Garrett Exner & Amber Smith
When Congress wrote Section 113 of Title 10, a code that outlines the role of the armed forces , it was instituting the belief that former generals should rarely, if ever, lead the Department of Defense . Such appointments were meant to be a last resort.
Yet both the current administration and the previous one asked Congress to waive this law and approve their defense secretary picks, and in both instances, Congress quickly acquiesced. Regardless of the rationale behind each nomination, this emerging trend should not be normalized and needs to be reversed.
In under 18 months, the next president will commence the process of filling out his or her Cabinet with political appointees. Congress should recommit to upholding Section 113, and perhaps consider expanding its scope. This would serve as a departure from the current trend of encouraging more general officers to pursue political careers after their military service.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, for example, who retired from the military in 2016, waited just four years before taking control of the Pentagon. His waiver received overwhelming support, 326 votes in the House and 69 in the Senate. That confirmation came just four years after Gen. Jim Mattis received his waivers with bipartisan support for his nomination for secretary of defense under then-President Donald Trump. It should be noted that several Democrats vowed, falsely, never to support another waiver after confirming Mattis.
If opportunities for general officers to take on political roles become more prevalent, we will see more generals expressing political ideologies in uniform. Just last month, a three-star Space Force general, speaking in uniform at the Pentagon, criticized state laws passed by state legislatures with which she personally disagreed. She even suggested she takes into consideration these laws when determining which officers should serve in certain jurisdictions.
This at a time when the majority of Americans believe the military leadership has already become too politicized and trust in the military as an institution has fallen from 70 % in 2018 to 48% in 2022.
Generals who are tempted to pursue a career as a political appointee after military service will inevitably tie themselves to politicians and partisan agendas at the earliest opportunity. In short, they will become “yes men” instead of the apolitical, strategic advisers they are called to be.
Austin is the perfect example of this trend because he tied his career to then-Vice President Joe Biden during the Obama administration. He worked hand in hand with Biden, orchestrating the disastrous withdrawal of troops from Iraq that precipitated the rise of the Islamic State. Remarkably, he and his team found a way to perform even worse during the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
This lackluster performance, coupled with the absence of any objection to it, should raise concerns for both Congress and the public regarding the willingness of the general officer corps to uphold the proper use of military forces. When Austin’s team failed to plan for an evacuation of U.S. citizens from Afghanistan properly, none of the generals in the chain of command voiced concerns. As a result, 13 Americans were killed, and many of our citizens and allies were abandoned. Austin has not held one general accountable for this failure, the lives it cost, or the nation’s embarrassment.
The Afghanistan debacle also helps highlight a deeper issue: a prevailing military culture that values and promotes mediocrity over risk-takers and innovators — one that ranking officers, especially generals, are beholden to. As Elliot Cohen wrote in 2021, generals are the “product of an all-absorbing institution as total in its way as the priesthood in the Catholic Church.” Therefore, it is fanciful to expect a general to break free from this culture after three or four decades of service and suddenly usher in the much-needed change and reform within the Pentagon.
And make no mistake, reform within the Pentagon is indeed imperative.
Congress has unequivocally acknowledged that the Department of Defense is plagued by numerous problems. Procurement is slow, innovation is stifled, recruitment is in a crisis unseen since the Vietnam era, and there are many antiquated combat systems that need replacement for the nation to prevail in future wars. Hiring another general officer will only perpetuate the same problems, and if the next president nominates a retired general, Congress should reject the nomination outright.
It is time to return to the original rationale behind Section 113 and reestablish an apolitical general officer corps by stripping away the temptation for political roles. Congress should expand the waiver requirement beyond 10 years and begin punishing generals who engage in political charades while in uniform. This year’s National Defense Authorization Act would be the perfect place to accomplish both items.
Garrett Exner is an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute, a member of the advisory council at Veterans on Duty, and a former Special Operations officer in the United States Marine Corps. Amber Smith is a former deputy assistant to the secretary of defense, U.S. Army helicopter pilot and combat veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, and author of Danger Close.
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