Loren Thompson
U.S. Army planners have learned an important lesson from observing Russian tactics in recent wars: if you want to avoid becoming a casualty, you better not stay in the same place for long. The Russians will find you and take you out.
That wasn’t a big concern when U.S. forces were fighting rag-tag irregulars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the focus of military strategy has now shifted to great-power competition, and the Russians are demonstrating what might await American soldiers on future battlefields.
So, mobility and dispersion have become critical to survival, and nowhere is that more true than in the case of tactical command posts.
Command posts are the nerve centers of maneuver warfare, continually sending and receiving intelligence, issuing orders to field units, and assuring that the movements of friendly forces are synchronized.
It is nearly impossible to sustain successful operations in modern warfare without secure command posts that are wirelessly connected to local forces and higher command via satellite links.
However, the traditional approach to establishing command posts in war zones—laboriously setting up tents filled with electronic equipment and tactical specialists—isn’t going to work in combat with a high-end adversary.
Fixed-site command posts won’t survive. If enemy drones don’t find them then monitoring of electronic transmissions will. And once they are targeted, the prospect for continuing successful maneuver operations breaks down fast.
The Army’s answer to this challenge is to ditch the tents and put command elements on vehicles so they can disperse and stay on the move.
The program is called Command Post Integrated Infrastructure, or CPI2, and along with a companion program for integrating previously stovepiped tactical computers, it is the Army’s preferred solution for to sustaining command in high-intensity warfare.
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The Army has been experimenting with new approaches to organizing command-post operations for several years, tapping Elbit and other tech outfits to fashion lighter, more movable systems.
Its program executive office for tactical command and control has recently paused the program, not because there is any doubt about the requirement, but because it wants to make sure it is pursuing the right acquisition strategy.
On November 13, it solicited technical papers from industry that identify ways of making command posts more resilient and flexible in wartime. The challenges are significant:
Command systems must be sufficiently lightweight and compact so that they can be installed on existing combat vehicles such as the StrykerSYK -0.1% troop carrier.
The vehicles must be able to generate sufficient electrical power (around 20 kilowatts) to operate all the necessary equipment.
Once the vehicles are dispersed, they must be able to remain connected via wireless links beyond line-of-sight distances.
The configuration of the mobile command post must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to diverse missions.
The systems used must mesh with the Army’s existing command and control network, because the service lacks the time and money needed to reinvent the whole network.
Bear in mind this all has to be accomplished in a warfighting environment where adversaries will be constantly searching for command posts via multiple methods and trying to electronically jam their links.
The ultimate goal is to field securely connected, mobile command posts that have smaller physical footprints, generate fewer detectable electronic signals, and can be set up or torn down in minutes rather than hours.
The Army figures that much of the equipment needed can be secured from off-the-shelf sources, either within the government or in the commercial world. Even the encryption software may be commercial. But that all has to be determined via experimentation, listening carefully to soldier feedback.
CPI2 will likely be fielded in multiple increments as the Army refines its standards and threats evolve. The end result, though, must be a command-post architecture that can survive the rigors of modern warfare, and given what we have seen of Russian operations in Ukraine, that is a tall order.
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