9/11 and the Lessons of Small Wars – An SWJ Editor’s Perspective

Small Wars Journal | David Maxwell

Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) showed that U.S. Special Operations Forces are able to counter transnational terrorist groups by giving advice to local forces rather than carrying out direct combat operations themselves. This approach, which is known as a low-footprint one, stressed the importance of respecting host-nation sovereignty and building up long-term trust in order to destroy the extremist networks. The strategic framework was developed as a result of the intelligence failures that occurred in connection with the 1995 Operation Bojinka plot in Manila, where the early warning signs of aviation-based terrorism were not taken into account.

In order to overcome these systemic weaknesses, the United States sent in tactical advisors to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines, focusing their training on the Light Reaction Company. This ongoing involvement was very successful. Seventeen American servicemen lost their lives in the operation, ten of them in the 2002 MH-47E Chinook crash. In the end, OEF-P showed that counterterrorism and foreign internal defence can succeed if they are based on mutual legitimacy, a continuous presence, and local capability, thus providing a viable alternative to large-scale military interventions.

Comment

The way in which Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines was designed shows that the strategy of indirect military action is more effective than direct military intervention. By focusing on securing the support of the host nation, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines avoided the problems associated with foreign military occupation. This method enabled the Light Reaction Company to gain tactical successes without causing a nationalist reaction. The approach proves that sustainable counterterrorism depends on the legitimacy of the local partner rather than on the extent of foreign combat power.

The same doctrinal restraint can be seen in the United States military advisory mission to El Salvador in the 1980s. There, a strict congressional limit of fifty-five trainers caused the MilGroup to concentrate fully on enhancing the institutional capabilities of the Salvadoran forces. In a similar way to the later operation in Mindanao, success in that campaign relied on the professionalisation of the local units rather than on direct American military intervention. As a result, the Salvadoran Armed Forces were able to contain the insurgency of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front by means of their own efforts.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Would the need for the support of the host nation still apply if the partner-centred approach used in Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines is applied to situations involving a highly contested peer adversary, or does the scale of large-scale combat operations make it unnecessary to provide indirect advice?

The way in which modern proxy warfare is carried out shows that the legitimacy of the host nation remains important even in cases of high-intensity conflict, since local forces that have no political credibility tend to collapse quickly under external pressure. Yet the extreme lethality of electronic warfare and precision artillery employed by a peer adversary is probably going to cause U.S. advisors to move from accompanying forces physically to giving advice by means of remote systems. The trend points to the continued relevance of the OEF-P model, but its implementation will have to involve adapting to communication degradations in situations where continuous physical presence can only be achieved through very wide dispersion.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here