Out of Ammo: A Two-Year Sprint to Rebuild the American Arsenal and Deter China

Council on Foreign Relations | Rush Doshi

The United States Department of Defense faces severe material constraints to deter a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan by 2027, following critical munition depletions during Operation Epic Fury. To close this critical capability gap within a two-year window, Congress and the Pentagon are deploying emergency legislation and administrative directives to rapidly scale precise mass capabilities, including low-cost autonomous drones, sensors, and containerized cruise missiles.

These expendable systems complement high-end legacy platforms like submarines and fighter jets, whose extended production timelines and supply chain bottlenecks prevent immediate expansion. Backed by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth directed $16 billion toward low-cost armaments and created a direct reporting portfolio manager overseeing $53.6 billion in unmanned capabilities. Sustaining credible deterrence ultimately demands prioritizing manufacturing schedule over traditional cost and quality constraints while placing American defense production on an immediate wartime footing.

Comment

The transition toward attrition-tolerant precise mass systems highlights a structural shift in Western industrial capacity, where manufacturing throughput overrides exquisite performance parameters. Contracting mechanisms established under the Defense Production Act demonstrate that high-volume production requires bypassing multi-year testing cycles in favour of rapid iteration. Integrating non-traditional commercial vendors into defense supply chains alters the traditional defense prime contractor model by substituting long-lead specialised components with commercial off-the-shelf hardware. This structural adaptation reflects an admission that peacetime industrial lead times cannot support theater-scale consumption during high-intensity conflict.

Executing high-volume assembly through programs like Gauntlets exposes acute bottlenecks in raw material processing and component sub-tier logistics rather than final assembly capacity. Reliance on commercial supply chains introduces vulnerability to foreign dual-use export controls, particularly regarding sub-tier microelectronics and solid rocket motor precursors. Consequently, the Gauntlets production target remains bounded by sub-tier solid rocket motor supply rather than prime facility throughput.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If programs like Gauntlets successfully shift production to non-traditional commercial vendors, which bottleneck proves more decisive for sustained theater replenishment: sub-tier component access under Defense Production Act authorities or final assembly rate limits?

The available evidence points toward sub-tier component access as the primary systemic constraint. While non-traditional vendors can scale commercial airframe assembly rapidly, critical bottlenecks in solid rocket motor energetics and military-grade microelectronics cannot be bypassed through simplified commercial procurement. Consequently, assembly speed under the Gauntlets initiative will likely outpace the underlying supply chain capacity required to sustain mass production.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here