Turning the tide: China seeks to set the rules at sea

Brookings Institution | Peter Dutton

China is advancing a coordinated legal and operational strategy to reshape international maritime law and consolidate control over the South China Sea. Reports from the China Institute for Marine Affairs and Chinese foreign policy advisor Wu Shicun signal that Beijing is abandoning its historically passive posture to establish new rules governing international waters.

This strategic shift leverages perceived declines in U.S. Navy readiness caused by protracted Middle Eastern deployments and severely depleted munition stockpiles. Beijing has warned that it may construct permanent military infrastructure at Scarborough Shoal, placing Chinese power projection capability just 120 nautical miles off Luzon and 200 nautical miles from Manila. Power will prevail. Consequently, Southeast Asian littoral states face intensifying operational pressure as Washington’s regional deterrence posture erodes. To succeed globally, Beijing must reconcile its excessive historic claims and illegal straight baselines with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Comment

Beijing's systematic reinterpretation of UNCLOS provisions aims to replace customary freedom-of-navigation rights with a sovereign-permission regime across exclusive economic zones. By institutionalising the Foreign Related Rule of Law initiative, China attempts to codify legal justifications for maritime interdiction prior to expanding physical infrastructure. This legal offensive treats international maritime treaties as dynamic instruments of state power rather than immutable multilateral norms. The strategy seeks to establish domestic legal precedents that restrict foreign military operations within the First Island Chain.

This normative re-engineering relies on creating ambiguity around straight baselines and historic waters claims, similar to Beijing's 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. By asserting administrative jurisdiction over contested maritime features like Scarborough Shoal before initiating dredging or militarisation, China constructs a legal fait accompli. Consequently, ASEAN littoral states face the burden of challenging China Maritime Surveillance enforcement around Scarborough Shoal rather than appealing to UNCLOS arbitration mechanisms.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If China successfully implements its Foreign Related Rule of Law initiative to justify administrative control over Scarborough Shoal, will regional states adapt through bilateral accommodation or seek counter-balancing naval partnerships with external powers?

The trajectory indicates that Southeast Asian claimants will increasingly lean toward bilateral accommodation as Chinese administrative enforcement hardens around disputed features. While multilateral frameworks like UNCLOS offer diplomatic leverage, the lack of immediate enforcement mechanisms leaves littoral states with little choice but to manage operational friction directly with Beijing. Consequently, external naval presence alone is unlikely to deter incremental grey-zone consolidation without binding security guarantees.

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