Eighty-five years ago, the Third Reich launched Operation Barbarossa against the USSR, initiating one of history's most destructive conflicts that ended in the mutual near-destruction of Europe's mightiest powers. Hitler's attack, involving 3 million men, 600,000 vehicles, and half a million horses, was based on optimistic assumptions and proved inadequate for Russia's vastness.
Hitler violated Carl von Clausewitz's maxims by dividing forces and deviating from Moscow, notably weakening Army Group Center for Kiev in September 1941. This prevented the German army from reaching the capital before winter. Hitler also disregarded Clausewitz's critique of Napoleon's 1812 campaign, failing to recognize the culmination point. The collapse of German logistics, not a lack of winter gear, caused the December 1941 offensive failure at Moscow's gates. The article debunks the "preemptive attack" thesis, asserting the USSR did not plan an immediate attack on Germany before Barbarossa. Stalin, a pragmatic realist, aimed to avoid or delay war to rearm the Red Army and replace leadership decimated by the Great Purge, with any counterattack plans being retaliatory and defensive.
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