out at a sea of supporters sporting red MAGA hats, Trump basked in the all-but-certain triumph. “We’ve achieved the most incredible political thing,” Trump said. “America has given us an unprecedented and powerful mandate.”

How Trump, 78, won re-election will be the stuff of history books, and already America’s choice can be traced to some key decisions. To Trump’s top aides, the thesis of the campaign could be summed up in a simple slogan: “Max out the men and hold the women.” That meant emphasizing the economy and immigration, which Trump did relentlessly. It meant diverting attention away from the chaos of his first term, the abortion bans he ushered in, and his assault on American democracy four years ago. It meant a campaign that rode the resentment of disenchanted voters and capitalized on the cultural fractures and tribal politics that Trump has long exploited.

5 Generative AI Trends to Watch in 2025

Megan Crouse

What is the future of generative AI? Today’s generative AI trends and the risks AI can bring may shape the development of enterprise technology next year.

Generative AI is as trendy as it has ever been.

This year, research into AI was awarded Nobel Prizes, and the largest tech companies in the world pumped AI into as many products as possible. The U.S. government promoted AI as a driver in creating a clean-energy economy and a strategic pillar for federal spending. But what’s next for 2025?

The trend of generative AI in the last few months of 2024 points to a greater push for adoption from tech companies. Meanwhile, the results as to whether AI products and processes see ROI for enterprise software buyers are mixed. While it’s difficult to foresee how AI will continue to shape the tech industry, experts have offered predictions based on current trends.

Respondents to an IEEE study in September rated AI as one of the top three areas of technology that will be most critical in 2025 in 58% of cases. Conversely, nearly all respondents (91%) agree that 2025 will see “a generative AI reckoning” regarding what the technology can or should do. Expectations for generative AI are high, but the success of projects leveraging it remains uncertain.

The Return of Peace Through Strength

Robert C. O’Brien

Si vis pacem, para bellum is a Latin phrase that emerged in the fourth century that means “If you want peace, prepare for war.” The concept’s origin dates back even further, to the second-century Roman emperor Hadrian, to whom is attributed the axiom, “Peace through strength—or, failing that, peace through threat.”

U.S. President George Washington understood this well. “If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known, that we are at all times ready for war,” he told Congress in 1793. The idea was echoed in President Theodore Roosevelt’s famous dictum: “Speak softly, and carry a big stick.” And as a candidate for president, Ronald Reagan borrowed directly from Hadrian when he promised to achieve “peace through strength”—and later delivered on that promise.

In 2017, President Donald Trump brought this ethos back to the White House after the Obama era, during which the United States had a president who felt it necessary to apologize for the alleged sins of American foreign policy and sapped the strength of the U.S. military. That ended when Trump took office. As he proclaimed to the UN General Assembly in September 2020, the United States was “fulfilling its destiny as peacemaker, but it is peace through strength.”

An “America First” World

Hal Brands

What would become of the world if the United States became a normal great power? This isn’t to ask what would happen if the United States retreated into outright isolationism. It’s simply to ask what would happen if the country behaved in the same narrowly self-interested, frequently exploitive way as many great powers throughout history—if it rejected the idea that it has a special responsibility to shape a liberal order that benefits the wider world. That would be an epic departure from 80 years of American strategy. But it’s not an outlandish prospect anymore.

The Next World War Starts Her

Matthew Kaminski

East Asia is the most serious threat to world peace. An eruption here is hotter and bigger than anything the Middle East or Europe would conceivably produce.

The Biden administration leaves behind a strong diplomatic legacy in Asia, in contrast to its failure in Afghanistan and mixed record in Ukraine and the Middle East. It built webs of security alliances across the region to deter China and forged what has proved elusive for decades — a rapprochement, if not warm friendship, between historical foes and America’s closest Asian allies, South Korea and Japan.

Huge challenges loom for Joe Biden’s successor here. The scale of the forces lining up against each other in the northern Pacific is terrifying. China is forging a deeper alliance of American adversaries in North Korea and Russia, making threats against Taiwan and staking stronger claims on territory in the South China Sea. America’s actions in other geopolitical theaters — above all Ukraine — will reverberate in East Asia.

The Self-Defense of American Democracy

Jenna Bednar and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar

Many Americans are afraid of what the aftermath of the 2024 U.S. presidential election could bring. Alongside familiar concerns about their country’s priorities, reflected in the candidates’ differing policy prescriptions, they worry that one of the candidates may refuse to accept the results as legitimate. With the memory of the violent January 6, 2021, insurrection at the Capitol still fresh, many voters fear that the peaceful transfer of power will again be under attack.

How the War in Ukraine Could Go Nuclear—by Accident

William M. Moon

A nuclear state’s greatest responsibility is to keep its warheads secure. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it has put approximately 30 percent of its estimated 5,580 warheads in an untenably precarious position. Early in the war, concerns that the invasion increased the danger of a nuclear detonation or accidental explosion focused on the risk to Ukraine’s four nuclear power plants and Russia’s threats to intentionally escalate the conflict past the nuclear threshold. But the more Ukraine seeks to hit targets inside Russia, the clearer it becomes that Russia’s unwillingness to adequately secure the nuclear arsenals it has stored in its west—which are now within striking distance of Ukrainian missiles and drones and even Ukrainian troops—poses a dire risk.

Every week, Russia is launching up to 800 guided aerial bombs and over 500 attack drones at Ukrainian cities and energy plants. In response, Ukraine has begun launching up to hundreds of drones daily at carefully selected Russian targets. Ukraine has every right to defend itself in this manner, and there is no indication that Ukrainian forces would intentionally target nuclear warhead storage sites. Because Ukrainian drone assaults have already reached as far as Moscow, however, it is clear that at least 14 Russian nuclear storage sites now fall within range of its drones. At least two of those sites are less than 100 miles from the Ukrainian border, well within striking range of the more damaging missiles Ukraine already possesses, and another five sites lie less than 200 miles from the border, close to or just beyond the range of the advanced Western-provided missiles that Ukraine is seeking permission to use against conventional targets in Russia.

Netanyahu ousts defense minister, a political rival and fierce war critic

Shira Rubin and Lior Soroka

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday dismissed Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, one of the most vocal and prominent critics of his war strategy and the country’s primary interlocutor with the Biden administration on military matters amid a widening conflict in the Middle East.

“In the midst of war, full trust between the prime minister and the defense minister is needed more than ever,” Netanyahu said in a video posted to X. “In recent months, this trust has eroded.”

Netanyahu said he decided to end Gallant’s tenure on Tuesday, and that he would be replaced by Foreign Minister Israel Katz, a close ally with little military experience. He added that Gideon Saar, a former Netanyahu disciple, would replace Katz as foreign minister.

The surprise late-night announcement, released as Washington and much of the rest of the world was preoccupied with the U.S. presidential election, sent immediate shock waves across Israel. Thousands of protesters turned out in Tel Aviv, and prominent members of the security establishment condemned the move as an effort by Netanyahu to ensure his political survival at a time of growing national peril — with the country engaged in grinding wars in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon and, increasingly, in direct conflict with Iran.

Whether Harris or Trump wins, Americans must unite to confront the enemies abroad

Joseph Bosco

The tyrannical rulers of the anti-West Axis of Evil — Russia, China, Iran and North Korea — have a stake in America’s Election Day. They are hard at work pursuing their shared goal of undermining and defeating America, from without and from within. The wars in the Middle East and Ukraine are the present arenas for military confrontation that is indirect — so far.

Though no U.S. troops are on the ground in either place, the flow of arms and material resources to America’s allies and partners has become an increasing financial drain and a distraction of diplomatic and political attention.

Former officials and other national security experts have complained that weapons sent to Ukraine are weakening our ability to help defend Taiwan from an attack by China, which they see as a greater threat to U.S. national security than Russia. Taiwan is a critical supplier of computer chips not only to the U.S. but to the world economy. And its strategic location as part of the first island chain that lies between China and the open ocean makes it a vital target in Beijing’s expansionist drive in the Indo-Pacific.

In Next President’s Inbox: 10 Global Nightmares

Tom Nagorski

As a divided nation hurtles towards the election, and officials worry about politically-driven violence, potential nightmares abound for the next commander-in-chief. Put simply, the 47th president of the United States will face an unprecedented array of global and national security threats.

Major wars are raging in Europe and the Middle East, powerful U.S. adversaries are acting in concert, China poses threats on many fronts, and fresh dangers lurk in the realms of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence as well.

This Retired General Settled the 9/11 Case. Then the Defense Secretary Took Charge

Carol Rosenberg

Susan Escallier excelled at being an Army lawyer. During her 32 years in uniform, she had jumped out of airplanes, deployed to Iraq three times and was a devoted, competitive runner. Then she suffered a stroke and had to retire in 2021.

So, a year ago, when she was offered a job as the Pentagon official in charge of the war court system at Guantánamo Bay, it was her ticket back to serving the military. It was a thankless job, largely unseen and even less understood.

For months, Ms. Escallier quietly oversaw years-old cases. Then she made one of the most important decisions in the court’s history, setting off events that have drawn attention to her role and to the dysfunctional military commissions.

On July 31, Ms. Escallier approved a prosecution plea deal with the man accused of masterminding the Sept. 11 plot, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and two other defendants. In exchange for pleading guilty, they would serve life in prison instead of someday possibly facing a death sentence.

Meta Permits Its A.I. Models to Be Used for U.S. Military Purpose

Mike Isaac

Meta will allow U.S. government agencies and contractors working on national security to use its artificial intelligence models for military purposes, the company said on Monday, in a shift from its policy that prohibited the use of its technology for such efforts.

Meta said that it would make its A.I. models, called Llama, available to federal agencies and that it was working with defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Booz Allen as well as defense-focused tech companies including Palantir and Anduril. The Llama models are “open source,” which means the technology can be freely copied and distributed by other developers, companies and governments.

Meta’s move is an exception to its “acceptable use policy,” which forbade the use of the company’s A.I. software for “military, warfare, nuclear industries,” among other purposes.

In a blog post on Monday, Nick Clegg, Meta’s president of global affairs, said the company now backed “responsible and ethical uses” of the technology that supported the United States and “democratic values” in a global race for A.I. supremacy.

How Trump Will Change the World

Peter D. Feaver

Agray rhino—a predictable and long-foreseen disruption that is still shocking when it occurs—has crashed into American foreign policy: Donald Trump has won a second term as president of the United States. Despite polls predicting a nail-biter, the final results were fairly decisive, and although we do not know the precise composition of the new order, we know Trump will be at the top of it.

Trump’s win in 2016 was far more of a surprise, and much of the debate in the weeks after Election Day revolved around the questions of how he would govern and how dramatically he might seek to alter the United States’ role in the world. Owing to Trump’s unpredictability, erratic style, and less-than-coherent thinking, some of those same questions remain open today. But we have far more information now after four years of watching him lead, four more years of analyzing his time in office, and a year of witnessing his third campaign for the White House. With that data, it’s possible make some predictions about what Trump will try to do in his second term. The known unknown is how the rest of the world will react and what the ultimate outcome will be.

Is Turkey’s Military the World’s Latest Paper Tiger?

Michael Rubin

A video circulating on Telegram and other social media suggests North Korean Special Forces dispatched to fight Ukraine on Russia’s behalf have seen their first combat. The video purports to interview the single North Korean survivor from a unit of 40 compatriots who encountered Ukrainian forces near the Ukraine-occupied Russian town of Kursk. While unclear if the video is authentic—some suggest it is psychological warfare—it is believable. While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky urges the world to intercede before more North Korean units can reach the battlefield, military analysts wait to see how North Koreans do in battle. After all, despite their fearsome displays and bellicose rhetoric, it has been decades since the North Korean Army engaged in open combat. North Koreans are increasingly shorter and lighter than their South Korean neighbors are.

North Korea is not the only country that coasts on reputation. As much as the United States fears China’s rise, the fighting ability of the People’s Liberation Army is an unknown. It is perhaps the only army in the world entirely comprised of only children. The last time the People’s Republic of China fought an open war—a month-long conflict with Vietnam in 1979—China lost. Since then, China has only engaged small and unarmed or only lightly armed opponents—Filipino coast guard speedboats, Vietnamese fishing boats, or small squads of Indian soldiers high up in the Himalayas. China can bluster about conquering Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army can cause incredible devastation with missiles and drones, but their ability to occupy the country is a different matter. The second the People’s Liberation Army engages, Beijing knows, their carefully crafted image of invincibility might crater.

The Theoretical Edge: Why Junior Officers Should Study Military Classics

Jack Tribolet

Throughout history, war has tested human ingenuity, often deciding the fate of empires, nations, and ideologies. Imagine looking out over an active battlefield, the air thick with tension and kinetic projectiles. Each choice could alter history, and you suddenly have a consequential decision to make with lives on the line. This is not only a hypothetical scenario but a possibility for which junior officers must be mentally prepared. While proficiency in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) is essential, broadening their understanding of the warfighting domains is equally important. This broader understanding can be achieved by studying military theory in a challenging era where the history discipline is contracting.1

Studying prominent military theorists before mid-level Professional Military Education would give junior officers a comprehensive understanding of the warfighting domains, enhancing their situational awareness and decision-making abilities. By studying theorists like Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and John Boyd before mid-level Professional Military Education (PME), junior officers can enhance their situational awareness and decision-making capabilities, increasing their lethality.

Drones Are Not Artillery Yet

L. Lance Boothe

“Mushroom clouds are rising above the ground; doors in Staraia Toropa are shaking. Part of the military personnel fled during the night, abandoning the vehicles they arrived in. Everything is burning,” an unidentified villager tells Russian Telegram channel VChK-OGPU.[1] These things happen when munitions are left laying out in the open in a depot and stacked-up on not-so-secret railway platforms.[2] Welcome to war. A drone pack set in motion by Ukrainian special forces claims another arsenal deep in Russian territory.

A few days prior on 18 September 2024, Ukrainian special forces attacked warehouses in Toropets, Russia, belonging to the 107th Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) 500 km from Ukraine.[3] One hundred Ukrainian produced drones descended on this ammunition depot, setting it ablaze after triggering earthquake producing explosions.[4] Clearly, at over 300 miles from the fight, the Russians did not see this coming despite claiming some of the drones were taken down by jamming. In war, belligerents constantly surprise each other as Clausewitz reminds us, so in this aspect there is nothing new here. But are we seeing a new evolution in drone warfare?

8 November 2024

A Donald Trump presidency threatens Indian economy. Just see his record - Opinion

Amitabh Dubey

Indian Americans are reportedly voting for Kamala Harris over Donald Trump by a margin of 2 to 1. Some Indians, though, are dizzy with admiration for Trump. After all, his White supremacist appeal is the mirror-image of their majoritarian drive in India.

But Trump is bad news for New Delhi, especially in his second coming. He will likely initiate a trade war — primarily with China but also with India, whom he described on 17 September as a “very big abuser” of bilateral trade. The consequences for India of his promised 10-20 per cent global import tariffs will very likely be rupee volatility, tighter monetary policy and therefore slower economic growth in India. Notably, Harris is proposing nothing of this kind — her main economic quibble will be India’s record trade with Russia in the context of the Ukraine war.

Theoretically, a trade war between the United States and China could help India. Trump has promised a higher 60 per cent tariff on imports from China. This could encourage companies pursuing “China+1” policies — offsetting their dependence on Beijing by investing more in other emerging markets — to diversify toward India. However, supply chains are difficult to build in high-tariff environments. High tariffs on imported parts make it less attractive to build products for export. And Trump or not, India has taken a far more protectionist turn under Prime Minister Narendra Modi — something we will discuss below.

India’s Canada Policy Is a Strategic Mistake

Dr. Muqtedar Khan and Shivani Pandey

India is embroiled in a steadily escalating diplomatic spat with Canada. Over a year ago, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau accused Indian officials of being involved in the assassination of a Sikh community leader, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, in June 2023 and demanded that the Indian government cooperate with Canada in its investigations of the Nijjar murder and other similar attempts.

India rejected the allegations as absurd and accused Canada of harboring Khalistani separatists wanted for terrorism in India. The first iteration of the spat led to the expulsion of diplomats and a reduction in the size of their respective diplomatic presence.

Escalating Crisis

The crisis has continued with periodic flare-ups and has now metastasized into a diplomatic disaster with no easy pathways to early resolution and normalization. For over a year Canada has been demanding that the Indian government cooperate with it in its investigation. The Modi government has responded by insisting that Canada had provided no evidence to substantiate its claims and so there was nothing that the Indian government could do to help.

In the past few weeks the Canadian investigative agencies claimed that they have presented the Indian government with the evidence they have and still India rejected it outright. The Canadians first announced that Indian High Commissioner Sanjay Verma (the highest Indian diplomat in Canada) was a person of interest along with several other diplomats who have since returned to India. According to media reports, Canadian officials met with India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval in Singapore and shared with him the evidence they had gathered.

Trouble Among the Chin of Myanmar

Michael Martin

Trouble is brewing within the Chin resistance movement. Two rival factions have emerged, contending for control of Chin State and the nature of a post-revolutionary government for a future State of Chinland. The rivalry manifests itself in several ways, including conflicting claims over territory, disagreements over governmental representation, and allegations of collaboration with perceived enemies. Underlying the rivalry are long-standing tensions between the various Chin tribes.

The Chin has a long history of opposition to military dictatorships in Myanmar. The Chin National Front (CNF) and its militia, the Chin National Army (CNA), were formed in March 1988 to wage armed resistance against Myanmar’s military junta. Following the military coup in February 2021, the people in dozens of towns and villages in Chin State formed local militias, commonly referred to as People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). Many of these PDFs subsequently consolidated into township-based military units known as the Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs). Some of the CDFs received military training and supplies from the CNF and CNA.

All That Glitters May Not Be Gold For Japan’s Semiconductor Revival – Analysis

Joseph Negrine

In the new age of industrial policy, advanced economies are driving public–private partnerships and abandoning notions of laissez-faire competition. As of September 2024, the Japanese government has spent over US$25 billion on subsidising semiconductors, the ‘new oil’ integral to civilian and military technologies. While the potential economic gains from Japan’s semiconductor manufacturing revival are colossal, Japan must not overlook the potential negative economic and security externalities.

Semiconductor dominance is a crucial aspect of geopolitical and economic superiority in the US–China ‘technological cold war’. Global disruptions like the Russia–Ukraine war and the COVID-19 pandemic have underscored the need for resilient supply chains. In 2021, chip shortages that increased semiconductor lead times cost the global automotive industry over US$200 million. The United States is attempting to stifle China’s semiconductor industry through coordinated export controls with the Netherlands and Japan. Both countries are crucial because they specialise in producing lithography equipment and associated materials that are chokepoints in China’s chip supply chain.

The United States and the Democracy Question in South Asia

S. D. Muni

Ideologically, the United States is a self-proclaimed promoter and protector of democracy in the world. Its democracy policy has evolved over the past century. The U.S. fought World War II, in part, to defend democracy against fascism and waged a three-decade-long struggle during the Cold War against communism.

Soon after the Cold War, U.S. President George H. W. Bush proposed a “New World Order” based on “freedom, peace and democracy.” His successor, President Bill Clinton, said at the United Nations on September 27, 1993, that the “overriding purpose” of U.S. foreign policy was to “expand and strengthen the world’s community of market based democracies.”

In order to advance this purpose, Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright took the initiative of establishing a Community of Democracies (CoD). At the first meeting of the CoD in Warsaw in 2000, 106 countries promised to advance democratic norms and institutions. The United Nations endorsed this intergovernmental organization and later raised a “U.N. Fund for Democracy,” with contributions from members.

In more recent years, President Joe Biden convened the “Summit for Democracy.” The first such summit was convened in a virtual form on December 9-10, 2021. Its objectives were “defending against authoritarianism, addressing and fighting corruption, and advancing respect for human rights.” The second summit was hosted by the United States in collaboration with Costa Rica, Zambia, the Netherlands, and South Korea in March 2023, and the third summit was hosted by South Korea in March 2024, in a hybrid format.

Narrative Intelligence: Detecting Chinese and Russian Information Operations to Disrupt NATO Unity

Joe Stradinger

Introduction

As geopolitical conflicts are increasingly shaped by misleading and deceptive information, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has become an indispensable tool in understanding adversarial information operations and being able to compete in the information environment. Noting the value of OSINT, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) recently published a framework for the intelligence community to leverage commercially available information. Competition in the information environment among major powers is not new or unique. Today, Russia and China strategically employ information operations as part of their attempts to undermine US interests. China has actively used information operations to generate favorable strategic outcomes in Africa. Russian and Chinese messaging is also aligned in exploiting how the Israel-Hamas conflict is characterized. In this competition space, the distinction between signal and noise is more heightened than ever. As the volume of data increases, so does the challenge of identifying what matters — the relevant information that can be synthesized into actionable intelligence. This makes OSINT crucial for tracking and analyzing security threats as well as for monitoring the ebb and flow of online narratives that can influence public opinion and shape national security policy.

China develops new satellite-wrecking Death Star-like microwave weapon

Christopher McFadden

Chinese scientists have reportedly developed a new kind of multi-beam converging microwave weapon. Designed to combine several beams in one location with ultra-precise timing, this weapon could be used to target a single object.

Similar in concept to the super laser from the Death Star battle station of Star Wars fame, the new Chinese weapon has allegedly completed experimental military trials. In Star Wars lore, the Death Star’s main weapon uses kyber crystals (the same used in lightsabers) to generate power.

This is then directed through several laser cannons, that merge at a single point to generate a beam so powerful it can destroy entire planets. While impressive cinematically, this kind of weapon has long been considered a complete fantasy.

According to reports, the new Chinese weapon consists of multiple independent microwave-transmitting vehicles that can be deployed in different locations.

HarmonyOS NEXT: Beijing’s Bid for Operating System Independence

W.Y. Kwok

On October 22, Huawei’s Executive Director Yu Chengdong (余承东) introduced HarmonyOS NEXT, an updated operating system that has been wholly indigenously developed (The Paper, October 22). This milestone marks the culmination of a strategic initiative launched in 2012 when CEO Ren Zhengfei (任正非) first highlighted the risk associated with relying on foreign operating systems (Tencent News, October 22).

HarmonyOS NEXT is the closest the world has come to an operating system that excludes technology from the United States. As such, it is yet another indicator of the further fracturing of international standards at the level of both software and hardware that began over two decades ago with Beijing’s initial forays into building the “great firewall.”

The launch of the new operating system has been well-received within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Yu Chengdong noted triumphantly that “in just one short year, [Huawei] has opened up a whole new world that foreign operating systems took over a decade to achieve (用短短的一年时间，开辟了一片新天地，走过了国外操作系统十几年生态发展的道路)” (STCN, October 22). State broadcaster CCTV hailed the launch as “another landmark achievement in breaking the constraints of ‘lacking a core and a soul’ and the technology monopoly of the West (打破“缺芯少魂”掣肘和欧美技术垄断的又一标志性成果)” (Tencent News, October 24). The phrase “lacking a core and a soul (缺芯少魂)” refers to a speech made by Xu Guanhua, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Minister of Science and Technology in 1999, who noted that the domestic industry lacked its own chip sector (the “core”) and its own operating system (the “soul”) (Xueqiu, December 7, 2022).

Joint Sword-2024B: Quarantining Key Ports and Seizing Comprehensive Superiority

Cheng-kun Ma & K. Tristan Tang

From 5:01 a.m. local time onward on October 14, information releases emerged from state media outlets in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) concerning the “Joint Sword-2024B (联合利剑-2024B)” exercise. These asserted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command had organized forces from the army, navy, air force, and rocket force to conduct operations in the Taiwan Strait, as well as in the northern, southern, and eastern waters surrounding Taiwan. The key areas of focus for the exercise, according to the reports, included “sea-air combat-readiness patrol, a blockade on important ports and areas, an assault on maritime and ground targets, and joint seizure of comprehensive superiority (海空战备警巡、要港要域封控、对海对陆打击、夺取综合制权),” all aimed at testing the joint operational capabilities of theater forces (Xinhua, October 14; China Military Online, October 14).

A 8:00 a.m. on the same day, the China Coast Guard (CCG; 中国海警局) simultaneously released information on its official website and Weibo account, indicating that four groups of CCG vessels conducted patrol operations around Taiwan (China Coast Guard, October 14; Weibo/China Coast Guard, October 14). At 6:06 p.m. that evening, Xinhua News Agency announced that the PLA Eastern Theater Command had successfully concluded the exercise (Xinhua, October 14).

The Art of War: PRC Weaponizes Culture to Galvanize the People

Arran Hope

In his 2003 book From War To Nationalism: China’s Turning Point 1924–5, the historian Arthur Waldron noted that military modernization has been perhaps the single most important engine of change in China since the nineteenth century. [1] Two decades on, this observation seems truer than ever. Today, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is attempting to mobilize the population of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in preparation for battle, while pushing forward an ambitious agenda under the rubric of “modernization.” Underpinning these two interrelated programs is the Party’s ideology, a prominent aspect of which is the place of culture and history—both that of the CCP itself and that of “Chinese civilization” more broadly. The clearest articulation of this in recent years has been the formal introduction of Xi Jinping Thought on Culture at last year’s National Conference on Propaganda, Ideology, and Cultural Work (People’s Daily, October 9, 2023; China Brief, October 20, 2023)

The last month has seen an effusion of writings and events by the Party on this very topic. Issue 20 of this year’s volume of Qiushi (求实), the Party’s flagship theory journal, was published on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the “Symposium on Literary and Artistic Work (文艺工作座谈会),” and includes Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech from that event (Qiushi, October 15).

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