Revolutionary Immortality? The Death of Mao, Fifty Years On

E-International Relations | Thomas J. Ward

By applying a practical approach Deng Xiaoping reformed the legacy of Mao Zedong, managing domestic ideological control while at the same time adopting a strategic policy towards the Western countries. The change in policy, which began after Mao's death in September 1976, brought about a shift in Beijing's position from revolutionary isolation to one of active international involvement. This geopolitical change was speeded up by the clash at Zhenbao Island on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, as a result of which Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai decided to seek rapprochement with the United States.

After the arrest of the Gang of Four, Deng brought about the sidelining of Hua Guofeng, who had been designated as Mao's successor, and abolished the dogmatic 'Two Whatevers' policy. The economic reforms that followed, which were summed up in Deng's well-known 'cat' philosophy, changed the poor country without undermining the Chinese Communist Party's political monopoly. The need to preserve the ideology remained absolute. Even though he had to deal with serious domestic crises such as the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Deng kept the party's legitimacy by stating that Mao's leadership was seventy percent correct.

Comment

The move from Maoist ideological purity to Dengist pragmatism shows how doctrinal flexibility enabled the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its rule during the succession crisis after 1976. Having rejected the dogmatic 'Two Whatevers' formula of 1977, Beijing succeeded in avoiding the self-destructive route of continuous revolution. This change enabled the Central Committee to separate economic modernisation from Marxist orthodoxy without undermining the founding revolutionary mythos.

The 'seventy percent correct' formula was used to put the doctrinal reform into practice, thus protecting the Party's central authority from the disastrous campaigns carried out by Mao, such as the Great Leap Forward. By setting this exact ratio, Deng created a precedent according to which failures in tactical policy could be admitted without undermining the general institutional legitimacy of the state. In the end, this approach allowed the State Council to incorporate capitalist market mechanisms while at the same time preserving the Chinese Communist Party's complete political monopoly.

Strategic Question for Discussion

What difference would it have made to the way the State Council handled the economic crises of the late 1980s if the Chinese Communist Party had adopted the 'Two Whatevers' doctrine rather than Deng's 'seventy percent correct' formula?

If the 'Two Whatevers' had been followed, the State Council would most likely have been paralysed and thus the market-oriented reforms needed to deal with the severe poverty left over from the Cultural Revolution would have been prevented. Since there had been no ideological flexibility afforded by the 'seventy percent correct' formula, any departure from Maoist economic planning would have been labelled as counterrevolutionary and this probably would have led to intense factional purges rather than to economic modernisation. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party would have experienced greater systemic instability and this might have accelerated the collapse of its political monopoly during the 1989 crises.

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