Seeking to Pry Russia Away from China, the United States May End Up Losing Europe

19FortyFive | Andrew A. Michta

Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a trilateral summit in China with the United States and China to settle the war in Ukraine, intentionally excluding both Kyiv and European allies from the initial proceedings. Reports that the second Trump administration is receptive to this initiative have revived Washington enthusiasm for a "Kissinger-in-reverse" strategy designed to split Moscow from Beijing.

This approach attempts to replicate the 1971 Nixon-era engagement with China to rebalance American great-power competition. Proponents argue that accommodating a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe could free American military resources for the Indo-Pacific theater while opening commercial opportunities in Moscow. Moscow gains elevated international standing. However, critics warn that abandoning European partners creates a pivotal turning point. The gamble risks invalidating NATO cohesion and driving European states toward Chinese sponsorship, ultimately increasing the likelihood of a major conflict in Asia rather than deterring it.

Comment

Bypassing frontline allies in bilateral negotiations destabilises the structural consensus underpinning NATO’s Allied Command Operations. When great powers structure regional security agreements outside formal treaty frameworks, member states on the eastern flank lose faith in the Article 5 collective defence guarantee. The 1971 Sino-American rapprochement succeeded because Washington held no binding treaty commitments with Beijing's regional competitors. Unilateral diplomatic maneuvers regarding Eastern European territorial integrity undermine decades of joint planning at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

A weakened transatlantic consensus directly accelerates hedging behaviour among frontline NATO members. European states will increasingly seek independent bilateral security guarantees or commercial alignments to offset perceived American retrenchment. This realignment undermines integrated air defence networks and host-nation support protocols at key nodes like Ramstein Air Base.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If unilateral diplomatic arrangements bypass Allied Command Operations, which structural mechanism will frontline European states prioritize to maintain deterrence along the eastern flank, and how does that shift affect host-nation support at facilities like Ramstein Air Base?

The pattern suggests that Eastern European allies would swiftly pivot toward sub-regional minilateral coalitions, such as the Bucharest Nine, to secure direct bilateral backing from willing partners. My assessment is that this fragmentation would dilute integrated NATO command structures while forcing operational hubs like Ramstein Air Base to accommodate overlapping, uncoordinated national mandates. Consequently, the cohesion required for rapid reinforcement along the Suwalki Gap would face severe institutional friction.

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