The United States' extended nuclear deterrence system, long relied upon by allies in Asia and Europe, is increasingly seen as a bluff due to shifting geopolitical realities and a recalibration of American foreign policy. The Cold War's high stakes made U.S. nuclear war threats credible, but today's regional conflicts, like Russia's threat or North Korea's growing arsenal, do not warrant such risks for Washington.
The Trump administration's "America first" policy further eroded trust, making allies like Latvia, Poland, and South Korea question U.S. willingness to risk its own destruction. Washington must accept it can no longer be a credible nuclear guarantor for all allies. It should support partners in developing autonomous deterrence postures, including acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Options include a nuclear sharing agreement with South Korea, modeled on NATO, or supporting Seoul's independent arsenal. In Europe, modifying NATO's nuclear sharing to increase French and UK control is suggested. North Korea's 50-90 nuclear weapons, fusion devices, and ICBMs threatening American cities, further undermine U.S. deterrence credibility for South Korea. South Korean strategists debate redeploying tactical nukes, nuclear sharing, or pursuing an independent deterrent, with polls showing strong public support.
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