The U.S. Army’s Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV)

Congressional Research Service | Andrew Feickert

The U.S. Army’s Infantry Squad Vehicle, built by GM Defense from a Chevrolet Colorado ZR2 baseline, is a lightweight, unarmoured transport for nine soldiers. In February 2026, the Army raised its procurement objective to 11,582 ISVs, an “exponential” increase from the original 2,065-vehicle requirement, citing soldier feedback and Transformation in Contact experimentation.

The FY2026 budget requests $308.620 million for 1,275 ISVs and associated equipment. The Army also issued a Commercial Solutions Opening on 30 March 2026 for up to 606 heavier ISV-H vehicles with exportable power for mobile command and control. DOT&E found the ISV effective as a troop carrier in permissive environments, though initial testing raised reliability, training and survivability concerns; later testing showed improved reliability. The trade-off is protection. Congress faces questions over fleet size, logistics and the ISV’s effect on the wider light tactical vehicle fleet.

Comment

The ISV’s rapid expansion from 2,065 to 11,582 vehicles makes sustainment the central programme question. A vehicle designed around 90% commercial off-the-shelf parts can be fielded quickly, but its wartime availability depends on civilian supply chains, GM Defense’s production capacity and the Army’s ability to maintain a much larger fleet across Active and Guard formations.

The mechanism is straightforward: mobility is gained by removing armour, payload and protection. The ISV can carry nine soldiers, be carried inside a CH-47 Chinook or CH-53E/K Super Stallion, or sling-load beneath a UH-60 Black Hawk, but it offers less payload than the HMMWV or JLTV and less protection than either. DOT&E’s finding that the vehicle is effective in permissive environments, while its survivability assessment remains unchanged, defines the boundary of that trade-off.

The proposed ISV-H would alter the balance further. Exportable power for mobile command-and-control systems, counter-UAS equipment or mortars could make the family more useful, but it also risks creating separate maintenance lines, different support requirements and pressure on the same commercial supply base. The Army’s light tactical vehicle fleet, including the JLTV and HMMWV, would then need to be planned as one system rather than as separate programmes.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Army proceeds with both the 11,582-vehicle ISV fleet and a heavier ISV-H variant, which will constrain operations more in a contested theatre: commercial supply-chain resilience or the loss of armoured protection?

The pattern suggests that protection will shape employment first, because an unarmoured vehicle limits where commanders can use it once direct fire, drones or artillery are present. Supply-chain resilience then determines whether the fleet can sustain high-tempo operations. My assessment is that the ISV-H could ease the payload and power problem, but it would not remove the basic vulnerability that DOT&E identified in the original ISV.

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