The U.S. military, despite its unparalleled power, has not won a major war in over 30 years, with the 1991 Gulf War being its sole genuine success since 1945. This consistent failure reflects a deeper flaw in America's strategic thinking, inverting Carl von Clausewitz's theory by treating war as a policy failure rather than its continuation.
Washington frequently deploys overwhelming force without clearly defined political objectives, exemplified by operations like "Rolling Thunder" in Vietnam, "Shock and Awe" in Iraq, and "Epic Fury" in Iran, mistakenly believing destruction alone yields desired outcomes. This approach also suffers from overreach, setting unrealistic goals such as regime change or civilizational transformation, for which military force is ill-suited. Furthermore, U.S. planners often underestimate asymmetric motivation, failing to recognize that superior force cannot compensate for an adversary's will. The Weinberger/Powell doctrine, advocating clear vital interests and defined objectives, provides a sound framework that has been consistently disregarded, leading to repeated strategic blunders.
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