Is Taiwan Preparing for a Long War?

Modern War Institute | Rowan Allport

Taiwan concluded its Han Kuang 42 military exercise in August 2026, marking a pivotal shift in its defense strategy toward enduring protracted warfare against a potential Chinese invasion. Rather than relying solely on stopping Chinese forces at the beachhead, Taiwanese military planners integrated defense-in-depth operations, decentralized command structures, and extensive reserve mobilization.

Decades of Chinese military modernization rendered conventional sea and air battles largely unwinnable for Taipei. In response, Taiwan restructured its annual maneuvers into a year-round operational architecture incorporating gray-zone response, anti-decapitation drills, and civilian infrastructure denial. The newly inaugurated Littoral Combat Command deployed truck-launched antiship missiles while ground forces practiced mission command procedures adopted from the United States military. Mass mobilization remains critical. Under Tung Hsin 36, two reserve-dependent brigades were activated alongside urban resilience exercises. Nevertheless, significant gaps persist between simulated exercise capabilities and the vast stockpiles required to sustain a prolonged conflict.

Comment

The adoption of mission command and back-briefing protocols during Han Kuang 42 reflects a deliberate structural adaptation to counter People's Liberation Army electronic warfare and decapitation strategies. By empowering tactical commanders to execute intent independently, the Ministry of National Defense aims to mitigate complete operational paralysis if central command nodes in Taipei are severed. This operational doctrine directly targets the single point of failure inherent in legacy, top-down Taiwanese C2 architectures.

However, operationalising decentralized command across conscript-heavy formations creates severe systemic friction within a military culture historically resistant to subordinate initiative. Delegating engagement authority to junior officers in units like the 269th Infantry Brigade requires extensive, unscripted joint force training that short-duration reserve call-ups cannot easily instill. Without institutionalizing mission command in basic training, tactical delegation across the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency's reserve network risks friction under active PLA bombardment.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor poses the greater obstacle to implementing mission command across the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency's reserve network: rigid institutional culture within the officer corps, or the limited duration of annual reserve call-ups?

The available evidence points toward institutional culture as the more entrenched barrier. While extended fourteen-day call-ups under Tung Hsin 36 increase technical familiarity, junior officers remain conditioned by a risk-averse command hierarchy that discourages independent decision-making. Until exercise evaluators actively reward tactical adaptation during PLA simulated interdiction, mission command will remain a theoretical doctrine rather than an operational reality.

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