Commercialisation of military space: dual-use risks and opportunities

Global Security and Innovation Summit | Boris Pistorius

The United States Space Force and NATO are rapidly integrating commercial dual-use space capabilities into their operational frameworks to bolster military resilience. This deep commercialisation exposes private operators to unprecedented geopolitical risks, including deliberate targeting, cyber attacks, and signal jamming by hostile states seeking to disrupt Western military defense networks.

European governments are driving this shift by committing over US$109 billion by 2030, including €35 billion from Germany and €10.2 billion from France, alongside major European Union initiatives like the IRIS2 secure connectivity constellation. However, the deployment of an estimated 100,000 satellites by 2030 dramatically increases orbital congestion and collision risks under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which legally attributes commercial space activities directly to their launching states. Consequently, private operators are increasingly compelled to actively participate in multilateral regulatory forums to shape technical standards, establish operational best practices, and mitigate escalating legal and physical vulnerabilities in a contested orbital domain.

Comment

The proximity operations of Russian Olymp-K reconnaissance satellites against Intelsat platforms expose a critical vulnerability in Western space doctrine, which historically separated commercial operations from military deterrence. Under Article VI of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, states bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, meaning hostile actions against private constellations risk triggering direct state-on-state retaliation. This legal attribution drives a fundamental shift in traditional escalation thresholds, as military commanders can no longer treat commercial assets as neutral bystanders.

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