Why Al-Qaeda Is Bringing Hamza bin Laden Back

Small Wars Journal | Sara Harmouch and Bruce Hoffman

To mark the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Al-Qaeda has issued a 52-minute video in which Hamza bin Laden is featured, thereby making a strategic move to show continuity even though he is said to have died in 2019. The purpose of this media initiative is to motivate Al-Qaeda's base of Arabic speakers without formally designating a successor to Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The de facto leader, Saif al-Adel, who is still not physically present and may be based in either Iran or Afghanistan, seems to be using the connection to the bin Laden family in order to keep the organisation together. By making use of Hamza's symbolic status, the main leadership avoids having to obtain formal oaths of allegiance, or bay‘ah, from the regionally independent affiliates. Central control over operations has declined as a result. The movement therefore depends on common founding myths to bring in a new generation of recruits who have no personal memory of the 2001 attacks, thus securing the long-term continuation of its global campaign against Western targets.

Comment

The fact that al-Qaeda has not established a formal system for the succession of leadership shows that there is a deliberate strategy regarding command and control aimed at maintaining unity within the organisation. Since Saif al-Adel, the de facto leader, makes use of the symbolic status of Hamza bin Laden, he is able to carry out operational supervision without having to impose the disruptive need for a formal bay'ah on the regional franchises. As a result, highly autonomous branches, for example Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin in the Sahel, can stay in line with the main organisation without having to accept direct administrative subordination.

In the downstream phase, the decentralised command system transfers the responsibility for al-Qaeda's strategic coherence from top-down orders to common ideological narratives. As a result, the central leadership's function is limited to handling the organisation's brand image via media bodies such as the As-Sahab Media Foundation, rather than being involved in directing tactical operations. This change enables the local campaigns carried out by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in East Africa to take place independently at the same time as they remain part of the wider global narrative of the parent organisation.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How can this brand-focused system of command continue if al-Qaeda keeps on relying upon the symbolic authority of Hamza bin Laden rather than naming a formal successor, when regional groups such as Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen come under local political pressures which differ from the organisation's main global narrative?

The pattern indicates that the brand-focused model is still resilient since the regional affiliates obtain local legitimacy through their connection with the global bin Laden legacy. But when the local conflicts in East Africa and the Sahel require more practical political concessions, the gap between the organisation's pure ideology and the actions of the affiliates is likely to grow wider. I believe that this divergence will ultimately lead to having to make a choice between preserving symbolic unity and exercising real operational control.

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