An Explosive Problem: Energetics, Supply Chain Fragility, and US Military Readiness

Modern War Institute  |  Morgan Bazilian, Matt Isler

Holston Ordnance Works in Kingsport, Tennessee remains the sole domestic manufacturer of RDX explosive filler for the United States military, leaving American precision munitions stockpiles vulnerable to severe supply chain bottlenecks. RDX detonates at nearly 8,750 meters per second, but domestic production depends on global precursor chemicals like acetic anhydride and hexamine, which are increasingly dominated by Chinese chemical manufacturing.

To address these vulnerabilities, the US Army funded a $903 million modernized explosives center at Blue Grass Army Depot aimed for 2031 operation and attempted to double Holston's output by July 2028. However, broader manufacturing failures continue to hamper surge capacity; a $469 million plant in Mesquite, Texas failed to produce usable projectile bodies, leaving 155-millimeter shell output at just 36,000 rounds monthly against a 100,000-round target. Concurrently, Russia expanded RDX capacity at its Biysk Oleum facility in Siberia to 6,000 metric tons annually, highlighting how adversary chemical bases set theater-level limits on wartime sustainability.

Comment

Single-source reliance at Holston Ordnance Works highlights a structural mismatch between modern capital allocation and chemical manufacturing lead times. While Congressional funding under the Defense Production Act accelerates physical facility construction, total energetic yield remains bound to upstream precursor chains like acetic anhydride and nitric acid. This single-node vulnerability means that expanding final assembly lines at Blue Grass Army Depot cannot generate additional round volume until multi-tier chemical synthesis networks are synchronised across domestic and allied markets.

The long construction horizons for facilities like the Radford Army Ammunition Plant demonstrate that military munitions capacity cannot function on just-in-time commercial supply principles. Unlike high-rate chassis or electronic assembly, chemical synthesis infrastructure requires years of environmental permitting, specialized machinery, and chemical engineering expertise to reach operational scale. Consequently, precision strike inventories like GMLRS and PrSM face multi-year production ceilings that capital injections alone cannot rapidly bypass.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the US military attempts to scale production for GMLRS and PrSM missiles, which bottleneck presents the more intractable operational constraint — single-node facilities like Holston Ordnance Works or upstream global chemical markets?

The available evidence points toward upstream chemical precursors as the far more restrictive constraint than single-facility capacity. While facilities like Holston Ordnance Works or Blue Grass Army Depot can be expanded with sufficient Defense Production Act funding, foreign market concentration in chemicals like acetic anhydride creates an external ceiling that domestic defense investments cannot directly control.

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