America is still fighting the wrong war

UnHerd | Robert D. Kaplan

After the September 11 attacks, //the United States military's actions in Afghanistan and Iraq seriously distracted its grand strategy, enabling China and Russia to rapidly increase their geopolitical influence without any obstruction. The strategic diversion caused a depletion of American resources and concentration during a key decade which saw exponential growth in the Chinese navy and consolidation of the Russian military.

Based on the triumphalism that followed the end of the Cold War and on the belief that limited humanitarian operations in Bosnia and Kosovo had been successful, US policymakers incorrectly thought that the use of conventional military force could easily establish democracy all over the Middle East. Yet the later, lengthy occupations of Kabul and Baghdad brought the conventional army's administrative machinery to a standstill. This strategic diversion turned out to be catastrophic. As a result, Iran gained power and was able to extend its influence in the region, leading the West into a continuing, generational conflict. At present, the global system is experiencing serious instability since Washington is still deeply preoccupied with Middle Eastern security while at the same time having to deal with resurgent peer competitors.

Comment

The fact that the United States concentrated for so long on counter-insurgency operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom caused important budgetary and intellectual resources to be taken away from high-end maritime deterrence. Although the Pentagon obtained mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles for use in land operations, the People's Liberation Army Navy quickly expanded its surface fleet by introducing Type 052D destroyers. This misallocation of resources has led to a structural shortfall in Western naval procurement, which now limits the US Pacific Fleet.

In particular, the decision to focus on low-intensity conflict caused a shortage of funds for the US Navy's shipbuilding budget, which as a result led to the Zumwalt-class destroyer programme being reduced to only three vessels. It is because of this that the present fleet structure does not have the necessary density of vertical launch system cells to deal with the anti-access/area-denial capability set up by China's Rocket Force in the South China Sea.

Strategic Question for Discussion

What effect does the VLS cell deficit inherited from the cut-short Zumwalt-class programme have on the operational feasibility of US Navy carrier strike 1..roups when operating within the threat area of China's Rocket Force?

The evidence shows that the US Navy will have to depend more and more on distributed maritime operations and unmanned surface vessels in order to disperse its offensive capabilities. Nevertheless, I believe that these temporary solutions are unable to make up for the concentrated firepower of a conventional surface combatant fleet in a severe conflict. As a result of this shortcoming, there will be a need to rely on submarine-launched cruise missiles, which in turn places the tactical responsibility on the undersea area where US acoustic superiority is still maintained.

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