8 August 2026

ASEAN winners and losers in the era of the Hormuz crisis

Asia Times  |  Chris Taylor

The Strait of Hormuz closure severely disrupted Southeast Asian economies, exposing divergent vulnerabilities across the region as energy costs spiked. Indonesia’s rupiah plunged past 1997 crisis levels due to escalating crude import bills, while the Philippines declared a national energy emergency under Executive Order 110 after pump prices doubled relative to neighboring states.

Lacking a strategic petroleum reserve or modernized grid, Manila suffered extreme economic disruption, leaving transit operators striking as fuel costs surged. Conversely, landlocked Laos sustained a 100% diesel price hike before mitigating shortages through a bilateral fuel-for-hydropower agreement with Thailand alongside prospective Russian petroleum shipments routed via Vietnamese ports. Meanwhile, Thailand bolstered its energy resilience and leveraged Chinese military hardware acquisitions, including tanks and submarines, to manage concurrent border friction with Cambodia. Ultimately, regional stability relied less on isolated fuel stockpiles and more on established inter-state dependencies and strategic bilateral trade relationships during external shocks.

Comment
Bangkok’s ongoing cross-border electricity purchases from the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project effectively compelled Thai energy authorities to prioritise refined petroleum deliveries to Vientiane despite domestic supply shocks. This leverage illustrates how critical infrastructure integration generates reciprocal security buffers that offset severe maritime chokepoint vulnerabilities. Concurrently, Beijing's dual export of VT-4 main battle tanks to both Thailand and Cambodia reflects a deliberate risk-hedging strategy designed to retain diplomatic arbitration power along the Mekong corridor. These intertwined energy and procurement dynamics demonstrate that sub-regional security alignment relies on established material interdependencies rather than isolated emergency fuel reserves.

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