U.S. and Allied Burden Sharing: A Progress Report

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Jerry McGinn and Celia Barrie

Poland, the Baltic states, and Scandinavian nations have increased their defense spending by 71 percent, 134 percent, and 126 percent respectively since 2022 to counter Russian aggression. These dramatic budget expansions reflect a broader shift across European NATO allies, whose collective defense spending has grown by over 50 percent since the invasion of Ukraine.

This rapid rearmament is driven by heightened threat perceptions along NATO's eastern flank and pressure from the United States to improve allied burden-sharing. To support this transition, the European Union launched the 2024 European Defence Industrial Strategy to scale up manufacturing and reduce market fragmentation. Collective deterrence now hinges on industrial capacity. Meanwhile, Asia-Pacific partners like Japan and South Korea are expanding defense investments and pursuing collaborative initiatives like AUKUS to secure critical supply chains. Ultimately, these efforts offer the U.S. Department of War a strategic opportunity to expand international coproduction and technology sharing.

Comment

The European Defence Industrial Strategy exposes a structural friction between sovereign industrial protectionism and collective allied interoperability. While Brussels seeks to consolidate fragmented continental markets, individual member states resist relinquishing control over national procurement pipelines. This protectionist impulse directly impedes the standardisation of critical munitions, such as 155mm artillery shells, across NATO's eastern flank. Consequently, the combat utility of Polish and Baltic artillery units remains constrained by these redundant supply chains.

This fragmentation shifts the burden of logistical sustainment onto Polish and Baltic tactical commanders forced to manage incompatible subsystems during high-intensity operations. Without centralised production mandates, multinational formations like the NATO Multinational Corps Northeast face severe maintenance bottlenecks. Ultimately, these localised supply constraints will prevent the rapid replenishment of Patriot missile batteries and artillery units deployed along the Suwalki Gap.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the European Defence Industrial Strategy fails to overcome national procurement protectionism, how can multinational formations like the NATO Multinational Corps Northeast maintain combat readiness during a high-intensity contingency along the Suwalki Gap?

The current trajectory indicates that failure to harmonise procurement under the European Defence Industrial Strategy will force multinational commanders to rely on ad-hoc, bilateral logistics workarounds. My assessment is that such fragmented supply lines will inevitably create critical maintenance delays for front-line units, severely degrading the defensive posture of the NATO Multinational Corps Northeast. Consequently, the alliance would likely struggle to sustain prolonged defensive operations along the Suwalki Gap without rapid, direct intervention from US-based logistics hubs.

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