Nigel Gould-Davies
The fifth year of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine has begun. It is Russia’s longest continuous major war since the 18th century (the 1979–89 Soviet war in Afghanistan was a sideshow in tempo and casualties by comparison). It is also one of the longest wars between neighbours globally since 1945. In 2025, Russia gained less than 1% of Ukrainian territory and lost over 416,000 troops. Given the length, cost and stasis of the war, how likely is it to end soon?
The driver of the war has not changed over the past four years. Russia seeks to subordinate Ukraine, and Ukraine is determined to resist this. These positions remain incompatible. Both states are materially capable of continuing to fight and judge the costs politically tolerable. The war will end only if Russia wins it or accepts that it cannot win. It cannot currently do the first and refuses to do the second. Since it will not scale back its goals, it must scale up the resources it commits to them. This is a strategy of attrition: generating sustained, superior mass and firepower to grind down an enemy. It is the opposite strategy to the initial invasion plan to seize Kyiv in days. Mass has replaced speed.
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