Ground vs. Air Sensing: India’s Multi-Domain Defence Strategy

Frontier India | Brig Arun Sahgal, PhD (Retired) and Dr. S.K. Vasudeva

India is advancing its multi-domain defence strategy through the initiation of the Netra Mk.2 and Embraer ERJ-145 AEW&C Mk.1A programmes to address a significant airborne early warning shortfall relative to China and Pakistan. This strategic initiative seeks to counter the closely coordinated Beijing-Islamabad intelligence alliance, which has rapidly enhanced its space-based and unmanned intelligence capabilities along disputed borders.

The operational urgency arises from a pronounced imbalance: the Indian Air Force maintains only five airborne warning platforms, whereas Pakistan operates thirteen and China possesses more than thirty such systems. To address this vulnerability, New Delhi is allocating Rs 19,000 crore to retrofit Airbus A321 aircraft with indigenous active electronically scanned array radars and to expand the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System. The effectiveness of ground-based radar is constrained by terrain masking. Therefore, the integration of space-based assets and artificial intelligence is essential to match the advanced orbital and unmanned surveillance capabilities deployed by adversaries along the Line of Actual Control.

Comment

India currently has only five operational airborne early warning platforms, while Pakistan has nine Erieye and four ZDK-03 aircraft. This shortfall creates a serious challenge for India in handling multiple air operations at once. The Netra Mk.2 program, which adds Indian-made radars to used Airbus A321 planes, is an important step to close this gap, but it has been delayed. With the project not expected to finish until 2033 or 2034, the Indian Air Force must keep relying on its older fleet of three EL/W-2090 Phalcon systems, even as Pakistan rapidly modernises its air force with help from China.

Because of these delays, the Indian Air Force has to depend more on ground-based systems such as the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System on the western border. This reliance limits the Air Force’s ability to guide deep-penetration strike missions beyond the radar range of fixed mountain sites along the Line of Actual Control.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Netra Mk.2 delivery timeline slips past 2034, what happens to the Indian Air Force's ability to counter low-altitude penetration along the Line of Actual Control if the legacy EL/W-2090 Phalcon fleet faces maintenance obsolescence?

If the delay continues, India will have to depend more on ground-based passive sensors and tethered aerostats along the Line of Actual Control. Still, I believe these ground systems cannot fully make up for the loss of elevated radar coverage, which could leave gaps for Chinese low-observable platforms to use. As a result, the Indian Air Force may need to move its remaining EL/W-2090 Phalcon assets from the western front, which would raise operational risks along the Pakistan border.

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