Military principles endure while changing operational conditions complicate their execution. The war in Ukraine demonstrates how persistent surveillance, unmanned systems, and electronic warfare constrain movement and force concentration. Conversely, Israel established rapid air superiority in its June 2025 campaign against Iran by combining preparation, electronic warfare, and integrated strikes, highlighting how the ability to shape conditions varies across conflicts.
Current NATO doctrine, including the 2025 AJP-3 Edition D Version 1, already incorporates mission command and the manoeuvrist approach, proving that the friction lies not in obsolete doctrine. Instead, the challenge sits between doctrinal intent and institutional capability, where force design, training, and procurement must adapt to modern operating environments. Bridging this gap requires separating enduring military purposes from traditional practices rather than declaring foundational concepts dead.
Doctrinal resilience depends less on the theoretical validity of manoeuvre or mass than on whether force design permits distributed execution under persistent sensor observation. When electronic warfare and overhead reconnaissance compress the window for safe physical concentration, operational tempo relies on generating effects without aggregating vulnerable signatures. Maintaining initiative under these conditions requires command arrangements capable of pushing tactical authority down to formations that must disperse to survive.
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