Cheng-kun Ma & K. Tristan Tang
From 5:01 a.m. local time onward on October 14, information releases emerged from state media outlets in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) concerning the “Joint Sword-2024B (่ๅๅฉๅ-2024B)” exercise. These asserted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command had organized forces from the army, navy, air force, and rocket force to conduct operations in the Taiwan Strait, as well as in the northern, southern, and eastern waters surrounding Taiwan. The key areas of focus for the exercise, according to the reports, included “sea-air combat-readiness patrol, a blockade on important ports and areas, an assault on maritime and ground targets, and joint seizure of comprehensive superiority (ๆตท็ฉบๆๅค่ญฆๅทก、่ฆๆธฏ่ฆๅๅฐๆง、ๅฏนๆตทๅฏน้ๆๅป、ๅคบๅ็ปผๅๅถๆ),” all aimed at testing the joint operational capabilities of theater forces (Xinhua, October 14; China Military Online, October 14).
A 8:00 a.m. on the same day, the China Coast Guard (CCG; ไธญๅฝๆตท่ญฆๅฑ) simultaneously released information on its official website and Weibo account, indicating that four groups of CCG vessels conducted patrol operations around Taiwan (China Coast Guard, October 14; Weibo/China Coast Guard, October 14). At 6:06 p.m. that evening, Xinhua News Agency announced that the PLA Eastern Theater Command had successfully concluded the exercise (Xinhua, October 14).
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