Modern War Institute | ROBERT G. ROSE, MATTHEW REVELS
The US Army's "Army 2030" shift towards division-centric warfighting, which centralizes intelligence, fires, and decision-making, risks repeating the failures of France's interwar _la bataille conduit_ doctrine. This approach misinterprets General Patton's "jazz band" analogy, favoring a synchronized orchestra over decentralized initiative. The Army's current doctrine, optimized for a Chinese joint island landing campaign, requires flexible forces to counter strategic surprise, but Army 2030's centralization impedes brigades' ability to rapidly integrate fires, conduct reconnaissance, and employ engineering assets, sacrificing cohesion and responsiveness. Historical examples, including World War I and II US Army experiences and the French Army's systemic breakdown against German _Schwerpunkt_ tactics, demonstrate the pitfalls of over-centralization. Critically, Ukrainian forces effectively blunted Russian aggression by fighting primarily at the brigade level, assigning artillery batteries in direct support of infantry battalions for rapid fires within three minutes, exemplified by the _Kropyva_ system. This decentralized model, where brigades retain significant organic capabilities and shape their battlespace, contrasts sharply with Army 2030's artificial separation of deep and close fights.
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