The recent US/Israel–Iran conflicts in 2025–26 and Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP in Ukraine since 2022 have intensified concerns regarding the security of nuclear facilities. Gulf states, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, pursuing nuclear energy for economic and energy strategies, must now seriously assess these heightened risks.
While state-level attacks, like those by the US and Israel against Iran's non-operational proliferation-sensitive sites, generally avoid large-scale radiological release, the targeting of energy infrastructure compounds perceived risks. Iran's Bushehr NPP, supplied and safeguarded by Russia and the IAEA, was spared, suggesting environmental considerations. However, NSAGs pose a significant threat, aiming for radiological release, as seen with the alleged 2017 Houthi attack on UAE's Barakah NPP and a 2026 drone strike on its generator. Such attacks, even if not breaching containment, could compromise spent-fuel pools, necessitating mass evacuations. Mitigating risks involves designing proliferation-resistant reactors, like light-water reactors with single-use fuel, and incorporating enhanced safety features such as hardened containment and redundant power systems.
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